Stephen Biddle
Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1985–1987; Editorial Board Member, Quarterly Journal: International Security
AP Photo
September 2012
"Giving the Surge Partial Credit for Iraq's 2007 Reduction in Violence"
Policy Brief
By Stephen Biddle, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1985–1987; Editorial Board Member, Quarterly Journal: International Security, Jeffrey A. Friedman, Research Fellow, International Security Program and Jacob N. Shapiro
Why did violence decline in Iraq in 2007? Many credit the "surge," or the program of U.S. reinforcements and doctrinal changes that began in January 2007. Others cite the voluntary insurgent stand-downs of the Sunni Awakening or say that the violence had simply run its course after a wave of sectarian cleansing. Evidence drawn from recently declassified data on violence at local levels and a series of seventy structured interviews with coalition participants finds little support for the cleansing or Awakening theses. This analysis constitutes the first attempt to gather systematic evidence across space and time to help resolve this debate, and it shows that a synergistic interaction between the surge and the Awakening was required for violence to drop as quickly and widely as it did.
Winter 2005/06
"Allies, Airpower, and Modern Warfare: The Afghan Model in Afghanistan and Iraq"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 3, volume 30
By Stephen Biddle, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1985–1987; Editorial Board Member, Quarterly Journal: International Security
An in-depth analysis should first be made of the indigenous forces the United States might choose to work with as well as their skill level and motivation. When the latter proves comparable to that of the enemy, then the Afghan model is potentially powerful. When an ally's skill level and motivation is below that of its enemy, however, the model will have little to no effect on transforming defense policy.
