Scott Sagan
Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1981-1982
Experience
Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1981-1982
Current Affiliation: Professor of Political Science; Co-director, CISAC, Stanford University, Stanford, California
Spring 2003
"The Madman Nuclear Alert: Secrecy, Signaling, and Safety in October 1969"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 4, volume 27
By Scott Sagan, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1981-1982 and Jeremi Suri
Recently declassified documents reveal that in October 1969, President Richard Nixon ordered the U.S. military to go on nuclear alert. Nixon’s decision to test his “madman theory” was meant to signal to leaders in Moscow and Hanoi his willingness to do whatever was necessary to end the war in Vietnam.
Spring 2001
"Correspondence: Responding to Chemical and Biological Threats"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 4, volume 25
By Susan B. Martin and Scott Sagan, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1981-1982
Susan Martin counters Scott Sagan’s proposition in “The Commitment Trap” (Spring 2000) that U.S. policy of “calculated ambiguity” is flawed. Sagan responds.
Spring 2000
"The Commitment Trap: Why the United States Should Not Use Nuclear Threats to Deter Biological and Chemical Weapon Attacks"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 4, volume 24
By Scott Sagan, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1981-1982
The author examines Washington's "calculated ambiguity doctrine," which holds that the United States does not rule out the use of nuclear weapons in response to a chemical or biological weapons attack. The author argues that the risks associated with this doctrine outweigh the benefits.



