Scott Sagan
Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1981-1982; Editorial Board Member, Quarterly Journal: International Security
AP Photo
Winter 2010
"Alternative Nuclear Futures"
Journal Article, Daedalus, issue 1, volume 139
By Steven E. Miller, Director, International Security Program; Editor-in-Chief, International Security; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom and Scott Sagan, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1981-1982; Editorial Board Member, Quarterly Journal: International Security
"Our crystal ball is not clear enough to predict with confidence whether the global nuclear future will be characterized by peace and prosperity or by conflict and destruction. But we do believe that the choices made in the coming few years will be crucial in determining whether the world can have more nuclear power without more nuclear weapons dangers in the future."
AP Photo
Fall 2009
"Nuclear Power Without Nuclear Proliferation?"
Journal Article, Daedalus, issue 4, volume 138
By Steven E. Miller, Director, International Security Program; Editor-in-Chief, International Security; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom and Scott Sagan, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1981-1982; Editorial Board Member, Quarterly Journal: International Security
Will the growth of nuclear power lead to increased risks of nuclear weapons proliferation and nuclear terrorism? Will the nonproliferation regime be adequate to ensure safety and security in a world more widely and heavily invested in nuclear power? The authors in this two-volume (Fall 2009 and Winter 2010) special issue of Dædalus have one simple and clear answer to these questions: It depends.
Spring 2003
"The Madman Nuclear Alert: Secrecy, Signaling, and Safety in October 1969"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 4, volume 27
By Scott Sagan, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1981-1982; Editorial Board Member, Quarterly Journal: International Security and Jeremi Suri
Recently declassified documents reveal that in October 1969, President Richard Nixon ordered the U.S. military to go on nuclear alert. Nixon’s decision to test his “madman theory” was meant to signal to leaders in Moscow and Hanoi his willingness to do whatever was necessary to end the war in Vietnam.
April 13, 1983
"Moral Dilemmas and Nuclear Strategy"
Op-Ed, Christian Science Monitor
By Paul Doty, Director Emeritus, Center for Science and International Affairs; Mallinckrodt Professor of Biochemistry, Emeritus, Albert Carnesale, Member of the Board, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Stanley Hoffmann, Editorial Board Member, Quarterly Journal: International Security, Samuel Huntington, Joseph S. Nye, Harvard University Distinguished Service Professor and Scott Sagan, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1981-1982; Editorial Board Member, Quarterly Journal: International Security
"Can nuclear strategy and morality be compatible....[and] can initiating the use of nuclear weapons ever be morally justified?"" asks Harvard University's Nuclear Study Group in a Christian Science Monitor op-ed released.
AP Photo
Winter 2010
"Alternative Nuclear Futures"
Journal Article, Daedalus, issue 1, volume 139
By Steven E. Miller, Director, International Security Program; Editor-in-Chief, International Security; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom and Scott Sagan, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1981-1982; Editorial Board Member, Quarterly Journal: International Security
"Our crystal ball is not clear enough to predict with confidence whether the global nuclear future will be characterized by peace and prosperity or by conflict and destruction. But we do believe that the choices made in the coming few years will be crucial in determining whether the world can have more nuclear power without more nuclear weapons dangers in the future."
AP Photo
Fall 2009
"Nuclear Power Without Nuclear Proliferation?"
Journal Article, Daedalus, issue 4, volume 138
By Steven E. Miller, Director, International Security Program; Editor-in-Chief, International Security; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom and Scott Sagan, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1981-1982; Editorial Board Member, Quarterly Journal: International Security
Will the growth of nuclear power lead to increased risks of nuclear weapons proliferation and nuclear terrorism? Will the nonproliferation regime be adequate to ensure safety and security in a world more widely and heavily invested in nuclear power? The authors in this two-volume (Fall 2009 and Winter 2010) special issue of Dædalus have one simple and clear answer to these questions: It depends.
Spring 2003
"The Madman Nuclear Alert: Secrecy, Signaling, and Safety in October 1969"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 4, volume 27
By Scott Sagan, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1981-1982; Editorial Board Member, Quarterly Journal: International Security and Jeremi Suri
Recently declassified documents reveal that in October 1969, President Richard Nixon ordered the U.S. military to go on nuclear alert. Nixon’s decision to test his “madman theory” was meant to signal to leaders in Moscow and Hanoi his willingness to do whatever was necessary to end the war in Vietnam.
April 13, 1983
"Moral Dilemmas and Nuclear Strategy"
Op-Ed, Christian Science Monitor
By Paul Doty, Director Emeritus, Center for Science and International Affairs; Mallinckrodt Professor of Biochemistry, Emeritus, Albert Carnesale, Member of the Board, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Stanley Hoffmann, Editorial Board Member, Quarterly Journal: International Security, Samuel Huntington, Joseph S. Nye, Harvard University Distinguished Service Professor and Scott Sagan, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1981-1982; Editorial Board Member, Quarterly Journal: International Security
"Can nuclear strategy and morality be compatible....[and] can initiating the use of nuclear weapons ever be morally justified?"" asks Harvard University's Nuclear Study Group in a Christian Science Monitor op-ed released.
Spring 2003
"The Madman Nuclear Alert: Secrecy, Signaling, and Safety in October 1969"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 4, volume 27
By Scott Sagan, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1981-1982; Editorial Board Member, Quarterly Journal: International Security and Jeremi Suri
Recently declassified documents reveal that in October 1969, President Richard Nixon ordered the U.S. military to go on nuclear alert. Nixon’s decision to test his “madman theory” was meant to signal to leaders in Moscow and Hanoi his willingness to do whatever was necessary to end the war in Vietnam.
Spring 2000
"The Commitment Trap: Why the United States Should Not Use Nuclear Threats to Deter Biological and Chemical Weapon Attacks"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 4, volume 24
By Scott Sagan, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1981-1982; Editorial Board Member, Quarterly Journal: International Security
The author examines Washington's "calculated ambiguity doctrine," which holds that the United States does not rule out the use of nuclear weapons in response to a chemical or biological weapons attack. The author argues that the risks associated with this doctrine outweigh the benefits.
