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Tom Sauer
Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1997-1999
May 2011
"U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe after NATO's Lisbon Summit: Why Their Withdrawal Is Desirable and Feasible"
Discussion Paper
By Tom Sauer, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1997-1999 and Bob van der Zwaan, Former Research Associate, Energy Technology Innovation research group/Project on Managing the Atom Project/Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program, 2001–2005
This paper describes how, over the past two decades, the usefulness of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons that are forward-deployed in Europe has gradually declined, and it explains the logic behind their decreased importance.
Winter 2006/07
"Correspondence: The Short Shadow of U.S. Primacy?"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 3, volume 31
By Jeffrey Lantis, Tom Sauer, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1997-1999, James Wirtz, Keir A. Lieber and Daryl Press
Jeffrey Lantis, Tom Sauer, and James Wirtz reply to Keir Lieber and Daryl Press's spring 2006 International Security article, "The End of MAD? The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Primacy."
March, 2002
Beyond the ABM Treaty: A Plea For a Limited National Missile Defense System
Discussion Paper
By Tom Sauer, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1997-1999
With approval rates higher than ever thanks to the war against terrorism, President George W. Bush finally did in December 2001 what he had threatened to do on different occasions but what many others thought - or hoped - was only bluff: withdrawing unilaterally from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Regardless of the rationale or emotions behind or against this decision, it ended a period of uncertainty. Although in principle the Bush administration can still change its mind until June 2002 when the six months withdrawal period expires, most observers believe that this will not happen. Indeed, there are already plans on the table to start building a new test site at Fort Greely in Alaska in the Summer of 2002 that from 2004 onwards could be used as a base for a small ground-based mid-course National Missile Defense (NMD) launch site if needed.
Winter 2006/07
"Correspondence: The Short Shadow of U.S. Primacy?"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 3, volume 31
By Jeffrey Lantis, Tom Sauer, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1997-1999, James Wirtz, Keir A. Lieber and Daryl Press
Jeffrey Lantis, Tom Sauer, and James Wirtz reply to Keir Lieber and Daryl Press's spring 2006 International Security article, "The End of MAD? The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Primacy."
May 2011
"U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe after NATO's Lisbon Summit: Why Their Withdrawal Is Desirable and Feasible"
Discussion Paper
By Tom Sauer, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1997-1999 and Bob van der Zwaan, Former Research Associate, Energy Technology Innovation research group/Project on Managing the Atom Project/Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program, 2001–2005
This paper describes how, over the past two decades, the usefulness of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons that are forward-deployed in Europe has gradually declined, and it explains the logic behind their decreased importance.
Winter 2006/07
"Correspondence: The Short Shadow of U.S. Primacy?"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 3, volume 31
By Jeffrey Lantis, Tom Sauer, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1997-1999, James Wirtz, Keir A. Lieber and Daryl Press
Jeffrey Lantis, Tom Sauer, and James Wirtz reply to Keir Lieber and Daryl Press's spring 2006 International Security article, "The End of MAD? The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Primacy."
March, 2002
Beyond the ABM Treaty: A Plea For a Limited National Missile Defense System
Discussion Paper
By Tom Sauer, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1997-1999
With approval rates higher than ever thanks to the war against terrorism, President George W. Bush finally did in December 2001 what he had threatened to do on different occasions but what many others thought - or hoped - was only bluff: withdrawing unilaterally from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Regardless of the rationale or emotions behind or against this decision, it ended a period of uncertainty. Although in principle the Bush administration can still change its mind until June 2002 when the six months withdrawal period expires, most observers believe that this will not happen. Indeed, there are already plans on the table to start building a new test site at Fort Greely in Alaska in the Summer of 2002 that from 2004 onwards could be used as a base for a small ground-based mid-course National Missile Defense (NMD) launch site if needed.
Winter 2006/07
"Correspondence: The Short Shadow of U.S. Primacy?"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 3, volume 31
By Jeffrey Lantis, Tom Sauer, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1997-1999, James Wirtz, Keir A. Lieber and Daryl Press
Jeffrey Lantis, Tom Sauer, and James Wirtz reply to Keir Lieber and Daryl Press's spring 2006 International Security article, "The End of MAD? The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Primacy."
March, 2002
Beyond the ABM Treaty: A Plea For a Limited National Missile Defense System
Discussion Paper
By Tom Sauer, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1997-1999
With approval rates higher than ever thanks to the war against terrorism, President George W. Bush finally did in December 2001 what he had threatened to do on different occasions but what many others thought - or hoped - was only bluff: withdrawing unilaterally from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Regardless of the rationale or emotions behind or against this decision, it ended a period of uncertainty. Although in principle the Bush administration can still change its mind until June 2002 when the six months withdrawal period expires, most observers believe that this will not happen. Indeed, there are already plans on the table to start building a new test site at Fort Greely in Alaska in the Summer of 2002 that from 2004 onwards could be used as a base for a small ground-based mid-course National Missile Defense (NMD) launch site if needed.
May 2011
"U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe after NATO's Lisbon Summit: Why Their Withdrawal Is Desirable and Feasible"
Discussion Paper
By Tom Sauer, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1997-1999 and Bob van der Zwaan, Former Research Associate, Energy Technology Innovation research group/Project on Managing the Atom Project/Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program, 2001–2005
This paper describes how, over the past two decades, the usefulness of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons that are forward-deployed in Europe has gradually declined, and it explains the logic behind their decreased importance.



