Barry Posen
Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1979-1981; Former Associate, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 1995-2000; Editorial Board Member, Quarterly Journal: International Security
Summer 2003
"Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 1, volume 28
By Barry Posen, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1979-1981; Former Associate, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 1995-2000; Editorial Board Member, Quarterly Journal: International Security
Barry Posen maintains that U.S. military command of the commons--land, sea, air, and space--has enabled the Bush administration to pursue a strategy of "primacy."
Winter 2001/02
"The Struggle against Terrorism: Grand Strategy, Strategy, and Tactics"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 3, volume 26
By Barry Posen, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1979-1981; Former Associate, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 1995-2000; Editorial Board Member, Quarterly Journal: International Security
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have changed the international environment in ways that few would have imagined when the new millennium began. International Security rarely commissions articles, but the extraordinary events of September 11 deserve attention in these pages.
Spring 2000
"The War for Kosovo: Serbia's Political-Military Strategy"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 4, volume 24
By Barry Posen, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1979-1981; Former Associate, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 1995-2000; Editorial Board Member, Quarterly Journal: International Security
Questions continue to swirl around Slobodan Milosevic's decision to pit Serb troops against NATO forces in the 1999 battle over Kosovo. Given NATO's overwhelming military superiority, what motivated the Serb leader to reject the Rambouillet accords and to fight a war that, at least on the surface, Serbia stood no chance of winning? Moreover, why did Milosevic agree to negotiate an end to the war when he did? The author addresses both questions through the "lens of strategy."
