Kelly M. Greenhill
Research Fellow, International Security Program
Contact:
Email: kelly_greenhill@harvard.edu
AP Photo
February 10, 2012
"Dead Reckoning: Challenges in Measuring the Human Costs of Conflict"
Op-Ed, REINVENTING PEACE
By Kelly M. Greenhill, Research Fellow, International Security Program
Determining what is "old" and "new" about conflicts demands attention to how we know what we know. Despite increasing demands for conflict data, as Kelly Greenhill argues in this post, "accurately assessing the human costs of conflict can be difficult at best."
AP Photo
April 21, 2011
"Using Refugees as Weapons"
Op-Ed, International Herald Tribune
By Kelly M. Greenhill, Research Fellow, International Security Program
"In 2006, and again in 2008, Qaddafi extracted from the E.U. additional financial aid and equipment (such as boats) that could be used for migration enforcement. In late 2010, the E.U. and Libya concluded a further £500 million accord, which succeeded in stopping, or at least demonstrably slowing, the flow of people across the Mediterranean — until the outbreak of unrest in Tunisia."
AP Photo
March 2008
"Strategic Engineered Migration as a Weapon of War"
Journal Article, Civil Wars, issue 1, volume 10
By Kelly M. Greenhill, Research Fellow, International Security Program
In recent years, it has been widely argued that a new and different armament — i.e., the refugee as weapon — has entered the world's arsenals. But just how new and different is this weapon? Can it only be used in wartime? And just how successful has been its exploitation?
December 2007
"Ten Ways to Lose at Counterinsurgency"
Journal Article, Civil Wars, The Origins and Effectiveness of Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Strategies, issue 4, volume 9
By Kelly M. Greenhill, Research Fellow, International Security Program and Paul Staniland, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program/Intrastate Conflict Program, 2008–2009
Counterinsurgency is one of the most important topics facing policymakers and scholars. Existing studies of counterinsurgency are very valuable, but sometimes adhere too strictly to sweeping dichotomies and paradigms. This article discusses ten specific mechanisms that lead counterinsurgent governments to squander their generally overwhelming power advantages. This mechanism-based approach can improve both policy and scholarly analysis.
ribena_wrath
May 28, 2007
"'24' on the Brain"
Op-Ed, Los Angeles Times
By Kelly M. Greenhill, Research Fellow, International Security Program
Torture is a staple on the popular show. Are Americans able to separate fact from fiction?
Winter 2006/07
"The Perils of Profiling: Civil War Spoilers and the Collapse of Intrastate Peace Accords"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 3, volume 31
By Kelly M. Greenhill, Research Fellow, International Security Program and Solomon Major
When civil wars are settled through negotiations, some of the parties to the settlement often emerge as "spoilers" and prevent implementation of the accords, thereby plunging a country back into civil war. Potential spoilers will seize upon any opportunity to destroy peace if they find it in their best interest to do so. The key to deterring and defeating spoilers lies in the possession and exercise of the material power to coerce or co-opt them, rather than in the capacity to discern their true character or personality type. By preserving the conditions present at the signing of the accord, by minimizing incentives for spoilers to emerge, and by monopolizing material power, peacemakers can defeat would-be spoilers and maintain the precarious peace in countries torn by civil war.
February 17, 2006
"Don't Dumb Down the Army"
Op-Ed, New York Times
By Kelly M. Greenhill, Research Fellow, International Security Program
"Four decades ago, during the Vietnam War, Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara created Project 100,000, a program intended to help the approximately 300,000 men who annually failed the Armed Forces Qualification Test for reasons of aptitude...Mr. McNamara further concluded that the best way to demonstrate that the induction of New Standards Men would prove beneficial was to keep their status hidden from their commanders. In other words, Project 100,000 was a blind experiment run on the military amid the escalation of hostilities in Southeast Asia."
