Martin B. Malin
Executive Director, Project on Managing the Atom
Contact:
Telephone: 617-496-0432
Fax: 617-496-0606
Email: martin_malin@harvard.edu
Photo by Martin Malin
Summer 2010
"U.S.-China Experts Meet to Strengthen Nuclear Cooperation"
Newsletter Article, Belfer Center Newsletter
By Martin B. Malin, Executive Director, Project on Managing the Atom
In mid-March, the Belfer Center's Managing the Atom (MTA) Project, together with Professor Li Bin of Tsinghua University, convened back-to-back workshops in Beijing on ways to strengthen U.S.-Chinese cooperation across a broad agenda of issues.
December 2012
"A WMD-Free Zone in the Middle East: Creating the Conditions for Sustained Progress"
Discussion Paper
By Martin B. Malin, Executive Director, Project on Managing the Atom and Paolo Foradori, Associate, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program
How can the states of the Middle East begin to create the political conditions for achieving sustained progress toward the elimination of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons? This paper examines the challenges and obstacles that the parties of the region will need to overcome to bring a WMD-free zone into force, and recommends near-term steps for improving regional security.
Press TV
May 28, 2012
"Prospects for a WMD-Free Zone in the Middle East"
Op-Ed, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
By Martin B. Malin, Executive Director, Project on Managing the Atom
As negotiations with Iran over the future of its nuclear program inch toward a possible deal, another intractable Middle East problem with a nuclear dimension is likely to start getting more serious attention. It is the question of whether there is any chance that Israel, Iran, and their Arab neighbors will agree to discuss establishing a regional zone free of all nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and their delivery systems. After decades of backsliding, proliferation, and conflict in the Middle East, the conventional wisdom says the current round of efforts will fail. I think the conventional wisdom is wrong.
www.raceforiran.com
June 8, 2010
"Four Reasons the US Could Get Israel to Talk About a Middle East Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction"
Op-Ed, Christian Science Monitor
By Martin B. Malin, Executive Director, Project on Managing the Atom
Martin Malin articulates four reasons the US could get Israel to talk about a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, even in light of the recent furor over Israel's attack on the Gaza-bound flotilla in an Op-Ed in the Christian Science Monitor.
www.voanews.com
December 5, 2007
"Exchanging Rhetoric for Reason with Iran"
Magazine or Newspaper Article, Metro Boston
By Jason Notte and Martin B. Malin, Executive Director, Project on Managing the Atom
According to Martin B. Malin, executive director of the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, the National Intelligence Estimate's not-so-shocking revelation may give the United States and its European allies greater latitude in their discussions with the Iranian government.
Photo by Martin Malin
Summer 2010
"U.S.-China Experts Meet to Strengthen Nuclear Cooperation"
Newsletter Article, Belfer Center Newsletter
By Martin B. Malin, Executive Director, Project on Managing the Atom
In mid-March, the Belfer Center's Managing the Atom (MTA) Project, together with Professor Li Bin of Tsinghua University, convened back-to-back workshops in Beijing on ways to strengthen U.S.-Chinese cooperation across a broad agenda of issues.
AP Photo
May 31, 2009
"US and China Must Stand Up to N. Korea"
Op-Ed, Boston Globe
By Martin B. Malin, Executive Director, Project on Managing the Atom and Hui Zhang, Senior Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom
"To facilitate enhanced Chinese support for North Korean denuclearization, Washington should also address some of Beijing's security concerns, including US-Japanese missile defense cooperation and sales of missile defense capabilities to Taiwan. The United States and China could also offer one another specific assurances regarding military deployments on the Korean peninsula. Even in the event of a North Korean collapse, the United States has no intention of moving its forces to the Chinese border; it would reduce Beijing's concerns if Washington said so."
AP Photo/Jorge Saenz
March 2012
Progress on Securing Nuclear Weapons and Materials: The Four-Year Effort and Beyond
Report
By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom, Eben Harrell, Associate, Project on Managing the Atom and Martin B. Malin, Executive Director, Project on Managing the Atom
On the eve of the Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul, South Korea, a new study finds that an international initiative to secure all vulnerable nuclear stockpiles within four years has reduced the dangers they pose.
AP Photo/Jorge Saenz
March 2012
Progress on Securing Nuclear Weapons and Materials: The Four-Year Effort and Beyond
Report
By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom, Eben Harrell, Associate, Project on Managing the Atom and Martin B. Malin, Executive Director, Project on Managing the Atom
On the eve of the Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul, South Korea, a new study finds that an international initiative to secure all vulnerable nuclear stockpiles within four years has reduced the dangers they pose.
May 2011
Limiting Transfers of Enrichment and Reprocessing Technology: Issues, Constraints, Options
Report
By Fred McGoldrick, Associate, Project on Managing the Atom, Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom, Martin B. Malin, Executive Director, Project on Managing the Atom and William H. Tobey, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
Fred McGoldrick authored a report, entitled "Limiting Transfers of Enrichment and Reprocessing Technology: Issues, Constraints, Options" that provides an informed analysis and set of recommendations on how to strengthen restraints on the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies in a manner that would be acceptable to all Nuclear Suppliers Group members, and would be credible to the major exporting states and industry.
