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Max Abrahms

Max Abrahms

Contact:
Email: maxabrahms@hotmail.com

 

Experience

Max Abrahms is a Ph.D. candidate at UCLA focusing on the interface of terrorism and international relations theory. He is the author of "Why Terrorism Does Not Work," International Security, Vol. 31, No. 2 (fall 2006) and "What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy," International Security, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Spring 2008). He has published other articles in International Security, Security Studies, Terrorism and Political Violence, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, and Middle East Policy. His research generally analyzes terrorist motives, effectiveness, and counterterrorism strategy.

In 2008-2009, Abrahms will be a pre-doc fellow at CISAC. Abrahms was a research associate at Harvard's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, a fellow at Tel Aviv University, and a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He used to be a commissioned op-ed writer on Palestinian terrorism for the Los Angeles Times. He has appeared as a terrorism analyst on ABC News, Al-Arabiyya, Al-Hurra, Al-Jazeera, BBC, CBS, CNN, Fox News, National Public Radio, and PBS.

 

 

By Date

 

2008

Spring 2008

"What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy"

Journal Article, International Security, issue 4, volume 32

By Max Abrahms

The strategic model—the dominant paradigm in terrorism studies—claims that terrorists are rational actors who attack civilians to achieve political goals. To defeat terrorism, policymakers have sought to decrease its political utility by adhering to a no concessions policy, engaging in political accommodation, and promoting democracy. The evidence suggests, however, that terrorists are not motivated primarily by a desire to achieve political objectives. Rather, they use terrorism to develop strong affective ties with fellow terrorists. Counterterrorism strategies must therefore find ways to diminish the social utility of terrorism.

 

2007

Summer 2007

"Correspondence: Does Terrorism Ever Work? The 2004 Madrid Train Bombings"

Journal Article, International Security, issue 1, volume 32

By William Rose, Rysia Murphy and Max Abrahms

William Rose and Rysia Murphy reply to Max Abrahms's fall 2006 International Security article, "Why Terrorism Does Not Work."

 

2006

Fall 2006

"Why Terrorism Does Not Work"

Journal Article, International Security, issue 2, volume 31

By Max Abrahms

Terrorism may be a choice method of political coercion at the moment, but this study finds that it is not very successful. Terrorists who attack civilian populations rather than military targets fail to achieve their policy objectives, because countries whose populations are victims of massive terrorist violence are highly unlikely to negotiate, let alone make political concessions, with terrorists whose actions imply that they will not compromise.

 

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