Timothy Crawford

January-March 2008

"Wedge Strategy, Balancing, and the Deviant Case of Spain, 1940–41"

Journal Article, Security Studies, issue 1, volume 17

By Timothy Crawford, Former Associate, International Security Program, 2006-2009

It is hard to imagine that any British leader in 1940 — let alone Winston Churchill — would venture to appease another Fascist dictator in Europe. But when it came to British relations with Franco's Spain Churchill doggedly pursued a wedge strategy that hinged on offers to reward and accommodate Madrid. And the results were impressive. As Britain faced the Nazi menace alone in 1940–41, Spain's government remained non-belligerent, despite it's ideological affinity and historical debt to the Axis powers, and despite its opportunity to re-claim Gibraltar and parts of Morocco with Nazi help. This surprising outcome was no minor feat, for Spain's non-belligerence in 1940 had enormous implications for the future course and duration of the conflict. The deviant case of Spain in 1940 is thus important not only because leading alliance theories do not explain it, but also because it made a big difference in the biggest war of the 20th century. This article revisits the history of this critical juncture of the war, and sets forth a theoretical framework for understanding the role of wedge strategy in the case, and in international security more generally.

October 4, 2006

Introduction: Debating the Hazards of Intervention

Book Chapter

By Alan Kuperman, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2000–2001 and Timothy Crawford, Former Associate, International Security Program, 2006-2009

October 4, 2006

Moral Hazard , Intervention and Internal War: A Conceptual Analysis

Book Chapter

By Timothy Crawford, Former Associate, International Security Program, 2006-2009

2006

Gambling on Humanitarian Intervention: Moral Hazard, Rebellion and Civil War

Book

By Timothy Crawford, Former Associate, International Security Program, 2006-2009 and Alan Kuperman, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2000–2001

This volume explores whether the emerging norm of intervention has backfired by exacerbating violence in conflicts such as Kosovo, leading to the unnecessary deaths and ethnic cleansing of innocent civilians.