Mailing address
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
79 John F. Kennedy Street, Mailbox 134
Cambridge, MA, 02138
Boaz Atzili
Research Fellow, International Security Program
Contact:
Telephone: 617-384-8065
Fax: 617-496-0606
Email: boaz_atzili@ksg.harvard.edu
Experience
Boaz Atzili is a research fellow at the Belfer Center’s International Security Program, and he holds a Ph.D. in political science from MIT and the Center for International Studies. He also holds a B.A. in international relations from the Hebrew University in Jerusalem and received fellowships from the Center for International Studies at MIT and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation.
Boaz wrote his dissertation on the effects of the norm of "border fixity", a prohibition on conquest and annexation of homeland territory. In regions where most states are socio-politically weak, he argues, the border fixity norm perpetuates and exacerbates state weakness and generates both civil and interstate conflicts. He shows this to be the case through a comparison across time and space, with cases taken from seventeenth century Europe, nineteenth century South America, and current day Africa and the Middle East.
His publications include “When Good Fences Make Bad Neighbors: Border Fixity, State Weakness, and International Conflict,” Forthcoming in International Security, Winter 2006/07, and “German Security and Foreign Policy in the 1990’s: Change Within Continuity,” Working Papers, The Helmut Kohl Institute for European Studies, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, February 2000. He has also written on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Boaz’s research interests include territories and borders in international disputes and peace, international relations theory and history, the Middle East, and relations between domestic and foreign policy. He served as a First Sergeant in the Israeli Defense Forces.
November 2007
"Peace Process"
Book Chapter
By Boaz Atzili, Research Fellow, International Security Program
"A peace process is a series of persistent diplomatic and political initiatives to negotiate a resolution to a protracted conflict between political entities. The term was first used consistently during the 1970s to describe the efforts to negotiate peace agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Its use has spread since, both geographically and across social categories...."
Summer-Fall 2007
"The Virtues and Vices of Fixed Territorial Ownership"
Journal Article, The SAIS Review of International Affairs, issue 2, volume XXVII
By Boaz Atzili, Research Fellow, International Security Program
Today, territorial ownership of states is essentially fixed, in marked contrast to earlier periods in history. This change has affected states in two very different ways. In regions in which most states are socio-politically strong, fixed territorial ownership is a blessing. It enhances peace, stability, and cooperation between states. In regions in which most states are socio-politically weak, however, fixed territorial ownership is largely a curse. It perpetuates and exacerbates states' weakness, and contributes to internal conflicts that often spill overacross international borders.
Winter 2006/07
"When Good Fences Make Bad Neighbors: Fixed Borders, State Weakness, and International Conflict"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 3, volume 31
By Boaz Atzili, Research Fellow, International Security Program
Since the end of World War II, the international community has regarded territorial conquest and annexation as illegitimate. The resulting norm of fixed borders has reduced external threats to the territorial integrity of many states, but such threats once drove leaders to engage in constructive state building. This norm, therefore, actually does more harm than good in weak states by eliminating incentives to reduce their internal weaknesses. Weak states are now a major source of global violence, generating civil wars that often spill over into interstate conflicts. The war in the Congo is a leading example.
