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Boaz Atzili
Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2006-2008
Experience
Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2006-2008
November 2007
"Peace Process"
Book Chapter
By Boaz Atzili, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2006-2008
"A peace process is a series of persistent diplomatic and political initiatives to negotiate a resolution to a protracted conflict between political entities. The term was first used consistently during the 1970s to describe the efforts to negotiate peace agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Its use has spread since, both geographically and across social categories...."
Summer-Fall 2007
"The Virtues and Vices of Fixed Territorial Ownership"
Journal Article, The SAIS Review of International Affairs, issue 2, volume XXVII
By Boaz Atzili, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2006-2008
Today, territorial ownership of states is essentially fixed, in marked contrast to earlier periods in history. This change has affected states in two very different ways. In regions in which most states are socio-politically strong, fixed territorial ownership is a blessing. It enhances peace, stability, and cooperation between states. In regions in which most states are socio-politically weak, however, fixed territorial ownership is largely a curse. It perpetuates and exacerbates states' weakness, and contributes to internal conflicts that often spill overacross international borders.
Winter 2006/07
"When Good Fences Make Bad Neighbors: Fixed Borders, State Weakness, and International Conflict"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 3, volume 31
By Boaz Atzili, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2006-2008
Since the end of World War II, the international community has regarded territorial conquest and annexation as illegitimate. The resulting norm of fixed borders has reduced external threats to the territorial integrity of many states, but such threats once drove leaders to engage in constructive state building. This norm, therefore, actually does more harm than good in weak states by eliminating incentives to reduce their internal weaknesses. Weak states are now a major source of global violence, generating civil wars that often spill over into interstate conflicts. The war in the Congo is a leading example.



