John Schuessler
Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2006-2007
Experience
Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2006-2007
Current Affiliation: Lecturer, Committee on International Relations, University of Chicago, Illinois
Fall 2010
"Correspondence: FDR, U.S. Entry into World War II, and Selection Effects Theory"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 2, volume 35
By Dan Reiter, Editorial Board Member, Quarterly Journal: International Security and John Schuessler, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2006-2007
Dan Reiter responds to John Schuessler's Spring 2010 International Security article, "The Deception Dividend: FDR's Undeclared War."
AP Photo
Spring 2010
"The Deception Dividend: FDR's Undeclared War"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 4, volume 34
By John Schuessler, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2006-2007
Although leaders are more likely to initiate wars they believe they can win, sometimes they enter conflicts where an easy victory is anything but assured. In such cases, leaders use deception to preempt domestic opposition by shifting blame onto the adversary. The United States' entry into World War II illustrates this argument: by 1941 Franklin Roosevelt welcomed U.S. entry into the war and manufactured events accordingly to avoid opposition that might have prevented the United States from entering the war. In some cases, then, deception may be in the national interest.
