Mailing address
One Brattle Square 527
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
79 John F. Kennedy Street, Mailbox 134
Cambridge, MA, 02138
Website
Tom Bielefeld
Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom
Contact:
Telephone: 617-495-7584
Fax: 617-496-0606
Email: tom_bielefeld@hks.harvard.edu
Website: http://tom.bielefeld.googlepages.com/home
Experience
Tom Bielefeld is a Research Fellow in the Belfer Center's Project on Managing the Atom. His research interests comprise nuclear and missile nonproliferation, radioactive sources security, radiological attack preparedness and response, and nuclear forensic science.
Tom studied physics in Bremen (Germany) and in Swansea (Wales). He obtained his Master of Science degree in theoretical particle physics at the University of Wales. His career in the arms control field began at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (Germany), where he studied missile defense systems and missile proliferation. Until 2006, Tom was a research scientist in the Radioactivity Measurements Laboratory at the University of Bremen, working on radiological terrorism issues and nuclear forensics.
Tom is a research affiliate with MIT's Science, Technology, and Global Security Working Group. He is also co-founder of the Bremen Institute of Technology and Society (BITG) and speaker of its section "Technology Aspects in Security Policy". He is pursuing a doctorate in physics with the University of Bremen.
LLNL
November 20, 2008
"Nuclear Forensics and Its Role in Security Policy"
Presentation
By Tom Bielefeld, Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom
Nuclear forensic analysis is currently discussed as a potentially important new tool to prevent nuclear terrorism by enabling investigators to attribute nuclear materials to their production facility and thus deterring potential state actors from transferring such materials to terrorists. In the seminar, an introduction into the technical possibilities and limitations of pre- and post-attack nuclear forensics will be given, based entirely on open source analysis. This will be followed by a discussion about the roles that nuclear attribution can — or cannot — play in security policy.
Petr Pavelicek/IAEA
July 17, 2008
"The Security of Medical and Industrial Radioactive Sources"
Conference Paper
By Tom Bielefeld, Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom and Helmut W. Fischer
Recent foiled and successful terrorist plots in Europe and the US (including two cases in the UK and Germany which included plans to design radiological dispersal devices in 2004 and 2005), clearly demonstrate that domestic or locally acting terrorist cells have become an important part of the terrorist threat picture. The uncovered “dirty bomb” – plots involved radioactive material of type or quantity that would not have caused much damage. Still, these observations underscore the necessity to revisit the issue of radioactive sources security in countries which may become the target of a radiological attack. This includes in particular countries in Europe, many of which in the past relied on sophisticated — but safety centred — regulations and functioning oversight institutions.
July 2007
"Reducing Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism Threats"
Conference Paper
By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom; Co-Principal Investigator, Energy Research, Development, Demonstration, and Deployment (ERD3) Policy Project and Tom Bielefeld, Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom
Urgent actions are needed to prevent a nuclear or radiological 9/11. Terrorists are actively seeking nuclear weapons and Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDDs) and the materials to make them. There are scores of sites where the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons exist, in dozens of countries worldwide. There are thousands of sites worldwide where radiological materials exist. Many of these sites are not sufficiently secured to defeat the kinds of threats that terrorists and criminals have demonstrated they can pose. A dangerous gap remains between the urgency of the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism and the scope and pace of the U.S. and world response. While the gap has narrowed significantly in recent years, much more needs to be done. This paper describes the nuclear and radiological terrorism threats, analyzes the actions taken so far to address these threats, and recommends further actions going forward.
July/August 2007
"The Khan Job"
Magazine or Newspaper Article, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, issue 4, volume 63
By Tom Bielefeld, Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom and Hassan Abbas, Senior Advisor, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
Tom Bielefeld and Hassan Abbas review Der Physiker der Mullahs (The Mullah's Physicist), a film by Egmont R. Koch, broadcast on German Public Television (WDR) on February 22, 2007.
Spring 2007
"Security and Damage Potential of Commercial Radioactive Sources"
Journal Article, Journal of Nuclear Materials Management, issue 3, volume 35
By Tom Bielefeld, Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom and Helmut W. Fischer
MTA/ISP fellow Tom Bielefeld and his co-author Helmut Fischer focus on the problem of protecting radiological sources, preventing a “dirty bomb” attack, and putting measures in place to mitigate the effects should an attack occur.
