Winter 2006/07
"The Perils of Profiling: Civil War Spoilers and the Collapse of Intrastate Peace Accords"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 3, volume 31
By Kelly M. Greenhill, Research Fellow, Intrastate Conflct Program/International Security Program and Solomon Major
When civil wars are settled through negotiations, some of the parties to the settlement often emerge as "spoilers" and prevent implementation of the accords, thereby plunging a country back into civil war. Potential spoilers will seize upon any opportunity to destroy peace if they find it in their best interest to do so. The key to deterring and defeating spoilers lies in the possession and exercise of the material power to coerce or co-opt them, rather than in the capacity to discern their true character or personality type. By preserving the conditions present at the signing of the accord, by minimizing incentives for spoilers to emerge, and by monopolizing material power, peacemakers can defeat would-be spoilers and maintain the precarious peace in countries torn by civil war.
