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**U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE CASPIAN REGION:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION**

By Brenda Shaffer



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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

As the Bush Administration assesses how to best promote U.S. national interests through its policies toward the Caspian region, it could benefit from considering the following policy proposals and guidelines and taking note of a few lessons derived from the results of the previous Administration's policies.¹ The resources of the Caspian region can make an important contribution to United States energy security. However, the importance of the region extends beyond energy; extensive ties with the states of the Caspian region can contribute to improvement of Washington's relations with the Muslim world and encourage U.S.-oriented regimes and open societies. In order to better advance these aims, the U.S., first and foremost, needs to conduct a comprehensive and coherent policy.

The U.S. should continue to promote the peaceful resolution of the conflicts in the region (in this area, the Bush Administration should be commended for its efforts to help resolve the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict). The U.S. should continue to conduct a policy that is cooperative with Russia and not allow the area to become a zone for U.S.-Russian rivalry. At the same time, the U.S. should be firm in its commitment to uphold the independence of the states of the Caspian region and resist potential Russian attempts to compromise that independence.

¹ The opinions in this brief are those of the author alone. She would like to acknowledge the extensive contributions of Emily Van Buskirk and Melissa Carr, as well as thank Graham Allison, Fiona Hill, Peter Rutland and C. Maury Devine for their important comments, and Seth Jaffe for editorial assistance.

THE CASPIAN REGION: ADVANCEMENT OF U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS

A number of U.S. national interests can be advanced through the successful articulation of policies in the Caspian region, which is understood to encompass the Caspian littoral states (Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan) as well as neighboring states that belong to the security and energy transport picture of the sea basin (Georgia, Armenia, Turkey, and Uzbekistan). These interests are:

1. **Viability and stability of global energy supplies and diversification of supply from areas other than the Persian Gulf.** As President Bush has noted: "Diversity is important, not only for energy security but also for national security."² Caspian discoveries are at least equal to and may prove larger than those in the North Sea. The Caspian's resources are located in countries possessing predominately pro-Western orientations that are not currently members of OPEC. The addition of Caspian oil could weaken the OPEC monopoly, providing greater leverage over the pricing policies of Saudi Arabia and other OPEC countries, ultimately contributing to lower world oil prices.
2. **Promotion of the well being of Turkey, an important U.S. ally, now in the midst of a financial crisis.** Ankara is trying to

²Remarks of President George Bush to the Capital City Partnership, St. Paul, Minnesota, May 17, 2001, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/05/20010517-2.html>.

build influence in and derive economic benefit from cooperation with the Caspian region, especially in the energy sphere. Turkey's economy can profit from the transit of Caspian oil and gas through its territory, and from access to this energy source.

3. **Improved relations with the Muslim world.** The United States has problematic relations with a large portion of states in the Muslim world. With the Soviet demise, a tremendous opportunity was created for the U.S.: the establishment of six new states whose majority population is Muslim, most of whom strive for close association with the West and increased cooperation with the U.S. Through strong relations with the Muslim states in the Caucasus and Central Asia, the U.S. can decisively signal that it is not interested in a conflict with the Muslim world as a whole. Moreover, through strengthening the independence of these Muslim states—many of which have made progress toward democratization and have a clear separation between religion and state—the U.S. might encourage these trends in the broader Muslim world.
4. **Promotion of U.S. economic interests.** American companies and U.S.-based multi-national companies have invested significant funds in the Caspian region, especially in the development of energy resources. Good political relations with the states of the region provide important support for American investments and encourage the growth of these investments. U.S. legislation establishing the transparency and legality of U.S. companies' actions abroad serves as a good example for local states and also helps to promote these practices.
5. **Promotion of the independence of the states in the Caucasus and Central Asia; their successful democratization; and general peace, stability and prosperity in the region.** The emergence of a group of independent, democratic, and

prosperous states with pro-American orientations would only serve to enhance U.S. security, removing potential future trouble spots that could embroil us.

HOW TO PROMOTE U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS IN THE CASPIAN REGION

The Clinton Administration recognized the importance of the Caspian region in the promotion of America's national interests and developed certain key policies targeted at advancing those interests. However, its policies often compromised the goals they set out to achieve. For instance, the previous administration declared its support for the designation of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan as the "Main Export Pipeline" (MEP) for Caspian oil, primarily as a means of reinforcing the independence of the states of the region. Unfortunately, maneuvers around the pipeline and Russian-U.S. rivalry over energy politics complicated conflict resolution efforts in the Caucasus, destabilizing the region and actually endangering the independence of certain Caspian states. Moreover, Washington failed to invest sufficient resources in solving regional conflicts and in developing methods to limit Russia's opposition to the proposed pipeline. Essentially, the manner in which Washington implemented its policies was at times at odds with the goals that Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan was originally meant to promote.

In many instances, Washington failed to coordinate its disparate policies and consequently sent mixed signals. For example, the Clinton Administration publicly declared the importance it attached to relations with the states of the region, especially Azerbaijan. Yet, in the sphere of concrete actions, the previous administration did little to waive or combat the sanctions imposed by Congress on Azerbaijan in the form of Section 907. Baku is clearly orientated toward the U.S. and vigorously promotes U.S. policies in the region; but at the same time, the country suffers under U.S. sanctions, a fact not lost on the Azerbaijani people at a grassroots level. Such contradictions create confusion and

disappointment for the Caspian states, especially since there is little popular understanding of the dynamics of the U.S. foreign policy process, the role of Congress, and the influence of U.S. domestic constituencies. **Credible commitments are crucial in this region, as they are everywhere.** It would be better to create no expectations for U.S. involvement than to disappoint local governments and their peoples.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. **Increase diplomatic efforts and encourage financial investment to promote the flow of Caspian energy resources along an East-West corridor (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan).** In order for Caspian oil to make an effective contribution to diversification of energy sources, it must flow to world markets via multiple routes, including an east-west pipeline. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline will ensure that a large portion of Caspian oil flows through non-OPEC countries and countries that do not have competing interests (Russia and Iran both have extensive oil and gas supplies). As President Bush pointed out, "Over dependence on any one source of energy, especially a foreign source, leaves us vulnerable to price shocks, supply interruptions, and, in the worse case, blackmail." President Bush's task force on energy security, led by Vice President Cheney, recommended that the U.S. step up efforts to develop export routes; it also specifically called on the President to direct the Secretaries of Commerce, State and Energy to "support the BTC oil pipeline as it demonstrates its commercial viability," and to work with companies and countries to establish the conditions necessary for BTC to materialize.³

The building of this pipeline serves a number of key U.S. strategic goals, foremost energy security, and it additionally promises

to bolster the political independence of Caspian states. The U.S. government must continue to appreciate the fact that BTC is not solely a private economic project; there are geopolitical stakes involved as well.

2. **Promote the establishment of arrangements and infrastructures for the creation of regional gas supplies in the South Caucasus.** Significant new gas supplies have recently been discovered in the Caspian region, especially in Azerbaijan. With Azerbaijan's agreement, the U.S. should promote the construction and revitalization of pipelines for the utilization of some Caspian gas resources to supply the states in the South Caucasus, potentially as part of a Nagorno-Karabagh settlement package. The U.S. should also encourage the World Bank to devote resources to this project and to facilitate investment from other states. Use of local gas supplies can enhance regional security and stability by lessening the region's dependence on Iran and Russia for electricity and heating, eliminating a source of vulnerability to political dictates.

3. **Attempt to communicate clearly with Russia about U.S. policies in the region, explaining the target of certain measures (such as Iran), and clarifying that the exclusion of Russia is not the objective of American policies.** The U.S. is capable of crafting a comprehensive policy that keeps the Caspian region from becoming a zone of U.S.-Russian rivalry, decreasing tension in the region. U.S.-Russian relations in the region can be converted from a "win-lose" to a "win-win" situation for both states. For example, efforts can be made to encourage Russian corporate involvement in East-West pipeline projects, increasing the likelihood of these projects' becoming actual and providing economic benefits to Russia. It should be made clear to Moscow that pipelines that avoid the Bosphorus, such as BTC, actually serve Russian interests; they avoid additional traffic in the straits and thus avert a potential challenge to the free passage regime in place, the preservation of

³ *National Energy Policy*, Report of the National Energy Policy Development Group, May 2001.

which is viewed by Moscow as a vital national interest.

4. Invest diplomatic capital to solve the conflicts that afflict the Caspian region, especially the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict.

Secretary of State Powell should be applauded for the investment he has made in a peace settlement for Nagorno-Karabagh as one of the first major foreign policy initiatives of the new Administration. As Secretary Powell pointed out, "A peaceful settlement is key to the future of the South Caucasus and the greater region."⁴ These efforts should continue and in full cooperation with Russia, if possible.

5. Promote security arrangements in the Caspian region that Russia perceives as compatible with its interests, and thus has a stake in preserving rather than undermining. Washington should strive to co-sponsor security arrangements and peace efforts in the region with Russia while developing structures that Moscow will perceive as at least minimally beneficial. Much of the instability that has plagued the region has resulted from the actions of rival powers: among them, the U.S., Russia, Iran and Turkey. In the early 1990s, Moscow's activities contributed to the escalation of many local disputes in the region to all-out wars.

Overall, Russia is strategically inferior to the U.S., but in the Caspian region, Moscow retains levers of influence that the U.S. cannot, or is not, willing to apply: i.e., Russian "relevant" versus American "relative" power. Moreover, some actions are available to Russia at much lower costs than they are to the U.S., such as the use of military troops. Certain policies, like obstructing U.S. pipeline plans, cost Russia less to implement than they cost the U.S. to undo or reverse. The applicable resources that Russia has at its disposal in the Caspian

region—for instance, destabilization through local forces or even the introduction of military troops—must enter into U.S. calculations in assessing Russia's potential actions in the Caspian. Actions resulting from U.S.-Russian rivalry can be very destabilizing to the region and, as a result, contrary to U.S. goals. Attempts by the U.S. to push Russia out of the region would be equally destabilizing. Russian-U.S. cooperation in the Nagorno-Karabagh peace negotiations contributed to the talks' success.

6. At the same time, fulfill U.S. commitments to the states of the region to help them preserve their independence, and simultaneously find ways to constructively deter Russia from undermining these states' interests. Secretary Powell stressed this point when referring to the U.S. commitment to the independence of the Republic of Georgia during his appointment hearing. Moreover, the U.S. must prevent Moscow from taking advantage of the peace process being conducted between Armenia and Azerbaijan as a means of forcing the redeployment of more Russian forces in the Caucasus. The U.S. should oppose the use of Russian forces for any long-term peacekeeping missions in the Caucasus. **Overall, a permanent foreign peacekeeping contingent of any composition should be avoided in the Caucasus.**

7. Make a serious effort to conduct a consistent, clear, and coordinated policy.

In Congressional hearings, State Department representatives have referred to Azerbaijan as one of the "cornerstones of U.S. policy in the Caspian region," while, at the same time, the U.S. Congress enacted legislation that bars direct government assistance to Azerbaijan. One of the important ways to achieve consistency in policies directed toward the region would be for the Executive to seek the repeal by Congress of Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act or to seek changes in, waive, or circumvent this

⁴ Remarks by Secretary of State Powell, Key West Florida, April 3, 2001. U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman.

legislation as much as legally possible.⁵ Section 907 is prejudicial towards Azerbaijan—which has expressed a willingness to conduct a pro-American foreign policy—and projects an inconsistent U.S. policy toward the region. Moreover, if Azerbaijanis had the opportunity to participate in more U.S.-sponsored training programs and initiatives, the security of the region as a whole (including Armenia) would improve. Mixed signals and the corresponding disappointment resulting from the lack of consistent support from the U.S. have led to the emergence of the first buds of anti-Americanism in Central Asia and the Caucasus. The U.S. must work to curb this development, and preserve its own credibility by following through with its commitment to the independence of these states.

- 8. Place less emphasis on religious identity when assessing policies and coalitions in the Caspian region.** Religion is only one facet of identity in the Caspian region. Ethnic, state, regional and other identities are extremely important. Most of the states of the region are overwhelmingly secular, and religion need not serve as a divide between the U.S. and these countries. Overemphasis on the Muslim factor by American policymakers has led to erroneous assessments and poor policy choices over the last decade. For example, the U.S. mistakenly assumed that Russia would cooperate with Washington in restraining Iranian efforts to obtain nuclear weapons,

⁵ Section 907 prohibits U.S. assistance (with the exception of humanitarian assistance and assistance for nonproliferation and disarmament programs) to the government of Azerbaijan under the Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets Support Act of 1992 (also known as the Freedom Support Act) “until the President determines, and so reports to the Congress, that the Government of Azerbaijan is taking demonstrable steps to cease all blockades and other offensive uses of force against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh.” The legislation imposes sanctions only on Azerbaijan, despite the fact that both Armenia and Azerbaijan waged a war over the territory of Nagorno-Karabagh.

due in part to Russian fears of Iranian-sponsored Islamist activities. Additionally, the U.S. failed to correctly read Iran’s policies in the South Caucasus and Chechnya, wrongly assuming that Tehran would back Muslim actors. The U.S. has often attached too much importance to religious identity, and often attaches religious motivations to various national movements: for instance, in Chechnya, the conflict was described as being between “Russian” soldiers and “Islamic” rebels.

- 9. Changes in Iran that may emerge in the coming months could allow a more cooperative relationship to develop between Tehran and Washington. In efforts to renew cooperation with Iran, Washington should be careful not to compromise the interests or independence of states like Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan—which have been very cooperative with Washington on its Iran policy.** Specifically, Washington should not reshape its pipeline policy with the intent of suiting Iran’s preferences. In addition, it should discourage European governments from adopting policies compromising the interests of Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan. As a result of U.S. encouragement, some Caspian states have stood up to Iran (e.g. barring Iran’s participation in some energy projects, supporting ILSA, and foiling Iranian proliferation attempts), often at the expense of aggravating their relations with Tehran. These states received only minimal concrete rewards from the Clinton Administration despite their pro-U.S. orientation and support for Washington’s policies in the area. The U.S. should continue to devote significant efforts to developing its cooperation with Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan and should assist these states in thwarting subversive efforts by Iran.
- 10. Work to contain and reduce the implications of the Afghanistan conflict, which is a source of actual, and in the future, potentially increasing instability in the Caspian region and the Middle East.** The conflict situation allows Afghanistan to

serve as center of terrorist operations against U.S. targets and its allies in the region and beyond. The Afghan issue provides an opportunity for U.S. cooperation with both Russia and Iran, because the central interests of the three states are congruent: checking the threats from the Taliban, halting drug trafficking, lessening the danger of spillover, destroying terrorist operation bases and stemming the flow of refugees. Together, as a basis for further cooperation, the three states could conduct activities aimed at improving the situation in Afghanistan.

- 11. Recognize the extensive Turkish domestic opposition to expanded traffic through the Bosphorus and design responsive policies that can reduce chances of accidents. Moreover, the Administration should identify the Bosphorus question as a potential future hot topic and work to prevent it from developing into a source of conflict between states in the region.** Currently, opposition is becoming more vociferous in Turkey that increased tanker flow in the Bosphorus will lead to accidents that could endanger large numbers of people in Istanbul and cause environmental disaster. The flow of high volumes of Caspian oil through the Turkish straits would lead to increased traffic and a corresponding increase in the chance of accidents. Turkey cannot legally regulate the flow of traffic in the straits or obstruct the “free passage regime” which was established by the 1936 Montreux Treaty.

President Bush’s energy task force recognized the importance of this issue, stating in its report, “Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan will help mitigate maritime risks in the crowded Bosphorus Straits.” BP Amoco and Shell have recently expressed recognition of the potential environmental and safety hazards of increased tanker traffic in the Bosphorus, and are aware that they cannot easily disregard this Turkish concern. Chevron has made important efforts and adopted, on its own accord, regulations that increase the safety of its tankers. Efforts to

diminish the threat of environmental accidents should be increased.

- 12. Alter the thrust of U.S. democratization programs in the region to emphasize the establishment of open society infrastructure (e.g. wide internet access, independent press and an independent and qualified judiciary), while recognizing that local leadership must guide these democratization efforts. Democratization is a long process. Elections and election monitoring should not be the focal point of the whole democratization policy nor should they be the only barometer of success.** Heavy emphasis on election monitoring has contributed to a public cynicism about elections. Democratization should instead be geared towards long-term goals. The U.S. must be perceived as a friend in the democratization process, and commend the positive steps in this regard whenever possible. The previous Administration often recognized progress by making more demands, creating confusion and animosity among the governments in the region. Moreover, foreign election monitoring created wide resentment in Central Asia and the Caucasus; alternative programs supporting the rule of law and infrastructure for information exchange would better promote democratization and produce less local resentment.

- 13. Increase people-to-people exchange initiatives, professional development opportunities, and specialized training programs with each of the countries of the region.** National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice explicitly made this excellent recommendation in her *Foreign Affairs* article of January 2000. The U.S. should create opportunities for Americans and the various peoples of the region to learn more about each other and each other’s countries: opportunities for educational, cultural, business, and other types of partnerships and collaboration. Interactions among citizens and civil societies, combined with strong economic relations, are key

pillars in good bilateral relationships. These pillars, or contact points, are critically important as fall-back relationships in times of misunderstandings when formal government to government contact and/or security relationships are strained.

14. **The U.S. should support and focus some of its resource allocation for the continued development of local and provincial zones of trade as well as the cross-border cooperation that is on the rise despite the many obstacles on the state-to-state level.** Examples of such trade and cooperation can be found between Armenia and Turkey, Azerbaijan and Armenia (taking place in Georgia), and Azerbaijan and the Azerbaijani-populated provinces in Iran. Establishing these trade and economic ties encourages peace, the flow of ideas, and general cooperation in the region. The U.S. should also promote investment to these regions, drawing on the success stories that already exist, while simultaneously pushing for more cooperation through technical assistance and conferences in the region on cross-border trade.

POLICY GUIDELINES

In conducting its policy in the region, Washington should consider the following factors:

- **It is easy to ruin U.S. credibility in the region and difficult to rebuild it.** The Bush Administration should be careful not to make quick or dramatic shifts in what have been cornerstones of the previous administration's policies. If the U.S. removes support for 'cornerstone' policies, Washington will only damage its credibility and find it more difficult to build future partnerships. Major policy shifts will cause confusion in the region, especially since local regimes have taken great risks to be good partners with America. Before Washington makes a major shift on any of its Caspian policies, it must factor in the costs to U.S. credibility; credibility will decisively impact the efficacy of future U.S. efforts to mobilize support for, and trust in, American policies. Policy officials in the Caspian region were disturbed to learn through the press about some of the U.S. reorganization measures in the government bodies and personnel dealing with the region. Senior U.S. officials prior to implementation of these changes can easily avoid such damage in the future by providing direct and thorough explanations of proposed changes to the representatives of the states of the region.
 - **The U.S. should continue to give careful thought to the names and labels it uses to refer to the states of the Caspian region and to the structure and names of the divisions within the government agencies that deal with these states. The U.S. should not use names that emphasize the regional states' former status as part of the USSR.** In the recent past, the U.S. labeled the Caspian states the "Newly-Independent States (NIS)," or the "Former Soviet Union," as if their independence even after 10 years is still conditional. Furthermore, in many U.S. government offices, the countries have been dealt with in the framework of departments dealing predominately with Russia, signaling that the U.S. related to these states through the prism of Moscow.
- The Bush Administration has taken commendable steps in the National Security Council to change the organization of the department dealing with the Caspian states, and placed them in the NSC as part of a directorate that includes Turkey. There have been similar efforts in the State Department to reassign the departments working on this region. Offices for Central Asia and the Caucasus should be placed within the major U.S. Government agencies responsible for foreign relations, as part of a single division. In addition, in agencies where these labels remain, the U.S. should change the names of the departments dealing with the Caspian region, removing the labels "Newly Independent states" or "Former Soviet

Union” and replacing them with alternatives: Central Asia and the Caucasus, the Caspian Region, or the Black Sea Region are potential substitutes. The U.S. could also place the region’s states in combinations with other countries in divisions labeled European, Eastern European, or Eurasian.

IMPORTANT UPCOMING EVENTS

1. **Summer 2001: Potential increased social and political turmoil in Iran.** Grass roots political activity in Iran is generally greater in the summer. Clashes with anti-reform elements may emerge as the result of the heightened political activity in connection with the recent June 8th presidential elections. Moreover, President Khatami has shown special interest in foreign policy activity toward the Caspian region and Russia; encouraged by his newly extended mandate, he may initiate policy advances toward the region in the near future.
2. **Summer/Fall 2001: Russian-Iranian cooperation in fields that enhance Iranian ability to acquire weapons of mass destruction and missile production.** In recent months, both Russia and Iran have reiterated their commitment to further cooperation in the military sphere. During Khatami’s visit (March 2001) to Moscow, he expressed explicit interest in further collaboration in the field of ballistic missile development. New developments in Russian-Iranian military cooperation may obligate the U.S. to take more assertive actions, which could lead to heightened tension between Moscow and Washington, straining U.S.-Russian cooperation in the Caspian region and contributing to general instability.
3. **Summer/Fall 2001: Activity in the peace process on the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict.** In April, the U.S. hosted a significant and high profile OSCE sponsored summit for the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan, which was reportedly extremely

successful, in advancing the peace process between the two sides. At the end of that round of negotiations, the co-chairs announced that a second summit would take place in June, though this date was subsequently postponed, presumably due to failure to further advance the peace process. Great expectations are linked to the recent negotiations. **Failure to achieve an effective agreement could trigger renewed violence between Azerbaijan and Armenia, perhaps even war.** The U.S. should continue and intensify its efforts to promote peace in the region. Successful negotiations will demand increased Western assistance and involvement in the implementation of the peace accord, including efforts (funding, coordination) for refugee resettlement and the construction of roads and other infrastructure. The U.S. and agencies like the World Bank should prepare for immediate action to consolidate the peace if an agreement is reached.

4. **Summer 2001: Possible renewed confrontations among the government forces in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan and subversive elements, such as the IMU.** These developments should be monitored closely.
5. **August 2001/Ongoing: Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (ILSA) renewal vote in Congress.** It is not expected that Congress will cancel ILSA this year, especially since little change has occurred in regards to Iran’s programs to achieve weapons of mass destruction and its support for terror against American targets and against its allies.

While highly unlikely, removal of ILSA legislation would be interpreted by the states of the region as a major U.S. policy shift with strong implications for the depth of relations with the Caspian countries specifically and for U.S. pipeline policy on Caspian energy resources more generally. If changes become imminent, the U.S. should update and consult with the states of the region on the implications of new legislation. Policymakers in the region

should not be initially informed through the press or briefings before the general public.

The National Energy Policy Development Group recommended that the President establish a task force to review sanctions policies. The task force will at some time make recommendations concerning U.S. sanctions against Iran.

6. **Ongoing:** If Russia continues to exert pressure (through mechanisms such as the visa regime, or cutting off electricity supplies); or escalates in its aggression toward Georgia; or increases indirect or begins direct support for the separatist forces

in Abkhazia, Ossetia, and Ajaria, the U.S. Administration may need to respond. Russia may even use this case as a test of the new U.S. Administration's resolve to protect the independent interests of the former Soviet states.

Our research team at the Caspian Studies Program continues to track these events and developments, and welcomes involvement in the continued debate about the evolution and articulation of U.S. policy toward this strategic region. We hope for increasing cooperation and interaction between the policy and academic communities to ensure a broadly successful and effective U.S. policy.

The **Caspian Studies Program** seeks to locate the Caspian region on the maps of the American policy-making community as an area in which the U.S. has important national interests and where U.S. policy can make major differences. Through its research and teaching, the Caspian Studies Program raises the profile of the region's opportunities and problems, and utilizes Harvard resources to train new leaders who will shape the future of the region. The Caspian Studies Program is made possible by a generous gift from the United States-Azerbaijan Chamber of Commerce and a consortium of companies led by ExxonMobil, Chevron, Aker-Maritime, CCC, and ETPM.

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