Options for Limiting the Security Risks from a Negotiated Nuclear Settlement with Iran
Matthew Bunn considers the premises, facts, and risks underlying negotiation with Iran over their nuclear program. He describes a range of options for limiting the risks of a negotiated settlement with Iran. Bunn suggests that insisting on zero centrifuges is likely to lead to no agreement. It is time to begin thinking about what the lowest risk, non-zero options might look like.
FEATURED PUBLICATIONS
June 2009
Funding for U.S. Efforts to Improve Controls Over Nuclear Weapons, Materials, and Expertise Overseas: A 2009 Update
By Andrew Newman, Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom and Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom; Co-Principal Investigator, Energy Research, Development, Demonstration, and Deployment (ERD3) Policy Project
Andrew Newman and Matthew Bunn assess the Obama administration's fiscal year 2010 budget request for programs to improve controls over nuclear weapons, materials, and expertise worldwide. Funding for U.S. Efforts to Improve Controls Over Nuclear Weapons, Materials, and Expertise Overseas: A 2009 Update concludes that the request is a "steady as you go" budget and recommends that Congress and the administration work together to establish a $500 million contingency fund that could be used flexibly on a range of nuclear security programs.
AP Photo
Summer 2009
"Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements"
International Security, issue 1, volume 34
By Matthew Fuhrmann, Affiliate, Project on Managing the Atom
Matthew Fuhrmann's article "Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements," was published by in the Summer 2009 issue of International Security. In his article, Dr. Fuhrmann argues "Peaceful nuclear cooperation—the transfer of nuclear technology, materials, or know-how from one state to another for peaceful purposes—leads to the spread of nuclear weapons. With a renaissance in nuclear power on the horizon, major suppliers, including the United States, should reconsider their willingness to assist other countries in developing peaceful nuclear programs."
February 2009
"Exporting the Bomb: Why States Provide Sensitive Nuclear Assistance"
American Political Science Review, issue 1, volume 103
By Matthew Kroenig, Affiliate, Project on Managing the Atom
Why do states provide sensitive nuclear assistance to nonnuclear weapon states, contributing to the international spread of nuclear weapons? Using a new dataset on sensitive nuclear transfers, this paper analyzes the determinants of sensitive nuclear assistance. Dr. Kroenig first describes a simple logic of the differential effects of nuclear proliferation, which is used to generate hypotheses about the conditions under which states provide sensitive nuclear assistance. He then shows that the strategic characteristics of the potential nuclear suppliers are the most important determinants of sensitive nuclear assistance. Explanations that emphasize the importance of economic motivations do not find support in the data. This paper presents a new approach to the study of the spread of nuclear weapons, focusing on the supply side of nuclear proliferation.
AFP/Getty Images
September/October 2008
A Nuclear Revival Needs New Cooperation
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, issue 4, volume 64
By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom; Co-Principal Investigator, Energy Research, Development, Demonstration, and Deployment (ERD3) Policy Project and Martin B. Malin, Executive Director, Project on Managing the Atom
In an Op-Ed in The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Matthew Bunn and Martin B. Malin argue that a reinvigorated IAEA and new approaches to cooperation on nuclear safety, security, and nonproliferation are required for nuclear energy to make a significant contribution to mitigating climate change without creating undue risks.
D. Calma/IAEA
May 2008
Reinforcing the Global Nuclear Order for Peace and Prosperity: The Role of the IAEA to 2020 and Beyond
The Commission of Eminent Persons, a high-level panel of international experts, has issued a comprehensive report and recommendations for the future of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
Graham Allison served as a co-Executive Director for the project. Matthew Bunn played a key role in the research and drafting of the report.
June 2008
100 Grams (and Counting...): Notes from the Nuclear Underworld
This report on the 2006 seizure of weapon-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU) in Georgia, by journalist Michael Bronner, provides new insights on both nuclear smugglers and those trying to stop them.
April, 1998
Getting to Zero: Is Pursuing a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World Too Difficult? Too Dangerous? Too Distracting?
By John P. Holdren, Director and Faculty Chair (on leave), Science, Technology and Public Policy Program
John P. Holdren sorts out some of the conceptual and terminological ambiguities about the meaning of "zero" nuclear weapons in this paper.
December 2003
The Economics of Reprocessing vs. Direct Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel
By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom; Co-Principal Investigator, Energy Research, Development, Demonstration, and Deployment (ERD3) Policy Project, Bob van der Zwaan, Former Research Associate, Energy Technology Innovation Research Group/Project on Managing the Atom Project/Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program, 2001-2005, John P. Holdren, Director and Faculty Chair (on leave), Science, Technology and Public Policy Program and Steve Fetter, Affiliate, Project on Managing the Atom
For decades, there has been an intense debate over the best approach to managing spent fuel from nuclear power reactors, whether it is better to dispose of it directly in geologic repositories, or reprocess it to recover and recycle the plutonium and uranium, disposing only of the wastes from reprocessing and recycling.
Dean Calma/IAEA
July 12, 2008
IAEA Safeguards: Dealing Preventively with Non-Compliance
Pierre Goldschmidt, former Deputy Director-General for Safeguards at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), outlines a new approach to strengthening the IAEA's hand in cases when states violate their safeguards agreements. Goldschmidt argues that the UN Security Council should pass a generic resolution laying out steps the Security Council would take to deal with any state found to be in violation of its safeguards obligations. Any state which violated its safeguards pact would be required to accept a broader inspection regime going well beyond the Additional Protocol until the IAEA was able to draw the conclusion that all of its nuclear facilities and materials were under safeguards. Goldschmidt offers a draft text for the resolution and for the "Model Temporary Complementary Protocol" that defines the broader inspection regime, along with an article-by-article analysis.
