FEATURED PUBLICATIONS
Spring 2009
Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: Agenda for the President's Opening Weeks in Office
Belfer Center Newsletter
By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom; Co-Principal Investigator, Energy Research, Development, Demonstration, and Deployment (ERD3) Policy Project and Andrew Newman, Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom
President Barack Obama took office in a world where the danger that terrorists could get and use a nuclear bomb remains very real. He should take several key steps in the opening weeks of his administration:This article is adapted from "Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: An Agenda for the Next President" (November 2008) by Matthew Bunn and Andrew Newman. For full text, see: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/18673.
AFP/Getty Images
September/October 2008
A Nuclear Revival Needs New Cooperation
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, issue 4, volume 64
By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom; Co-Principal Investigator, Energy Research, Development, Demonstration, and Deployment (ERD3) Policy Project and Martin B. Malin, Executive Director, Project on Managing the Atom
In an Op-Ed in The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Matthew Bunn and Martin B. Malin argue that a reinvigorated IAEA and new approaches to cooperation on nuclear safety, security, and nonproliferation are required for nuclear energy to make a significant contribution to mitigating climate change without creating undue risks.
D. Calma/IAEA
May 2008
Reinforcing the Global Nuclear Order for Peace and Prosperity: The Role of the IAEA to 2020 and Beyond
The Commission of Eminent Persons, a high-level panel of international experts, has issued a comprehensive report and recommendations for the future of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
Graham Allison served as a co-Executive Director for the project. Matthew Bunn played a key role in the research and drafting of the report.
June 2008
100 Grams (and Counting...): Notes from the Nuclear Underworld
This report on the 2006 seizure of weapon-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU) in Georgia, by journalist Michael Bronner, provides new insights on both nuclear smugglers and those trying to stop them.
April, 1998
Getting to Zero: Is Pursuing a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World Too Difficult? Too Dangerous? Too Distracting?
By John P. Holdren, Director and Faculty Chair (on leave), Science, Technology and Public Policy Program
John P. Holdren sorts out some of the conceptual and terminological ambiguities about the meaning of "zero" nuclear weapons in this paper.
Dean Calma/IAEA
July 12, 2008
IAEA Safeguards: Dealing Preventively with Non-Compliance
Pierre Goldschmidt, former Deputy Director-General for Safeguards at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), outlines a new approach to strengthening the IAEA's hand in cases when states violate their safeguards agreements. Goldschmidt argues that the UN Security Council should pass a generic resolution laying out steps the Security Council would take to deal with any state found to be in violation of its safeguards obligations. Any state which violated its safeguards pact would be required to accept a broader inspection regime going well beyond the Additional Protocol until the IAEA was able to draw the conclusion that all of its nuclear facilities and materials were under safeguards. Goldschmidt offers a draft text for the resolution and for the "Model Temporary Complementary Protocol" that defines the broader inspection regime, along with an article-by-article analysis.
Department of Energy
July 18, 2008
'Appropriate Effective' Nuclear Security and Accounting: What is It?
By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom; Co-Principal Investigator, Energy Research, Development, Demonstration, and Deployment (ERD3) Policy Project
Project on Managing the Atom's Matthew Bunn discusses United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540-a major new tool for combating nuclear terrorism and proliferation that is little used.
Oak Ridge National Laboratory
July 2008
Expanded and Accelerated HEU Downblending: Designing Options to Serve the Interests of All Parties
By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom; Co-Principal Investigator, Energy Research, Development, Demonstration, and Deployment (ERD3) Policy Project
Accelerating and expanding the downblending of highly enriched uranium (HEU) beyond the current 500-ton U.S.-Russian HEU Purchase Agreement would have significant security benefits. Russia will still have large quantities of HEU not needed for military purposes after 500 tons of HEU has been blended to low-enriched uranium (LEU). But no agreement to expand and accelerate the downblending of Russian or U.S. excess HEU will succeed unless it is structured in a way that serves the interests of all sides. Russia has made clear that it has no interest in extending the HEU Purchase Agreement on its current terms. This paper outlines key Russian, U.S., and industry interests relating to expanded and accelerated HEU downblending.
