Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: Continuous Improvement or Dangerous Decline?
In this new report, Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: Continuous Improvement or Dangerous Decline?, Matthew Bunn, Martin Malin, Nickolas Roth, and William Tobey provide a global reality check on nuclear security. They note that effective and sustainable nuclear security capable of addressing plausible threats is the single most effective chokepoint preventing terrorists from acquiring a nuclear weapon.
FEATURED PUBLICATIONS
REUTERS/Kim Kyung-Hoon
March 28, 2016
China’s Nuclear Security: Progress, Challenges, and Next Steps
By Hui Zhang, Senior Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom
In a new report from the Project on Managing the Atom, Senior Research Associate Hui Zhang finds that China has made important nuclear security improvements in areas ranging from its legal framework, to its approaches to physical protection and material accounting, to bolstering nuclear security culture. But China also faces ongoing threats. The possibility of insider theft of nuclear materials in China cannot be ruled out, especially as China increasingly grows into a market-oriented society contending with corruption. Zhang also notes that Beijing faces a growing terrorism threat from separatists in China’s autonomous Xinjiang region.
Greg Webb / IAEA
March 24, 2016
What Price Nuclear Governance? Funding the International Atomic Energy Agency
By Trevor Findlay, Associate, Project on Managing the Atom
Trevor Findlay proposes a grand bargain to address the IAEA’s longstanding funding challenges. The report considers critical questions facing the Agency’s budget and finance, and concludes that funding is insufficient for the Agency to carry out its core functions; increasing reliance on voluntary funding is problematic; the budget negotiation process is not as effective or streamlined as it should be; and the current funding system is inequitable and inappropriate given changes in the nuclear industry since the IAEA was founded. Findlay recommends a number of steps to cut the Gordian knot between the funding of technical cooperation, nuclear safeguards, and nuclear security and break the impasse on IAEA funding.
January 2016
The Cost of Reprocessing in China
By Matthew Bunn, Professor of Practice; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom, Hui Zhang, Senior Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom and Li Kang
Faced with the twin pressures of a still-quickly growing economy and unprecedented smog from coal-fired plants, China is racing to expand its fleet of nuclear power plants. As it does so, Beijing is considering making large capital investments in facilities to reprocess spent nuclear fuel and recycle the resulting plutonium in fast neutron reactors that breed more plutonium. This report outlines the enormous costs China would likely face if it decides to build large-scale plants for reprocessing plutonium from spent nuclear fuel and recycling the plutonium in fast neutron reactors.
March 22, 2016
"The Real Threat to the Iran Deal: Tehran's Banking System"
The Diplomat
By Aaron Arnold, Associate, Project on Managing the Atom
In this op-ed for The Diplomat, MTA Associate Aaron Arnold argues that the key to ensuring long-run stability of the nuclear agreement will be reintegrating Iran’s banks in the global system.
October 20, 2015
Proliferation Alert! The IAEA and Non-Compliance Reporting
By Trevor Findlay, Associate, Project on Managing the Atom
In this new report, Trevor Findlay provides the first comprehensive study of the IAEA's handling of states not complying with their non-proliferation obligations. The report finds that none of the cases have followed the non-compliance process outlined in the Agency's Statute and safeguards agreements. Rather, each case has posed unique challenges to the non-proliferation regime. The report concludes that creativity and deft statecraft are key to the handling of complex non-compliance cases.
January 7, 2016
North Korea’s Latest Nuclear Test: A Belfer Center Expert Round-Up
North Korea’s report that it tested a hydrogen bomb this week set off alarm bells around the world. Though analysts are casting doubt on the nature of the detonation, Pyongyang’s fourth nuclear test is a reminder of the regime's unpredictability. How serious is this action and how should foreign powers respond? Belfer Center experts Graham Allison, Jieun Baek, Matthew Bunn, Nicholas Burns, Olli Heinonen, John Park, Gary Samore, and William Tobey weigh in on the significance and implications of North Korea’s latest nuclear test.
August 7, 2015
"Making Life Harder for Iran's Bomb Advocates"
The National Interest
By Matthew Bunn, Professor of Practice; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom
"...[I]t's important to remember that the broad inspections called for by the International Atomic Energy Agency's Additional Protocol are permanent, not limited to ten to fifteen years. Iran's legal obligation not to build nuclear weapons is also permanent."
August 3, 2015
The Iran Nuclear Deal: A Definitive Guide
By Gary Samore, Executive Director for Research, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
The Iran Nuclear Deal: A Definitive Guide has been produced in the interest of contributing to informed Congressional review and public discourse on a comprehensive nuclear agreement with Iran—the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). It provides a concise description of the agreement and the accompanying UN Security Council Resolution 2231. It also includes a balanced assessment of the agreement's strengths and weaknesses with respect to its central objective to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
The team of experts who prepared the report includes Democrats, Republicans, independents, and internationals. Noting areas of disagreement among themselves, they agreed that this report provides an accurate description and balanced assessment of the agreement.
August 3, 2015
"Just How Vulnerable Is Iran to Sanctions?"
The National Interest
By Aaron Arnold, Associate, Project on Managing the Atom
"Although this phased-approach to sanctions relief under the JCPOA ensures that Iran does not receive benefits without first implementing its nuclear commitments, uncertainties remain. The agreement does not affect U.S. and EU non-nuclear sanctions, such as those that target human rights abuses, support for terrorism, and money laundering. One question is whether or not relief from nuclear-related sanctions will affect the usefulness of non-nuclear sanctions."
July 20, 2015
Plutonium Separation in Nuclear Power Programs: China
By Hui Zhang, Senior Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom and Yun Zhou, Former Associate, Project on Managing the Atom (MTA), 2013–2014; Former Research Fellow, International Security Program (ISP)/MTA, 2011–2013; Former Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow, ISP/MTA, 2010–2011; Former Research Fellow, ISP/MTA, 2009–2010
"Plutonium was first separated by the United States during the Second World War. Uranium was loaded into nuclear reactors, irradiated, cooled, and then chemically “reprocessed” in another facility to recover the plutonium. The reactors and the reprocessing plant were built as part of the secret atomic bomb project. Since then, eight other countries also have produced and separated plutonium for weapons..."
Summer 2015
"Beyond Emboldenment: How Acquiring Nuclear Weapons Can Change Foreign Policy"
International Security, issue 1, volume 40
By Mark Bell, Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom
How does the acquisition of nuclear weapons affect states' foreign policy? A new typology of six potential post-acquisition state behaviors—aggression, expansion, independence, bolstering, steadfastness, and compromise—offers a more nuanced answer to this question than previous studies have provided. The United Kingdom's foreign policy after it developed the bomb reveals how nuclear weapons can make a country more assertive.
NNSA
August 12, 2014
"The Russian Tie We Can't Cut"
The New York Times
By William H. Tobey, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Matthew Bunn, Professor of Practice; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom and Nickolas Roth, Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom
In this op-ed for the International New York Times, William H. Tobey, Matthew Bunn, and Nickolas Roth make the case for continuing nuclear security cooperation with Russia and continuing to fund international nuclear security efforts.
March 18, 2014
Advancing Nuclear Security: Evaluating Progress and Setting New Goals
By Matthew Bunn, Professor of Practice; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom, Martin B. Malin, Executive Director, Project on Managing the Atom, Nickolas Roth, Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom and William H. Tobey, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
In the lead-up to the nuclear security summit, Advancing Nuclear Security: Evaluating Progress and Setting New Goals outlines what was accomplished in a four-year effort launched in 2009 to secure nuclear material around the globe—and what remains to be done. The effort made significant progress, but some weapons-usable nuclear materials still remain “dangerously vulnerable." The authors highlight the continuing danger of nuclear and radiological terrorism and call for urgent action.
Ministry of Public Security (Ch)
March 14, 2014
Securing China's Nuclear Future
By Hui Zhang, Senior Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom and Tuosheng Zhang
China’s approach to strengthening the security of its nuclear weapons, materials, and facilities plays an important role in facilitating strong global action on nuclear security. This report provides a better understanding of Chinese perceptions of the threat of nuclear terrorism and attitudes toward the nuclear security challenge; describes the current status of nuclear security practices in China and of planned improvements in rules and organization, management, and technologies; and recommends steps for further improvements.
March 11, 2014
"Beyond Nuclear Summitry: The Role of the IAEA in Nuclear Security Diplomacy After 2016"
By Trevor Findlay, Associate, Project on Managing the Atom
There has been much speculation as to what might replace the Nuclear Security Summits after 2016. One candidate touted as a suitable inheritor of the summits’ mantle is the International Atomic Energy Agency. In this discussion paper, Trevor Findlay examines whether and to what extent the IAEA could and should do so, what form its role might take, and how the Agency and summiteers might prepare for such an eventuality.
August 15, 2013
Plutonium Mountain: Inside the 17-Year Mission to Secure a Legacy of Soviet Nuclear Testing
By Eben Harrell, Former Associate, Project on Managing the Atom April 2013–June 2015; Former Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom, July 2011–June 2015 and David E. Hoffman
The Belfer Center’s Eben Harrell and Pulitzer Prize-winning author David E. Hoffman for the first time report the details of one of the largest nuclear security operations of the post-Cold War years — a secret 17-year, $150 million operation to secure plutonium in the tunnels of Degelen Mountain.
