"Do Nuclear Weapons Affect the Guns-butter Trade-off? Evidence on Nuclear Substitution from Pakistan and Beyond"
Conflict, Security & Development, issue 3, volume 15
By Ahsan I. Butt, Former Stanton Nuclear Security Junior Faculty Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom, 2014–2015; Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, August 1, 2011–August 31, 2012
Scholars have argued that acquiring nuclear weapons should allow states the luxury of exiting conventional arms races. In turn, a decreased budgetary focus on conventional arms should make possible greater spending on social welfare. The author contests this logic of nuclear substitution by examining its most likely exponent, Pakistan. As a poor, underdeveloped state, a nuclear Pakistan should have welcomed the opportunity to cease its arms race with India, and spend greater sums on its population's welfare. Instead, the article shows that Pakistan has doubled down on its pre-nuclear conventional posture, mainly because of its revisionism over Kashmir.
June 29, 2015
India in Transition
By Jayita Sarkar, Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom
"The middle powers' congruence between New Delhi and Paris expanded with French quest for nuclear technology partners outside Europe, especially for technology that had not already been proved to be economically viable. For much of the Cold War, French nonchalance toward nuclear safeguards, frequent foreign policy differences with Washington, and close ties between key Indian and French physicists helped further. From India's point of view, the CEA offered technological assistance, including active encouragement as in 1974, when no other atomic energy commission was willing to offer much."
By Gary Samore, Executive Director for Research, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
To assist Members of Congress and observers in analyzing these issues and judging a potential comprehensive agreement, the Belfer Center prepared this brief to outline the key facets of sanctions against Iran. Written as an addendum to our April policy brief, ‘Decoding the Iran Nuclear Deal,’ this report is driven by the policy debate’s leading questions.
By Nickolas Roth, Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom
The United States and Russia are the two countries with the vast majority of the world's nuclear weapons and material. In an age of global terrorism, they share both a special responsibility in ensuring that they each employ effective nuclear security systems and an understanding of the unique challenge of securing hundreds of tons of nuclear material. For two decades, the United States and Russia lived up to this responsibility by working together to strengthen nuclear security in Russia and around the globe. That ended in 2014 when Russia halted the majority of its work on nuclear security with the United States. The negative consequences of that decision could seriously affect international security and cooperation in the nuclear realm.
June 5, 2015
The Huffington Post
"Russia has developed a proposal that seems to offer a solution to these problems. Under the acronym BOO (Build, Own, Operate), Russia's state-owned Rosatom offers to finance, build and operate new nuclear reactors for the aspiring nuclear energy countries....Rosatom's proposal only contributes to a quicker global dispersal of nuclear energy, while the existing nuclear safety governance regime is not ready yet to ensure the safety of a global expansion."
May 26, 2015
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
In this new oped for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, MTA Associate Aaron Arnold and colleague Nikos Passas consider the role of banks in monitoring and verifying proliferation-related transactions. He outlines steps that the P5+1 and Iran can take in a final agreement that will allow them to remain vigilant about proliferation financing.
May 26, 2015
By Hui Zhang, Senior Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom
Official plans in China call for a three-fold increase in nuclear energy by 2020, and much more is under consideration for the coming decades. How will China get the uranium it needs to feed its ambitious nuclear energy plans for the coming decades? This report suggests that between domestic uranium mining, uranium purchased on the international market, and uranium mined by Chinese-owned companies overseas, the security of China’s uranium supply will not pose a challenge to China’s nuclear power development, even under the most ambitious scenarios for growth.
May 26, 2015
The National Interest
By Kathleen Araújo, Former Associate, Science, Technology, and Public Policy (STPP)/Project on Managing the Atom (MTA), July–August 2014; Former Research Fellow, STPP/MTA, 2013–2014; Former Research Fellow, STPP, 2012–2013 and Behnam Taebi, Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program
MTA/ISP Research Fellow Behnam Taebi and former Research Fellow and Associate Kathleen Araújo explore lessons learned from early adopters of consent-based processes in nuclear waste decisions. They argue, whatever waste sites are evaluated, public consent must more fully be taken into account for there to be any chance of durable buy-in.
Belfer Center Newsletter
By Josh Anderson, Coordinator, Project on Managing the Atom
The Project on Managing the Atom joined the Netherlands government, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), and the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey in convening a research symposium on the sidelines of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) 2015 review conference. The symposium, Fresh Ideas for the Future, took place on April 28 in the UN headquarters in New York City.
May 22, 2015
Washington Post, Monkey Cage Blog
By Gene Gerzhoy, Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program
MTA/ISP Research Fellow Gene Gerzhoy argues that the United States should leverage Saudi Arabia’s dependence on U.S. military support to keep it from pursuing nuclear weapons. Using the example of West Germany during the Cold War, he states that the threat of military embargo combined with corresponding security assurances will convince Saudi Arabia to support U.S. diplomacy with Iran.