PUBLICATIONS
September 24, 2009
President Obama's Nuclear Resolution: Statements from Matthew Bunn & William H. Tobey of Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center
By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom; Co-Principal Investigator, Energy Research, Development, Demonstration, and Deployment (ERD3) Policy Project and William H. Tobey, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
The following are statements from Matthew Bunn and William H. Tobey at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs on President Obama’s nuclear resolution.
September 22, 2009
"Options for Limiting the Security Risks from a Negotiated Nuclear Settlement with Iran"
By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom; Co-Principal Investigator, Energy Research, Development, Demonstration, and Deployment (ERD3) Policy Project
Matthew Bunn considers the premises, facts, and risks underlying negotiation with Iran over their nuclear program. He describes a range of options for limiting the risks of a negotiated settlement with Iran. Bunn suggests that insisting on zero centrifuges is likely to lead to no agreement. It is time to begin thinking about what the lowest risk, non-zero options may look like.
September 21, 2009
"Obama's AfPak Metrics Miss the Mark on Pakistan"
Foreign Policy
By Hassan Abbas, Senior Advisor, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
"It is quite striking that framers of the metrics have avoided the merest mention of Pakistan-India relations as a factor in understanding which way the wind is blowing in Pakistan's security environment. While the Obama administration has every right to wish that Pakistan delink its rivalry with India in the Kashmir region from its policy towards Afghanistan (and consequently in Federally Administered Tribal Areas), one cannot ignore the prevailing ground realities."
September 20, 2009
"Settling for Failure in the Middle East"
Washington Post
By Stephen M. Walt, Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Affairs; Faculty Chair, International Security Program
"This situation is a tragedy in the making between peoples who have known more than their share. Unless Obama summons the will and skill to break the logjam, a two-state solution will become impossible and those who yearn for peace will be even worse off than before."
September 17, 2009
"Obama Made the Right Decision on Missile Defense"
National Review Online
By Thomas M. Nichols, Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom
"Despite the outcry that President Obama has sold out the Europeans and caved to the Russians by cancelling missile defenses in Europe, it was the right thing to do. Those defenses were not going to work (or work well enough or soon enough to matter in any major crisis with Iran), and the diplomatic price we were paying for them was far out of proportion to any small gains we might have made by annoying the Russians or reassuring the Czechs and the Poles...."
September 14, 2009
"American Power in 21st Century"
The Korea Times
By Joseph S. Nye, Harvard University Distinguished Service Professor
The problem for American power in the 21st century is that there are more and more things outside the control of even the most powerful state. Although the U.S. does well on military measures, there is much going on that those measures fail to capture.
Fall 2009
"The Paradox of Iran's Nuclear Consensus"
World Policy Journal, issue 3, volume 26
By Kayhan Barzegar, Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program
"...[S]ituated in what it sees as a hostile neighborhood, it is hardly surprising that the Iranian government views an independent nuclear fuel cycle as interchangeable with deterrence, rather than as a bid for building a nuclear arsenal. While building a nuclear arsenal would be a costly endeavor, risking international isolation and assuring Iran's 'pariah status,' acquiring civilian nuclear capability would afford Iran the security and psychological edge it has long sought, and at a lower cost."
Summer 2009
"Planning the Peace and Enforcing the Surrender: Deterrence in the Allied Occupations of Germany and Japan"
Journal of Interdisciplinary History, issue 1, volume 40
By Melissa Willard-Foster, Research Fellow, International Security Program
Much is known about the efforts of the United States to democratize, reconstruct, and deliver humanitarian aid to Germany and Japan after their defeat in WorldWar II. Much less is known about the willingness of the United States to use coercive tactics to deter and counter resistance to its military occupation of the two countries. Many of the scholars and politicians who consider the occupations of Germany and Japan to be models for success, largely because of their peaceful outcomes, often overlook the initial period of occupation, in which latent violence figured prominently. An understanding of this early period, however, is crucial to assessing the determinants of peace.
September 8, 2009
"Big Business Fears Obama's Plans to Radically Reform Healthcare in US"
The Scotsman
By Azeem Ibrahim, Research Fellow, International Security Program
"...[H]ealthcare reform would open up health insurance companies to more effective competition, and they fear it. Many are lobbying hard and trying to muddy the argument with scaremongering stories. In fact, many of the angry people at the town hall meetings were actually members of organised groups, paid for by vested interests."
August 31, 2009
"Keeping Up with the Indians"
Foreign Policy
By Paul Staniland, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program/Intrastate Conflict Program, 2008–2009
"Neither Americans nor Indians always understand how threatening their military strength can look to weaker countries. This dynamic is clearly at play in the case of Pakistan — Indians feel that they are self-evidently not a threat, while Americans are often baffled that Pakistani security elites care so much about India, which to the U.S. looks like a positive force for stability and democracy. At the end of the day, however, the world does not look the same from Rawalpindi and Islamabad as it does from Washington, and the U.S. needs to remember these differing goals, incentives, and fears as it pursues its vital interests in the region."

