BELFER CENTER STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
2009
Pride and Prejudice and Prithvis: Strategic Weapons Behavior in South Asia
By Vipin Narang, Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom
Vipin Narang's chapter "Pride and Prejudice and Prithvis: Strategic Weapons Behavior in South Asia" in the book Inside Nuclear South Asia was published by Stanford University. Narang examines the ballistic missile flight-testing pattern in the region as a proxy for nuclearization and as an indicator for both states' strategic weapons decisions, attempting to clarify the variables that drive both India and Pakistan to test strategic weapons when they do.
March 30, 2009
"It's About Accountability, Stupid"
On Leadership at washingtonpost.com
By Ben Heineman, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
"One of the fundamental issues raised by the economic crisis, primarily in the financial sector but also in failing industries like the automobile industry, is: Where was the board of directors to set meaningful performance goals (not simply stock price) and hold business leaders accountable?"
January 14, 2009
"Sectoral Approaches to International Climate Policy: A Typology and Political Analysis"
By Jonas Meckling, Research Fellow, Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements and Gu Yoon Chung
This paper presents a study of sectoral approaches to climate change that have been gaining currency in the international debate as a possible remedy to the shortfalls of the Kyoto Protocol.
December 9, 2008
"Transparent and Irreversible Dismantlement of Nuclear Weapons"
By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom; Co-Principal Investigator, Energy Research, Development, Demonstration, and Deployment (ERD3) Policy Project
Matthew Bunn authored the chapter "Transparent and Irreversible Dismantlement of Nuclear Weapons" in the book Reykjavik Revisited: Steps Toward a World Free of Nuclear Weapons.
December 8, 2008
"Pay For Performance"
Washington Post
By Ben Heineman, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
"For the CEOs to say that they will work for a dollar a year if Congress forks over the cash ignores the vital importance of providing compensation carrots (and sticks) for the key executives who, as a team, will have to defy auto history and transform the industry, which these executives had a hand in creating."
October 7, 2008
"Equity and Climate Policy: An Allocation Method Based on Individual Emissions"
By Shoibal Chakravarty, Ananth Chikkatur, Associate, Energy Technology Innovation Policy and Massimo Tavoni
The speakers presented a new framework for allocation of a global carbon reduction target among nations, in which "common but differentiated responsibilities" refers to the emissions of individuals, rather than of nations.
Fall 2008
"Ten Years of Instability in a Nuclear South Asia"
International Security, issue 2, volume 33
Nuclear weapons have had two destabilizing effects on the South Asian security environment. First, nuclear weapons’ ability to shield Pakistan against all-out Indian retaliation, and to attract international attention to Pakistan’s dispute with India, encouraged aggressive Pakistani behavior. Second, these Indo-Pakistani crises led India to adopt a more aggressive conventional military posture toward Pakistan. This development could exacerbate regional security-dilemma dynamics and increase the likelihood of Indo-Pakistani conflict in years to come. Thus nuclear weapons not only destabilized South Asia in the first decade after the nuclear tests; they may damage the regional security environment well into the future.
Fall 2008
"Security and Displacement in Iraq: Responding to the Forced Migration Crisis"
International Security, issue 2, volume 33
By Sarah Kenyon Lischer, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2002-2003
Since the 2006 bombing of the al-Askari Mosque, 4.5 million Iraqis have fled their homes, and displacement has become a central strategy in the civil war. To prevent the wide-scale militarization of the displaced Iraqis, donors and host states should heed the following policy recommendations. First, provide a massive infusion of humanitarian aid. Second, resist the temptation to build camps to house the displaced. Third, do not return the displaced people home against their will. Fourth, expand and expedite the resettlement process, especially for vulnerable Iraqis such as those who were once coalition employees.
Fall 2008
"Making the World Safe for Partial Democracy? Questioning the Premises of Democracy Promotion"
International Security, issue 2, volume 33
By Arthur Goldsmith, Former Senior Research Fellow, Intrastate Conflict Program/International Security Program, 2004-2005
Democracy promotion is a favored strategy to advance the cause of world peace, especially in the Greater Middle East, but undifferentiated democracy promotion has two faulty premises. First, all progress toward the establishment of democratic regimes does not necessarily make the global community safer. Second, regime change is not something external actors have the capacity to direct along desired pathways. The first assumption fails to consider the well-documented security problems caused by partial democracies. The second assumption overstates the ability of powerful outsiders to induce transitions to full democracy. These research findings are grounds for cautious and selective democracy promotion, not a blanket approach that is indifferent to the composition of the regimes designated to be reformed and democratized.
Fall 2008
"Wishful Thinking or Buying Time? The Logic of British Appeasement in the 1930s"
International Security, issue 2, volume 33
By Norrin M. Ripsman and Jack S. Levy
British appeasement was primarily a strategy of buying time for rearmament against Germany. British leaders understood the Nazi menace and did not expect that appeasement would avoid an eventual war with Germany. They believed that by the time of the Rhineland crisis of 1936 the balance of power had already shifted in Germany’sfavor, but that British rearmament would work to reverse the balance by the end of the decade. Appeasement was a strategy to delay an expected confrontation with Germany until the military balance was more favorable.
