BELFER CENTER STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
AP Photo/Kin Cheung
February 2, 2013
"India is a Nation of Unfulfilled Greatness"
The Times of India
By Robert D. Blackwill, International Council Member, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Ali Wyne, Associate, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; Douglas Dillon Professor of Government, Harvard Kennedy School
Read an excerpt in The Times of India from a new book on Lee Kuan Yew by Belfer Center Director Graham Allison and Ambassador Robert D. Blackwill, with Belfer Center Associate Ali Wyne. The book is titled: Lee Kuan Yew: The Grand Master's Insights on China, the United States, and the World.
February 2013
Lee Kuan Yew: The Grand Master's Insights on China, the United States, and the World
By Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; Douglas Dillon Professor of Government, Harvard Kennedy School, Robert D. Blackwill, International Council Member, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and Ali Wyne, Associate, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
When Lee Kuan Yew speaks, presidents, prime ministers, diplomats, and CEOs listen. Lee, the founding father of modern Singapore and its prime minister from 1959 to 1990, has honed his wisdom during more than fifty years on the world stage. Almost single-handedly responsible for transforming Singapore into a Western-style economic success, he offers a unique perspective on the geopolitics of East and West. This book gathers key insights from interviews, speeches, and Lee's voluminous published writings and presents them in an engaging question and answer format.
AP Images
January 21, 2013
"End the Damaging Obsession With Deficit"
Financial Times
By Lawrence Summers, Charles W. Eliot University Professor
In the two and a half months between the election and this week’s inauguration of President Barack Obama, America’s public policy debate has been focused on prospective budget deficits and what can be done to reduce them. Lawrence Summers writes that while we should address budget deficits, we should "not obsess over it in counterproductive ways – nor lose sight of the jobs and growth deficits that will ultimately have the greatest impact on the way this generation of Americans lives and what they bequeath to the next."
IAEA
November 5, 2012
"Iran's Nuclear Ambitions and Future Prospects"
By Olli Heinonen, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
International diplomacy efforts dealing with Iran’s nuclear program continue to fill the daily news headlines. The efforts of P5+1, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) have tried, in various formats, to encourage and enforce Iran to comply with the provisions of the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) to ensure that Iran’s nuclear program is not used as a cover for the development of nuclear weapons. The challenge of discovering what has taken place as well as currently with Iran’s nuclear ambitions is difficult not only because of Tehran’s obstructionism, but also because the same nuclear technologies, particularly uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing, can be used for both civilian and military purposes.
October 22, 2012
Our Own Worst Enemy? Institutional Interests and the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Expertise Wins 2012 Louis Brownlow Book Award
Sharon's Weiner's, Our Own Worst Enemy? Institutional Interests and the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Expertise, which was published in 2011 in the Belfer Center Studies in International Security book series, has won the National Academy of Public Administration's 2012 Louis Brownlow Book Award.
September 2012
Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and U.S. Intervention
By David L. Phillips, Former Non-Resident Fellow, The Future of Diplomacy Project
In Liberating Kosovo, David Phillips offers a compelling account of the negotiations and military actions that culminated in Kosovo's independence. Drawing on his own participation in the diplomatic process and interviews with leading participants, Phillips chronicles Slobodan Milosevic's rise to power, the sufferings of the Kosovars, and the events that led to the disintegration of Yugoslavia. He analyzes how NATO, the United Nations, and the United States employed diplomacy, aerial bombing, and peacekeeping forces to set in motion the process that led to independence for Kosovo.
October 2011
Our Own Worst Enemy? Institutional Interests and the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Expertise
When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, many observers feared that terrorists and rogue states would obtain weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or knowledge about how to build them from the vast Soviet nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons complex. The United States launched a major effort to prevent former Soviet WMD experts, suddenly without salaries, from peddling their secrets. In Our Own Worst Enemy, Sharon Weiner chronicles the design, implementation, and evolution of four U.S. programs that were central to this nonproliferation policy and assesses their successes and failures.
Winner of the 2012 Louis Brownlow Book Award
September 2010
Laws, Outlaws, and Terrorists: Lessons from the War on Terrorism
By Gabriella Blum and Philip B. Heymann
Gabriella Blum and Philip Heymann reject the argument that traditional American values embodied in domestic and international law can be ignored in any sustainable effort to keep the United States safe from terrorism. In Laws, Outlaws, and Terrorists, they demonstrate that the costs are great and the benefits slight from separating security and the rule of law.
Winner of the 2010 Chicago-Kent College of Law/Roy C. Palmer Civil Liberties Prize
Fall 2008
"Wishful Thinking or Buying Time? The Logic of British Appeasement in the 1930s"
International Security, issue 2, volume 33
By Norrin M. Ripsman, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, January–June 2011 and Jack S. Levy
British appeasement was primarily a strategy of buying time for rearmament against Germany. British leaders understood the Nazi menace and did not expect that appeasement would avoid an eventual war with Germany. They believed that by the time of the Rhineland crisis of 1936 the balance of power had already shifted in Germany’sfavor, but that British rearmament would work to reverse the balance by the end of the decade. Appeasement was a strategy to delay an expected confrontation with Germany until the military balance was more favorable.
Fall 2008
"Correspondence: ASEAN, Regional Integration, and State Sovereignty"
International Security, issue 2, volume 33
By Hiro Katsumata, David Martin Jones and Michael L.R. Smith
Hiro Katsumata responds to David Martin Jones and Michael L.R. Smith's Summer 2007 International Security article, "Making Process, Not Progress: ASEAN and the Evolving East Asian Regional Order."
