BELFER CENTER STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
Spring 2002
"Tragedy or Choice in Vietnam? Learning to Think Outside the Archival Box: A Review Essay"
International Security, issue 4, volume 26
By John Garofano, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2000-2002
The author examines the contributions of each volume to the debate over what compelled the national leadership to increase U.S. military involvement in Vietnam in the mid-1960s.
Spring 2002
"The Need for Praxis: Bringing Policy Relevance Back In"
International Security, issue 4, volume 26
The author asks where political scientists and international relations scholars should turn to find answers to a variety of questions emerging from the attacks.
Spring 2002
"A Global Coalition against International Terrorism"
International Security, issue 4, volume 26
While noting that much of this burden will continue to fall on the United States (given its overwhelming military capabilities), the author cautions the U.S. leadership from going it alone. The breadth and depth of the terrorist threat, he argues, require a global coalition that can tackle the problem on a variety of fronts: political, economic, intelligence, and legal.
Spring 2002
"Limited National and Allied Missile Defense"
International Security, issue 4, volume 26
By James M. Lindsay, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, Spring 1986 and Michael O'Hanlon
The authors claim that in arguing that the costs of a national missile defense outweigh the benefits, Charles Glaser and Steve Fetter underestimate or ignore three possible scenarios that support the development of a limited NMD system.
Spring 2002
"Limited National and Allied Missile Defense"
International Security, issue 4, volume 26
By Steve Fetter, Affiliate, Project on Managing the Atom and Charles Glaser, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1982-1985
In an exchange of letters, James Lindsay and Michael O’Hanlon claim that in arguing that the costs of a national missile defense outweigh the benefits, the authors underestimate or ignore three possible scenarios that support the development of a limited NMD system. The authors respond.
Winter 2001/02
"The Architecture of Government in the Face of Terrorism"
International Security, issue 3, volume 26
By Dr. Ashton B. Carter, Co-Director, Preventive Defense Project (on leave), Harvard & Stanford Universities
Peacekeeping and peacemaking in these places, although engaging important humanitarian concerns, never addressed the vital security interests of the United States, and none of these conflicts could begin to threaten its survival.
May, 1999
Biological Weapons: Limiting the Threat
Biological weapons pose a horrifying and growing threat to the United States and to the world in general. Revelations about Iraq's weapons research and the plans of the Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan serve as frightening reminders of the potential for military or terrorist use of biological agents.
April, 1999
Condemned to Repetition? The Rise, Fall, and Reprise of Soviet-Russian Military Interventionism, 1973-1996
By Andrew Bennett, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1987-1989
Why did the Soviet Union use less force to preserve the Soviet empire from 1989 to 1991 than it had used in distant and impoverished Angola in 1975? This book fills a key gap in international relations theories by examining how actors'' preferences and causal conceptions change as they learn from their experiences.
July 30, 1998
The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia
Analysts of international politics have debated heatedly over the likely consequences of the spread of nuclear weapons. Most argue that nuclear proliferation will destabilize the world and increase the risk of nuclear war. Others counter that the threat of nuclear war is enough to convince new nuclear nations to adopt prudent security policies.
January, 1998
Soviet Strategic Thought, 1917-91
During the Cold War, Westerners were obsessed with the military policies of the Soviet Union. Until the demise of the Soviet Union, however, few details of Moscow's thinking on military matters were available. In this book, Andrei Kokoshin reveals how Soviet military theorists developed and debated the concepts that provided the basis for the Kremlin's defense policies. Drawing on Soviet-era archives and unpublished materials, he sheds light on this important chapter in the history of Russia and the world.
