PUBLICATIONS
Spring 2010
"Correspondence: Going Nowhere Fast: Assessing Concerns about Long-Range Conventional Ballistic Missiles"
International Security, issue 4, volume 34
By Austin Long, Dinshaw Mistry, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2001-2002 and Bruce M. Sugden
Austin Long and Dinshaw Mistry respond to Bruce Sugden's summer 2009 International Security article, "Speed Kills: Analyzing the Deployment of Conventional Ballistic Missiles."
Summer 2009
"Speed Kills: Analyzing the Deployment of Conventional Ballistic Missiles"
International Security, issue 1, volume 34
The United States, if it works to mitigate the risk of misperception and an inadvertent nuclear response, should deploy near-term conventional ballistic missiles (CBMs) in support of the prompt global strike (PGS) mission. The prompt response of CBMs would likely be sufficient to defeat many time-sensitive, soft targets, provided actionable intelligence was available.
Winter 1999/2000
"Provisional Stabilities: The Politics of Indentities in Post-Soviet Eurasia"
International Security, issue 3, volume 24
The author seeks to dispel the notion that ethnicity is "essentialist, holistic, and homogeneous." Using a constructivist approach to the study of ethnic and national conflicts, the author holds that it is fallacious to assume that nations and states possess a single identity that drives their domestic and foreign policies.
Spring 2003
"The Madman Nuclear Alert: Secrecy, Signaling, and Safety in October 1969"
International Security, issue 4, volume 27
By Scott Sagan, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1981-1982; Editorial Board Member, Quarterly Journal: International Security and Jeremi Suri
Recently declassified documents reveal that in October 1969, President Richard Nixon ordered the U.S. military to go on nuclear alert. Nixon’s decision to test his “madman theory” was meant to signal to leaders in Moscow and Hanoi his willingness to do whatever was necessary to end the war in Vietnam.
Winter 2000/01
"Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited"
International Security, issue 3, volume 25
According to offensive realism, an anarchical international system strongly favors expansion. In contrast, defensive realism offers a more optimistic view: The international system provides incentives for expansion, but only under certain conditions.
Summer 2000
"Brother, Can You Spare a Paradigm? (Or Was Anybody Ever a Realist?)"
International Security, issue 1, volume 25
By Andrew Moravcsik, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1986-1988, Jeffrey W. Legro, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1987-1989, Peter D. Feaver, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1985-1987; Editorial Board Member, Quarterly Journal: International Security, Gunther Hellmann, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1987-1988, Randall Schweller, Editorial Board Member, Quarterly Journal: International Security, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro and William Wohlforth, Editorial Board Member, Quarterly Journal: International Security
In this issue's correspondence section, Peter Feaver, Gunther Hellmann, Randall Schweller, Jeffrey Taliaferro, and William Wohlforth argue against points made in Jeffrey Legro and Andrew Moravcsik's fall 1999 article "Is Anybody Still a Realist?" Legro and Moravcsik respond to their critics.
Winter 2008/09
"Correspondence: Costs and Difficulties of Blocking the Strait of Hormuz"
International Security, issue 3, volume 33
By William D. O'Neil and Caitlin Talmadge
William O'Neil replies to Caitlin Talmadge's Summer 2008 International Security article, "Closing Time: Assessing the Iranian Threat to the Strait of Hormuz."
AP photo
Summer 2008
"Closing Time: Assessing the Iranian Threat to the Strait of Hormuz"
International Security, issue 1, volume 33
How might Iran retaliate in the aftermath of a limited Israeli or U.S. strike? The most economically devastating of Iran's potential responses would be closure of the Strait of Hormuz. According to open-source order of battle data, as well as relevant analogies from military history and GIS maps, Iran does possess significant littoral warfare capabilities, including mines, antiship cruise missiles, and land-based air defense. If Iran were able to properly link these capabilities, it could halt or impede traffic in the Strait of Hormuz for a month or more. U.S. attempts to reopen the waterway likely would escalate rapidly into sustained, large-scale air and naval operations during which Iran could impose significant economic and military costs on the United States — even if Iranian operations were not successful in truly closing the strait. The aftermath of limited strikes on Iran would be complicated and costly, suggesting needed changes in U.S. force posture and energy policy.
Summer 2007
"Correspondence: Uncertainty and Reassurance in International Politics"
International Security, issue 1, volume 32
By Shiping Tang and Evan Braden Montgomery
Shiping Tang responds to Evan Braden Montgomery's fall 2006 International Security article, "Breaking Out of the Security Dilemma: Realism, Reassurance, and the Problem of Uncertainty."
Spring 2006
"The Evolution of U.S.-Indian Ties: Missile Defense in an Emerging Strategic Relationship"
International Security, issue 4, volume 30
New challenges and threats have caused India to reverse its historical opposition to strategic defenses and embrace missile defense, much to the approval of the United States . This is one indication of the deepening bilateral relationship between these two nations that has become part of New Delhi 's broader efforts to defeat threats that might require such defenses in the future.
