International Security, issue 1, volume 27
Helen Purkitt and Stephen Burgess respond to Peter Liberman's fall 2001 IS article, "The Rise and Fall of the South African Bomb."
International Security, issue 2, volume 29
This article explores the history of failed military reform in Russia and what it might reveal about current Russian military reform efforts.
James T. Quinlivan
International Security, issue 2, volume 24
The author examines the policies that have produced coup-proof regimes in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Syria. These policies include the exploitation of special loyalties, the creation of parallel militaries, the establishment of internal security agencies, the encouragement of expertness in the regular military, and adequate funding of both the parallel militaries and the security agencies.
International Security, issue 4, volume 31
If it wanted, Israel could stop Iran from developing a nuclear weapons program. With the experience of its successful 1981 military strike against Iraq's Osirak reactor, a much-improved air force, and decent intelligence on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, Israel is in a position to repeat such an attack, this time against one or all of Iran's three well-hardened targets. Israel has the most to fear from a nuclear-armed Iran, but it should also be aware ofthe consequences of such an attack. Ultimately, only a combination of conventional military force, good intelligence, and political and economic efforts can successfully check nuclear proliferation.
"Keeping the Bombs in the Basement: U.S. Nonproliferation Policy toward Israel, South Africa, and Pakistan"
International Security, issue 1, volume 40
Many accounts suggest that the United States did little to prevent Israel, Pakistan, and South Africa from developing nuclear weapons. These accounts are flawed, however. The United States did attempt to stop all three countries from acquiring the bomb and, when those efforts failed, to halt additional proliferation measures such as further testing and weaponization.
International Security, issue 3, volume 37
By Aaron Rapport, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2009–2010
The George W. Bush administration’s assessments of challenges that might come after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq were wide of the mark, but it is unclear why this was the case. An established psychological theory that describes how peoplementally represent distant future actions—as opposed to those that are seen as impending—explains the nature of strategic assessment in the Iraq case. As individuals think about actions at the end of a sequence of events, the desirability of their goals becomes increasingly salient relative to the feasibility of achieving them. This makes decisionmakers more prone to underestimate the costs and risks of future actions.
issue 1, volume 38
By Paul R. Pillar, Robert Reardon, Former Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, 2012–2014, James K. Sebenius, Gordon Donaldson Professor of Business Administration, HBS, Belfer Center Faculty Affiliate and Michael K. Singh
Paul R. Pillar and Robert Reardon respond to James K. Sebenius and Michael K. Singh's Winter 2012/2013 International Security article, "Is a Nuclear Deal with Iran Possible: An Analytical Framework for the Iran Nuclear Negotiations."
International Security, issue 1, volume 31
Child soldiers are being used more frequently in civil and interstate wars despite international protocols designed to curb this practice. The reason lies in the varying degrees of protection that children in camps housing internally displaced persons and refugees receive from governments and external actors. Furthermore, the growing use of child soldiers has become more than just a humanitarian concern, as child soldiering can be linked to insurgency, terrorism, and the prolongation of war.
International Security, issue 2, volume 31
Louis Klarevas responds to Peter Feaver, Christopher Gelpi, and Jason Reifler's winter 2005/06 International Security article, "Success Matters: Casualty Sensitivity and the War in Iraq"; Christopher Gelpi and Jason Reifler respond.
International Security, issue 3, volume 30
"Success Matters" authoritatively explains the rationale for the George W. Bush administration's attempts to maintain U.S. domestic support for the war in Iraq. In 2005, as the war became increasingly unpopular, Peter Feaver, one of the article's authors, was appointed to the National Security Council staff as special adviser for strategic planning and institutional reform. He has reportedly played a key role in shaping U.S. policy. Feaver and his coauthors conclude that the American public will support a war when it believes that success is likely. This article offers a detailed look at the analysis that underpins current U.S. policy. It is suggested that the public will even tolerate relatively high levels of casualties if victory is the probable outcome of the war. These conclusions have served as the basis for the "strategy for victory" that President Bush outlined in his November 30, 2005 Naval Academy speech and elsewhere.