Malfrid Braut-Hegghammer (continued)
International Security, issue 1, volume 36
By Malfrid Braut-Hegghammer, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom, 2008–2010
Israeli’s attack on Iraq’s nearly operational Osirak reactor in 1981 may have caused immediate delays in Iraq’s nuclear capabilities, but ultimately it may have galvanized Iraq into revamping its nuclear program. Prior to the attack, Iraq’s nuclear program was disorganized and inconsistently supported; it also lacked a steady budget. Immediately after the attack, Iraq established a covert nuclear program aimed specifically at producing nuclear weapons. Although preventative attacks can be affective in the short term, it is crucial to consider that such attacks may create a consensus among leaders about the need for nuclear weapons and therefore lead to an intensified nuclear program.
December 14, 2011
By Risa Brooks
"...[I]nflating the terrorist threat could alienate Muslim communities in the United States. This would be a worrisome development, because those communities’ widespread rejection of terrorism and their ongoing willingness to expose suspected militants are two reasons why the homegrown threat remains small."
International Security, issue 2, volume 36
By Risa Brooks
Despite a surge of arrests in 2009, evidence suggests that Muslim American terrorist activity—a phenomenon sometimes referred to as “homegrown” terrorism—is not on the rise. The 2009 arrest count is likely a combination of more aggressive law enforcement and an accident of data: several long-term plots led to arrests in 2009, and many of the plots involved groups, increasing the number of arrests per incident. In addition, many plots have been detected with the help of inside informants. It is therefore crucial not to overreact to statistics in a way that could alienate the Muslim community.
International Security, issue 2, volume 28
By Risa Brooks
Risa Brooks reviews two books on regime type and military effectiveness: Arabs at War, by Kenneth Pollack, and Democracies at War, by Dan Reiter and Allan Stam.
International Security, issue 2, volume 38
By Campbell Craig, Benjamin H. Friedman, Brendan Rittenhouse Green, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2009–2011, Justin Logan, Stephen Brooks, Former Fellow, International Security Program, 2003-2004, G. John Ikenberry and William Wohlforth, Editorial Board Member, Quarterly Journal: International Security
Campbell Craig and Benjamin H. Friedman, Brendan Rittenhouse Green, and Justin Logan respond to Stephen G. Brooks, G. John Ikenberry, and William C. Wohlforth's Winter 2012/2013 International Security article, "Don't Come Home, America: The Case against Retrenchment."
The United States' extended system of security commitments creates a set of institutional relationships that foster political communication. Alliance institutions are first about security protection, but they also bind states together and create institutional channels of communication. For example, NATO has facilitated ties and associated institutions that increase the ability of the United States and Europe to talk to each other and to do business. Likewise, the bilateral alliances in East Asia also play a communication role beyond narrow security issues. Consultations and exchanges spill over into other policy areas. This gives the United States the capacity to work across issue areas, using assets and bargaining chips in one area to make progress in another.
International Security, issue 3, volume 37
After sixty-five years of pursuing a grand strategy of global leadership—nearly a third of which transpired without a peer great power rival—has the time come for the United States to switch to a strategy of retrenchment? This analysis shows that advocates of retrenchment radically overestimate the costs of deep engagement and underestimate its benefits. We conclude that the fundamental choice to retain a grand strategy of deep engagement after the Cold War is just what the preponderance of international relations scholarship would expect a rational, self-interested leading power in America’s position to do.
International Security, issue 3, volume 30
By Stephen Brooks, Former Fellow, International Security Program, 2003-2004, Robert Art, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1974-1977, 1978-1979; Editorial Board Member, Quarterly Journal: International Security, William Wohlforth, Editorial Board Member, Quarterly Journal: International Security, Keir A. Lieber and Gerard Alexander
Some scholars argue that the balance of power theory that explained the bipolar and multipolar systems of the past is irrelevant in a unipolar world. These letters debate the possibility of expanding the traditional definition of "balancing" to account for policies that states are pursuing today.
International Security, issue 1, volume 30
The development of the concept of soft balancing is an attempt to stretch balance of power theory to encompass an international system in which traditional counterbalancing among the major powers is absent.
International Security, issue 3, volume 28
Contrary to those who argue that economic globalization increases vulnerability to a bioterrorist threat—and for this reason should be restricted—Hoyt and Brooks contend that globalization is a “double-edged sword” that has the potential to increase but also decrease levels of vulnerability—for example, by facilitating the development of vaccines.