An aerial view of the USS George H.W. Bush (CVN77) aircraft carrier, Saturday, Jan. 10, 2009, in Norfolk, Va.
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Balancing on Land and at Sea: Do States Ally against the Leading Global Power?
Scholars often interpret balance of power theory to imply that great powers almost always balance against the leading power in the system, and they conclude that the absence of a counterbalancing coalition against the historically unprecedented power of the United States after the end of the Cold War is a puzzle for balance of power theory. They are wrong on both counts. Balance of power theory is not universally applicable.
FEATURED PUBLICATIONS
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Summer 2010
"Balancing on Land and at Sea: Do States Ally against the Leading Global Power?"
International Security, issue 1, volume 35
By Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson
Scholars often interpret balance of power theory to imply that great powers almost always balance against the leading power in the system, and they conclude that the absence of a counterbalancing coalition against the historically unprecedented power of the United States after the end of the Cold War is a puzzle for balance of power theory. They are wrong on both counts. Balance of power theory is not universally applicable.
AP Photo
Summer 2010
"Pyongyang’s Survival Strategy: Tools of Authoritarian Control in North Korea"
International Security, issue 1, volume 35
By Daniel Byman and Jennifer Lind
Speculation about the future of the North Korean regime has been intense for nearly two decades, yet Kim Jong-il's hold on power appears more secure than many believe. Several theories of authoritarian control help to explain how Kim Jong-il and his family have remained in power and how this might change over time.
Summer 2010
"The Center Still Holds: Liberal Internationalism Survives"
International Security, issue 1, volume 35
By Stephen Chaudoin, Helen V. Milner and Dustin H. Tingley
Recent research, including an article by Charles Kupchan and Peter Trubowitz in this journal, has argued that the United States' long-standing foreign policy orientation of liberal internationalism has been in serious decline because of rising domestic partisan divisions. A reanalysis of the theoretical logic driving these arguments and the empirical evidence used to support them suggests a different conclusion.
Summer 2010
"The Illusion of Liberal Internationalism’s Revival"
International Security, issue 1, volume 35
By Charles A. Kupchan and Peter L. Trubowitz
Over the past two decades, political polarization has shaken the domestic foundations of U.S. grand strategy, sorely testing bipartisan support for liberal internationalism. Stephen Chaudoin, Helen Milner, and Dustin Tingley take issue with this interpretation, contending that liberal internationalism in the United States is alive and well. Their arguments, however, do not stand up to careful scrutiny.
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Summer 2010
"Perpetuating U.S. Preeminence: The 1990 Deals to “Bribe the Soviets Out” and Move NATO In"
International Security, issue 1, volume 35
By Mary Elise Sarotte, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1997-1998
Washington and Bonn pursued a shared strategy of perpetuating U.S. preeminence in European security after the end of the Cold War. As multilingual evidence shows, they did so primarily by shielding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) from potential competitors during an era of dramatic change in Europe. In particular, the United States and West Germany made skillful use in 1990 of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's political weakness and his willingness to prioritize his country's financial woes over security concerns. Washington and Bonn decided "to bribe the Soviets out," as then Deputy National Security Adviser Robert Gates phrased it, and to move NATO eastward.
Summer 2010
"Getting What You Want: Positive Inducements in International Relations"
International Security, issue 1, volume 35
Positive inducements as a strategy for dealing with regimes that challenge core norms of international behavior and the national interests of the United States ("renegade regimes") contain both promises and pitfalls. Such inducements, which include policy concessions and economic favors, can serve two main purposes: (1) arranging a beneficial quid pro quo with the other side, and (2) catalyzing, via positive engagement, a restructuring of interests and preferences within the other side's politico-economic system (such that quid pro quos become less and less necessary).
Summer 2010
"Correspondence: Civilian Nuclear Cooperation and the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons"
International Security, issue 1, volume 35
By Christoph Bluth, Matthew Kroenig, Affiliate, Project on Managing the Atom, Rensselaer Lee, William Sailor and Matthew Fuhrmann, Affiliate, Project on Managing the Atom
Christoph Bluth, Matthew Kroenig, Rensselaer Lee, and William Sailor respond to Matthew Fuhrmann's summer 2009 International Security article, "Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements."
July 2, 2010
"Correspondence: Debating the Role of Religion in War"
By Ron E. Hassner and Michael Horowitz, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2005-2007
Ron Hassner responds to Michael Horowitz's fall 2009 International Security article, "Long Time Going: Religion and the Duration of Crusading."
