Targeting Top Terrorists: How Leadership Decapitation Contributes to Counterterrorism
New evidence suggests that states featuring the tactic prominently in their counterinsurgency strategy, including the United States and Israel, may be on the right track.
FEATURED PUBLICATIONS
Spring 2012
"Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns"
International Security, issue 36, volume 47-79
By Patrick B. Johnston, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2010–2011: International Security Program/Intrastate Conflict Program, 2009–2010
A recent, data-driven study suggests that leadership targeting in counterinsurgency campaigns is a surprisingly effective tactic. Successful leadership decapitation can decrease campaign length, improve campaign success rate, and lessen the intensity of conflict and the number of terrorist attacks. Furthermore, there is no evidence to suggest that possible negative effects, such as the “martyrdom effect” and decentralization, outweigh the benefits of successful decapitation. Although leadership decapitation is not a silver bullet, it is an effective technique that should be considered carefully in counterinsurgency strategy.
Spring 2012
"Barriers to Bioweapons: Intangible Obstacles to Proliferation"
International Security, issue 36, volume 4
Bioweapons knowledge may be less transferable than many scholars and analysts have thought. A new look at past weapons programs reveals that intangible factors, such as work organization, program management, structural organization, and social environment, can affect a program’s success rate. Because these intangible factors are especially restrictive for clandestine organizations such as terrorist groups, they should be considered carefully both in terms of threat assessment and the development of more effective counterproliferation strategies.
Spring 2012
"Trading on Preconceptions: Why World War I Was Not a Failure of Economic Interdependence"
International Security, issue 36, volume 4
By Erik Gartzke and Yonatan Lupu
A close look at the events leading up to World War I reveals that the war was not a failure of economic integration as many scholars have claimed. The conflict began in a weakly integrated portion of Europe, and the more integrated powers were roped in through their alliances. Before the war, the interdependent powers were able to resolve crises without bloodshed, but they were also incentivized to increase their commitment to the less interdependent powers. Had globalization pervaded Eastern Europe, or if the rest of Europe had been less locked into events in the east, Europe might have avoided a “Great War.”
Spring 2012
"Confronting Soviet Power: U.S. Policy during the Early Cold War"
International Security, issue 36, volume 4
By Paul C. Avey
U.S. policy during the early Cold War is better explained by balance of power logic than ideology. Not only did the United States initially seek to cooperate with the Soviet Union, shifting toward a confrontational approach only when the balance of power tilted in the Soviet Union’s favor, but it later sought to engage communist groups that promised to undermine Soviet power. Given the vast differences between U.S. and Soviet ideology, the United States’ willingness to put ideology aside in these instances suggests that relative power concerns are more important in generating and shaping confrontational foreign policies than is ideology.
Spring 2012
"Correspondence: Decline and Retrenchment: Peril or Promise?"
International Security, issue 36, volume 4
By William R. Thompson, Kyle Haynes, Paul MacDonald, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2006-2008 and Joseph M. Parent
Kyle Haynes and William R. Thompson respond to Paul K. MacDonald and Joseph M. Parent's spring 2011 International Security article, "Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment."
