Leadership and Responsibility for Cybersecurity
ECIR Senior Advisor Melissa Hathaway's new article appears in Georgetown Journal of International Affairs' Special Issue on International Engagement on Cyber: 2012.
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FEATURED PUBLICATIONS
February 11, 2013
"The Information Revolution Gets Political"
The Australian
By Joseph S. Nye, Harvard University Distinguished Service Professor
"Beneath the Arab political revolutions lies a deeper and longer process of radical change that is sometimes called the information revolution. We cannot yet fully grasp its implications, but it is fundamentally transforming the nature of power in the twenty-first century, in which all states exist in an environment that even the most powerful authorities cannot control as they did in the past."
December 2012
"Preliminary Considerations: On National Cyber Security"
By Melissa Hathaway, Senior Advisor, Project on Technology, Security, and Conflict in the Cyber Age and Alexander Klimburg
In this chapter, Melissa Hathaway and Alexander Klimburg introduce three conceptual tools to help focus the strategic context and debate. These are termed the "three dimensions," the "five mandates," and the "five dilemmas" of national cyber security. Each dimension, mandate and dilemma will play a varying role in each nation's attempt to formulate and execute a national cyber security strategy according to their specific conditions.
March 2012
"On the Use of Offensive Cyber Capabilities: A Policy Analysis on Offensive US Cyber Policy"
By Robert Belk and Matthew Noyes
This paper offers analysis and policy recommendations for use and response to various forms of cyber action for Offensive Military Cyber Policy. It establishes a pragmatic policy-relevant, effects-based ontology for categorizing cyber capabilities, and develops a comprehensive framework for cyber policy analysis. Furthermore, it demonstrates the utility of the cyber policy analysis framework by analyzing six key categories of external cyber actions identified by our ontology, which range the entire spectrum of cyber activity. Lastly, this work develops actionable policy recommendations from our analysis for cyber policy makers while identifying critical meta-questions.
May 3, 2012
"Cyber Disorders: Rivalry and Conflict in a Global Information Age"
By Lucas Kello, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, International Security Program/Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program/Project on Technology, Security, and Conflict in the Cyber Age
The risks posed by the proliferation of cyber weapons are gaining wide recognition among security planners. Yet the general reaction of scholars of international relations has been to neglect the cyber peril owing to its technical novelties and intricacies. This attitude amounts to either one or both of two claims: the problem is not of sufficient scale to warrant close inspection, or it is not comprehensible to a non-technical observer. This seminar challenged both assertions.
April 25, 2012
"When We Wage Cyberwar, the Whole Web Suffers"
Bloomberg
By Susan P. Crawford, Former Faculty Affiliate, Information and Communications Technology and Public Policy Project, January–December 2012
"Purveyors of cyberfear are going in the opposite direction. They are not interested in engaging with other countries to come up with codes of online conduct or to translate the Geneva Conventions for cyberspace — so as to avoid collateral damage and protect hospitals, electrical grids, and so on. They want to be able to change ones to zeros on servers around the globe, whatever that means for speech and commerce at home and worldwide."
April 10, 2012
"Cyber War and Peace"
Today's Zaman
By Joseph S. Nye, Harvard University Distinguished Service Professor
"Cyber war, though only incipient at this stage, is the most dramatic of the potential threats. Major states with elaborate technical and human resources could, in principle, create massive disruption and physical destruction through cyber attacks on military and civilian targets. Responses to cyber war include a form of interstate deterrence through denial and entanglement, offensive capabilities, and designs for rapid network and infrastructure recovery if deterrence fails. At some point, it may be possible to reinforce these steps with certain rudimentary norms and arms control, but the world is at an early stage in this process."

