PDP Hosts WMD Workshop on Heading Off a Nuclear Proliferation Cascade

Press Release

June 20, 2007

Author: Robin Olsen

Washington, DC - On June 20, 2007, PDP Co-Directors Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry hosted another in a series of WMD-related workshops entitled "Heading Off a Nuclear Proliferation Cascade." The off-the-record workshop, held at the Mayflower Renaissance Hotel, explored the likelihood of a nuclear cascade in the next decade and the consequences of this possibility. Participants discussed potential cascades in East Asia and the Middle East, and recommended country, regional and global strategies to address this proliferation challenge.

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In the first session, "An East Asian Cascade? Country and Regional Strategies," participants considered the likelihood of a cascade in East Asia. The discussion focused on the impact of the Six Party Talks, the perceived credibility of the United States security guarantees, and the factors that might influence Japanese and South Korean decisions about developing nuclear weapons in the future.

Participants agreed that the erosion of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), military developments in China, and North Korea's nuclear weapon capability may all push Japan and South Korea to consider developing nuclear weapons over the next 3-5 years. Such a cascade is not inevitable or even likely, according to most participants, but the probability has increased and should be addressed by U.S. policymakers.

While the Six Party Talks have failed to prevent North Korea from going nuclear, they at least provide a framework for South Korea and Japan to respond to this development within the context of their security alliances with the United States.

While Japan's robust civilian nuclear power infrastructure and know-how could enable it to develop a weapons capability relatively quickly, participants noted that bureaucratic and political difficulties would constrain this choice. South Korea, by contrast, has larger technological barriers but lower bureaucratic and political barriers. If South Korea or Japan made the decision to develop nuclear weapons, this choice would be visible to outside observers, thereby creating an uncomfortable period of time where the world would know their intentions but they would not yet have the weapons.

Participants also considered how proliferation decisions in one country might be linked to those made by others. Participants generally agreed that North Korea's nuclear future would be linked to Japan's decisions, and that if South Korea or Japan were to develop nuclear weapons, the other country would likely follow suit. Most participants agreed that Taiwan's policies are not linked to these developments, but that its dependence on the United States and the likelihood that any weapons effort would be detected at any early stage are major factors in its nuclear calculus. Finally, the possibility of a unified Korea possessing nuclear weapons raised a number of interesting questions, and most agreed that this scenario would spark reactions in China.

Finally, participants discussed how a potential East Asian cascade might impact Latin America, particularly Venezuela and Brazil. They also considered how countries' decisions about developing nuclear weapons might be influenced by the United States' own nuclear.

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In the second session, "Middle East Cascade? Country and Regional Strategies," participants were asked to consider both the "Arab route" and the "Turkish route" to a potential proliferation cascade.

Arab Route: Participants agreed that Saudi Arabia is a key factor in the Arab route to a proliferation cascade. They concluded that nuclear decisions in Egypt and the United Arab Emirates are linked to Saudi Arabia's actions, and that Algeria's decisions are linked to Egypt's. Overall, participants warned that if Iran develops nuclear weapons, a cascade among these four countries would be very hard to stop. Participants also discussed the relationship between Saudi Arabia's capabilities and Pakistan's nuclear arsenal: Saudi Arabia might purchase or borrow weapons from Pakistan rather than make them.

Turkish Route: Participants considered Turkey's likely response to a future Iranian nuclear weapon, noting Iran and Turkey's shared interest in dealing with the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party), Turkey's growing belief that NATO and the European Union will provide little defense assistance, and the Turkish General Staff's commitment to defending secularism. Participants did not agree on the implications of these factors, however, as some predicted that these trends would strengthen Turkey's relationship with Iran, while others warned that these developments might weaken the relationship and drive Turkey to develop a nuclear weapon of its own.

To address this uncertainty, participants agreed that NATO should reinforce its commitment to Turkey. Most concurred that the United States has a role to play in helping Turkey overcome domestic distrust of NATO and the European Union, as well as recent alienation from the U.S. Some participants pointed out that Turkey's relationship with Israel might also be an important factor, and that Turkish proliferation might further impact Greece's nuclear decisions.

Participants did not reach agreement on the likelihood that the Arab and Turkish proliferation cascades would be coupled, as some argued that there would be little connection and others questioned whether continued rejection by the Europeans would cause Turkey to be more competitive or more aligned with Arab nations. There was consensus, however, that developments in the Middle East would likely influence Latin American proliferation decisions.

Overall, participants accepted that establishing a defense posture against a nuclear Iran would be very difficult (and likely would not include much help from the Europeans), but that this would be necessary to prevent a proliferation cascade. Some individuals pointed out that if Iran develops a nuclear weapon, Middle Eastern countries might take other actions -- apart from nuclear proliferation -- that would also be troubling to the United States.

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In the third session, "Global Strategies - U.S. National Security Posture and Relationship," participants considered a variety of strategies for mitigating a possible nuclear cascade.

There was consensus among participants that the development and tests of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan as well as the spread of nuclear technology by A.Q. Khan might eventually be seen as the beginning of a cascade. Participants further speculated on the lessons that other countries - notably North Korea, Japan, and Brazil - may have learned from the consequences of nuclear proliferation in India and Pakistan, such as how proliferation influences one's standing with the United States and the likelihood that meaningful penalties will be imposed.

Some participants recommended that the United States become more specific in its nuclear guarantee for Japan, building on previous statements of extended deterrence in response to North Korea's new nuclear status. Others suggested working with other nations to reduce both the real benefits and the perceived benefits of Iran's efforts to develop the bomb.

Many participants endorsed strengthening and expanding the existing do-not-use and do-not-divert taboos. Participants also discussed the impact of massive retaliation declarations to discourage use of nuclear weapons, but disagreed as to whether this approach would be effective in deterring threats from non-state actors or potential use by proliferators friendly to the U.S.

Participants further disagreed on the question of whether conventional military threats should be used to deter or prevent proliferation. Those in favor of this approach argued that a cascade following proliferation to North Korea or Iran would be intolerable and that strong military enforcement of the nonproliferation regime was necessary. Others disagreed with this strategy, suggesting that events in Iraq have made this preemptiveoption very difficult to execute.

Overall, participants generally agreed that America's security guarantees and sustained soft power were crucial to its efforts to reassure other countries and stop a cascade, yet the United States must continue to take steps to make these pledges credible.

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During the wrap up, each participant had an opportunity to offer policy recommendations or concluding thoughts.

Participants commented on the need to use American prestige and legitimacy to build up new norms of behavior, identify common concerns shared by a variety of states, and seize opportunities to work with Russia and China to combat proliferation. Others recommended that the United States reexamine its security guarantees, increase its dialogue with other nations, and back up these discussions with soft and hard power. The respective roles of China, subnational groups, enrichers, and Israel were also highlighted.

Finally, participants noted the need to understand the proliferation dynamics within each region, and the connections between geographic regions. For example, Asian nations have may see tremendous incentives to develop to nuclear weapons, but they also face political and technical constraints in making the leap. In the Middle East, it is likely that an Iranian nuclear weapon capability will spark a proliferation debate among several states in the region, but a cascade is not inevitable. Despite the complexity of nuclear decision making, participants noted that it may be possible to stop a cascade by identifying key pressure points in the process.

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The "Heading Off a Nuclear Cascade Workshop" was the seventh in a series of WMD-related activities of the Preventive Defense Project. Other workshops and related publications and Congressional testimony have concerned policy recommendations for the Day After a Nuclear Attack, Plan B for Iran, Improving WMD Intelligence, Updating the NPT Regime, Plan B for North Korea, and the US-India Nuclear Deal. These workshops are supported by the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Richard Lounsberry Foundation and the Herbert S. Winokur Fund.

The following individuals participated in the "Heading Off a Nuclear Cascade Workshop":

The Honorable Stephen W. Bosworth
Dean, The Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy, Tufts University
Dr. Kurt Campbell
Chief Executive Officer & Co-Founder, Center for a New American Security
Dr. Ashton B. Carter
Co-Director, Preventive Defense Project, Harvard University, Kennedy School of Government
Dr. Patrick Clawson
Deputy Director for Research, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Dr. Lewis A. Dunn
Senior Vice President, Science Applications International Corporation
Dr. John Harvey
Director, Policy Planning Staff, National Nuclear Security Administration, U.S. Department of Energy
Ms. Rebecca Hersman
Senior Research Fellow, Center for the Study of WMD, National Defense University
The Honorable Fred C. Iklé
Distinguished Scholar, Center for Strategic & International Studies
The Honorable Richard Lawless
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense
Dr. George Look
Director, International Security & Nonproliferation, Strategic Planning & Outreach, U.S. Department of State
The Honorable John E. McLaughlin
Senior Fellow, Merrill Center for Strategic Studies, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University
Dr. Ernest J. Moniz
Professor of Physics and Engineering Systems & Co-Director, Laboratory for Energy and the Environment, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
VADM Robert R. Monroe, USN (Ret.)
Former Director, Defense Nuclear Agency
Mr. Rodney W. Nichols
President Emeritus, New York Academy of Sciences
The Honorable Sam Nunn
Co-Chairman & Chief Executive Officer, Nuclear Threat Initiative
Dr. Gordon Oehler
Former Director, Non-Proliferation Center, CIA and Deputy Director, WMD Commission
Dr. Keith B. Payne
CEO & President, National Institute for Public Policy
Dr. William J. Perry
Co-Director, Preventive Defense Project, Stanford University, Center for International Security & Cooperation
Dr. Amy Sands
Provost & Academic Vice President, Monterey Institute of International Studies
Mr. David E. Sanger
Chief Washington Correspondent, The New York Times
The Honorable Lawrence Scheinman
Distinguished Professor of International Policy, Monterey Institute of International Studies
Dr. Thomas C. Schelling
Distinguished University Professor Emeritus, University of Maryland
Ambassador Wendy R. Sherman
Principal, The Albright Group
Dr. Elizabeth D. Sherwood-Randall
Senior Advisor, Preventive Defense Project, Stanford University, & Adjunct Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations
Mr. Giovanni Snidle
Senior Coordinator for Hemispheric Security Policy, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of State
Mr. Robert D. Walpole
Principal Deputy Director, National Counterproliferation Center
Dr. Paul C. White
Director, National Security Office, Los Alamos National Laboratory
Mr. Jon Wolfsthal
Senior Fellow, International Security Program, Center for Strategic & International Studies

For more information about this publication please contact the PDP Associate Director at 617-495-1412.

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