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Russia's Support for Zero: Tactical Move or Long-term Commitment?

Russia's Support for Zero: Tactical Move or Long-term Commitment?

Paper, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School

September 11, 2009

Author: Simon Saradzhyan, Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs

 

INTRODUCTION

Until recently, it would have been difficult to imagine that the Russian leadership would embrace the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons, given the roles they play in Russia's policies, including that of deterrent and equalizer in the overall military balance between Russia and the U.S. and its NATO allies, and even between Russia and China.

Distinguished arms control experts Ivo Daalder and Jan Lodal wrote recently that the U.S. might find Russia to be the most difficult country to convince to acquiesce to the "logic of zero" should Washington decide to pursue the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. "A Russia-first diplomatic approach would…almost certainly doom the effort from the start," they wrote in an article published in November 2008. Such skepticism was far from groundless, given the formidable range of different utilities that the Russian political-military leadership finds in nuclear weapons.

But political realities suggest the skeptics could be too pessimistic. In March 2008, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov became the first top Russian official to publicly praise the idea of nuclear disarmament revived in a series of op-eds and statements by George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn, collectively referred to as the Four Horsemen. Then, in September 2008, Russia's Prime Minister Vladimir Putin asserted that he had come to believe the world can fully eliminate nuclear weapons. And April 2009 saw presidents Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev sign a declaration that commits their countries to seeking a world without nuclear weapons.

More recently, President Medvedev signed off in May 2009 on Russia's new Strategy of National Security Through the Year 2020, which introduces a commitment to Zero, arguing that "Russia's sustainable long-term development" depends on progress "towards a world free of nuclear weapons, and the creation of conditions of equal security for all." Reacting to this repeated endorsement of Zero by the nation's leaders, even the chief of the main component of Russia's strategic nuclear triad has come to concede that nuclear weapons may eventually lose their significance and Russia may abandon its nuclear status "as a result of…a change in the nature of international relations."

However, while publicly endorsing the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons, the Russian leadership has also continued to believe that the nation's nuclear arsenal is of vital importance to its defense, security, foreign and even domestic policies. Apart from deterring other nuclear powers and compensating for Russian conventional forces' inferiority to Western armies, the existence of its nuclear arsenal also re-affirms Russia's great power status in the eyes of both foreign audiences and its domestic constituency. It likewise accommodates the institutional interests of the nuclear weapons sector in the military-industrial complex and the armed forces per se.

Therefore, the Russia-first approach of the new U.S. administration in its nuclear disarmament efforts has yielded an initial success, but can succeed in the longer-term only if the value of possessing nuclear weapons decreases in the eyes of Russian leaders. Such a devaluation could occur under a number of conditions, which Russia insists are mandatory and which include (but are not limited to) the resolution of regional conflicts and the codification of guarantees that no hostile country or alliance will have an overwhelming superiority in conventional armed forces over Russia and its allies.

This article will start with a short overview of key doctrines and other strategic documents that codify Russia's position on the roles of nuclear weapons, nuclear arms control and, in particular, the elimination of nuclear weapons. It will then offer an overview of the positions held on these issues by key Russian stakeholders and will assess the consolidated Russian position. Nuclear weapons play a number of key roles in Russia's defense and security posture. In peacetime, they prevent forceful pressure and deter aggression against Russia or its allies. In wartime, the functions assigned to Russia's nuclear weapons by its strategic documents include: a first-use option in response to large-scale aggression that poses a critical threat to national security; de-escalating aggression or defeating an aggressor in a large-scale war in any scenario, including one in which the enemy massively uses WMD; and achieving cessation of military operations under conditions that are acceptable for Russia.

Although powerful contingents within the Russian leadership ascribe significant value to the various roles played by the country's nuclear arsenal, they have nonetheless enumerated consecutive or simultaneous external conditions necessary for Russia to embark on the road towards eliminating nuclear weapons. These include: universal implementation of existing nuclear arms control and nonproliferation treaties; further and irreversible cuts in U.S.-Russian nuclear arsenals; constraints on U.S. missile defense and enhancement of Russian conventional forces; and resolution of major conflicts. Subsequently, there will be a verifiable accounting of all nuclear powers' nuclear arsenals, their reduction and elimination, followed by guarantees that no country or sub-state actor would be able to develop/acquire such weapons in the future.

Granted there are major obstacles to negotiating Zero, but Russia's current nuclear posture also entails major costs and risks, including WMD proliferation and the risk of nuclear terrorism. Growing support for Zero by state and non-state actors alike offers a unique opportunity for Russia and other responsible nations. The article will conclude that there are overarching nuclear security interests, such as the need to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons and prevent nuclear terrorism, that compel Russia to embark on the path to a world free of nuclear weapons, formidable obstacles notwithstanding.

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For Academic Citation:

Saradzhyan, Simon. "Russia's Support for Zero: Tactical Move or Long-term Commitment?." Paper, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, September 11, 2009.

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