Multinational Approaches to Limiting the Spread of Sensitive Nuclear Fuel Cycle Capabilities

Report, Stephen A. LaMontagne

April 5, 2005

Author: Stephen A. LaMontagne

Belfer Center Programs or Projects: International Security; Preventive Defense Project

INTRODUCTION

The international crises over the nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea have exposed a critical loophole in the nonproliferation regime. Under the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), non-nuclear weapon states can acquire sensitive nuclear fuel cycle capabilities – uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing – under the cover of peaceful nuclear power development. These states can subsequently divert fuel cycle capabilities to the production of nuclear weapons, sell sensitive technologies to third parties, or leave stockpiles of nuclear materials vulnerable to acquisition by terrorist groups.

The proliferation threat is especially alarming given the current global resurgence of interest in nuclear power. As states gradually turn to nuclear power to meet their domestic electricity needs, they may become increasingly interested in acquiring indigenous enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. The international community must therefore find a way to limit the spread of these capabilities while at the same time satisfying the legitimate fuel needs of states with civil nuclear power programs.

This report evaluates one potential approach to closing the loophole in the nonproliferation regime – creation of a multinational supply regime that would guarantee nuclear fuel cycle services to countries that agree to forego indigenous enrichment and reprocessing. In particular, this report evaluates various options for such a regime in the context of the following research questions:

- Is a multinational supply regime economically viable?
- Is a multinational supply regime politically feasible?
- How should a multinational supply regime be structured and implemented?

The international crises over the nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea have exposed a critical loophole in the nonproliferation regime. Under the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), non-nuclear weapon states can acquire sensitive nuclear fuel cycle capabilities – uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing – under the cover of peaceful nuclear power development. These states can subsequently divert fuel cycle capabilities to the production of nuclear weapons, sell sensitive technologies to third parties, or leave stockpiles of nuclear materials vulnerable to acquisition by terrorist groups.

The proliferation threat is especially alarming given the current global resurgence of interest in nuclear power. As states gradually turn to nuclear power to meet their domestic electricity needs, they may become increasingly interested in acquiring indigenous enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. The international community must therefore find a way to limit the spread of these capabilities while at the same time satisfying the legitimate fuel needs of states with civil nuclear power programs.

This report evaluates one potential approach to closing the loophole in the nonproliferation regime – creation of a multinational supply regime that would guarantee nuclear fuel cycle services to countries that agree to forego indigenous enrichment and reprocessing. In particular, this report evaluates various options for such a regime in the context of the following research questions:

- Is a multinational supply regime economically viable?
- Is a multinational supply regime politically feasible?
- How should a multinational supply regime be structured and implemented?

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Document Length: 57 pp.