G8 Global Report Card on Preventing Nuclear Terrorism

Report, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs

July 12, 2006

Author: Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; Douglas Dillon Professor of Government; Faculty Chair, Dubai Initiative, Harvard Kennedy School

I.       No Loose Nukes: B

A.     US-Russian Nunn-Lugar Comprehensive Threat Reduction: B+

-        Pursuant to Bratislava, assignment of responsibility to Bodman-Kiriyenko; increased rate of comprehensive upgrades (now covering 54% of FSU materials); on track to meet completion target of 2008.

-        More security and accounting upgrades of buildings with nuclear material finished in 2005 than in any other year.

-        US-Russian agreement to extend CTR agreement for another 7 years.

-        Civil nuclear agreement (assuming announcement on July 14).

-        US removal of 70% of a bombs worth of HEU from Czech Republic.

-        US-Russian removal of 3 bombs worth of HEU from Uzbekistan.

-        Nuclear Threat Initiative’s blending down of 20 bombs worth of uranium from Kazakhstan.

-        Required but undone: Sustained personal presidential priority; assured nuclear security to a global “gold standard;” accelerated global cleanout of HEU from research reactors; leadership in launching global Alliance Against Nuclear Terrorism.

B.     Other G8: D

-         Of $20 billion announced at Kananaskis G8 meeting in 2002, $17 billion pledged, $3.5 billion expended; some progress on legal frameworks including Russian liability issue; misplaced focus on actions with minimal impact on nuclear danger.

-        Required but undone: Focus and accelerate action on highest-priority dangers.

II.    No New Nascent Nukes: C-

A.     US-Russian cooperation: C-

-        Guaranteed nuclear fuel bargain

·        Russian proposal to establish international spent fuel centers.

·        US proposal of a Global Nuclear Energy Partnership.

·        Bodman pledge of 17 tons of uranium for nuclear fuel reserve.

·        IAEA proposal to become guaranteed supplier of last resort.

·        G8 announcement possible.

-        Iran

·        US in the game; plausible coordinated US-Russia-EU offer in bargaining with Iran; upcoming move to SC and sanctions

B.     Other G8: as above

-        Required but undone: Close NPT loophole that permits signatories to develop nuclear fuel production capabilities.

III. No New Nuclear Weapons States: D-

A.     US-Russia plus Six Party Talk members China, Japan, South Korea, DPRK

-        Six Party joint statement in September: North Korean commitment to “abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs.”

-        Expansion of North Korean arsenal by 2 bombs worth of plutonium; production line making two more bombs worth per year.

-        Pyongyang provocations: nuclear test threats, ballistic missiles sales (18 BM-25s to Iran late last year), test of the long-range Taepodong II, ongoing covert HEU program.

-        No progress since September’s joint statement.

·        Deepening disagreements on approach among parties.

·        Continued payments to Pyongyang by China and South Korea.

·        Current US approach: a striking failure. Staying the course will produce more of the same.

B.     Other G8

-        G8 Gleneagles statement: “We call on North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons-related programs.”

IV.  Nonproliferation Regime: D-

A.     US-Russia

-        Iran and North Korea as above: examples that could collapse regime.

B.     Other G8

-        2004 UN High Level Panel report: "We are approaching a point at which the erosion of the nonproliferation regime could become irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation."

-        Proliferation Security Initiative, extension of UNSC 1540 Committee.

-        Failure of the 2005 NPT Review Conference; no remedy proposed.

-        “Appalling failure” that excluded mention of nuclear proliferation at UN World Summit in September 2005.

-        Lethargic implementation of UNSC 1540 and global export controls.

-        Failure to learn/apply lessons from the AQ Khan experience. 

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