G8 Global Report Card on Preventing Nuclear Terrorism
July 12, 2006
Author: Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; Douglas Dillon Professor of Government, Harvard Kennedy School
I. No Loose Nukes: B
A. US-Russian Nunn-Lugar Comprehensive Threat Reduction: B+
- Pursuant to Bratislava, assignment of responsibility to Bodman-Kiriyenko; increased rate of comprehensive upgrades (now covering 54% of FSU materials); on track to meet completion target of 2008.
- More security and accounting upgrades of buildings with nuclear material finished in 2005 than in any other year.
- US-Russian agreement to extend CTR agreement for another 7 years.
- Civil nuclear agreement (assuming announcement on July 14).
- US removal of 70% of a bombs worth of HEU from Czech Republic.
- US-Russian removal of 3 bombs worth of HEU from Uzbekistan.
- Nuclear Threat Initiative’s blending down of 20 bombs worth of uranium from Kazakhstan.
- Required but undone: Sustained personal presidential priority; assured nuclear security to a global “gold standard;” accelerated global cleanout of HEU from research reactors; leadership in launching global Alliance Against Nuclear Terrorism.
B. Other G8: D
- Of $20 billion announced at Kananaskis G8 meeting in 2002, $17 billion pledged, $3.5 billion expended; some progress on legal frameworks including Russian liability issue; misplaced focus on actions with minimal impact on nuclear danger.
- Required but undone: Focus and accelerate action on highest-priority dangers.
II. No New Nascent Nukes: C-
A. US-Russian cooperation: C-
- Guaranteed nuclear fuel bargain
· Russian proposal to establish international spent fuel centers.
· US proposal of a Global Nuclear Energy Partnership.
· Bodman pledge of 17 tons of uranium for nuclear fuel reserve.
· IAEA proposal to become guaranteed supplier of last resort.
· G8 announcement possible.
· US in the game; plausible coordinated US-Russia-EU offer in bargaining with Iran; upcoming move to SC and sanctions
B. Other G8: as above
- Required but undone: Close NPT loophole that permits signatories to develop nuclear fuel production capabilities.
III. No New Nuclear Weapons States: D-
A. US-Russia plus Six Party Talk members China, Japan, South Korea, DPRK
- Six Party joint statement in September: North Korean commitment to “abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs.”
- Expansion of North Korean arsenal by 2 bombs worth of plutonium; production line making two more bombs worth per year.
- Pyongyang provocations: nuclear test threats, ballistic missiles sales (18 BM-25s to Iran late last year), test of the long-range Taepodong II, ongoing covert HEU program.
- No progress since September’s joint statement.
· Deepening disagreements on approach among parties.
· Continued payments to Pyongyang by China and South Korea.
· Current US approach: a striking failure. Staying the course will produce more of the same.
B. Other G8
- G8 Gleneagles statement: “We call on North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons-related programs.”
IV. Nonproliferation Regime: D-
- Iran and North Korea as above: examples that could collapse regime.
B. Other G8
- 2004 UN High Level Panel report: "We are approaching a point at which the erosion of the nonproliferation regime could become irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation."
- Proliferation Security Initiative, extension of UNSC 1540 Committee.
- Failure of the 2005 NPT Review Conference; no remedy proposed.
- “Appalling failure” that excluded mention of nuclear proliferation at UN World Summit in September 2005.
- Lethargic implementation of UNSC 1540 and global export controls.
- Failure to learn/apply lessons from the AQ Khan experience.
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