"The SO2 Allowance Trading System: The Ironic History of a Grand Policy Experiment"
Discussion Paper 2012-53, Harvard Project on Climate Agreements, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School
August 2012
Authors: Richard Schmalensee, Robert N. Stavins, Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government; Member of the Board; Director, Harvard Project on Climate Agreements
The Harvard Project on Climate Agreements Discussion Paper Series
Belfer Center Programs or Projects: Harvard Project on Climate Agreements
ABSTRACT
Two decades have passed since the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 launched a grand experiment in market-based environmental policy: the SO2 cap-and-trade system. That system performed well but created four striking ironies. First, by creating this system to reduce SO2 emissions to curb acid rain, the government did the right thing for the wrong reason. Second, a substantial source of this system's cost-effectiveness was an unanticipated consequence of earlier railroad deregulation. Third, it is ironic that cap-and-trade has come to be demonized by conservative politicians in recent years, since this market-based, cost-effective policy innovation was initially championed and implemented by Republican administrations. Fourth, court decisions and subsequent regulatory responses have led to the collapse of the SO2 market, demonstrating that what the government gives, the government can take away.
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