Panorama of Warsaw, Poland, site of COP-19.
Harvard Project to Conduct Side-Event on Linkage at COP-19
October 23, 2013
Belfer Center Programs or Projects: Harvard Project on Climate Agreements
The Harvard Project on Climate Agreements will conduct an official side event at the Nineteenth Conference of the Parties (COP-19) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Warsaw, Poland:
"Linkage: A Promising Approach to Achieving the Goals of the Durban Platform"
Monday, November 18, 2013
1:15 – 2:45 pm
We cordially invite all of our friends and colleagues attending COP-19 to join us.
Panelists will evaluate what may be an important component of global climate-policy architectures for the post-Durban era: linkage of regional, national, and sub-national cap-and-trade systems with other such systems; with carbon-tax regimes; and with non-market-based regulatory systems. The event is co-hosted by the Enel Foundation and the International Emissions Trading Association (IETA). Speakers will be:
- David Hone, Chairman of the Board of Directors, IETA and Senior Climate Change Advisor, Shell
- Gilbert Metcalf, Professor of Economics, Tufts University
- Simone Mori, Executive Vice President of Regulation, Environment, and Innovation, and Head of Carbon Strategy, Enel
- Ashley Conrad-Saydah, Deputy Secretary for Climate Policy, California Environmental Protection Agency
- Robert Stavins, Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government, Harvard Kennedy School, and Director of the Harvard Project
Presentations will be based in part on a Harvard Project Discussion Paper co-authored by Robert Stavins and Matthew Ranson, "Linkage of Greenhouse-Gas Emissions Trading Systems: Learning from Experience." The paper notes that:
The last ten years have seen the growth of linkages between many of the world's cap-and-trade systems for greenhouse gases...both directly between systems, and indirectly via connections to credit systems such as the Clean Development Mechanism. If countries have tried to act in their own self-interest, this proliferation of linkages implies that for many countries, the expected benefits of linkage outweighed expected costs. In this paper, we draw on the past decade of experience with carbon markets to test a series of hypotheses about why systems have demonstrated this revealed preference for linking.
We look forward to seeing you on November 18 in Warsaw.
For more information about this publication please contact the Harvard Project on Climate Agreements Coordinator at 617-496-8054.
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