Some Comments on S.1008: Amendments to the Energy Policy Act of 1992 to Develop the United States Climate Change Response Strategy

Testimony

July 18, 2001

Author: John P. Holdren, Former Director and Faculty Chair, Science, Technology and Public Policy Program

Belfer Center Programs or Projects: Environment and Natural Resources; Science, Technology, and Public Policy; Energy Technology Innovation Policy

I find S.1008 to be a well conceived, well drafted, timely, and important piece of legislation. Many of the thrusts of the bill -- particularly (a) recognition of the key role of technological innovation in energy in ameliorating greenhouse-gas-related risks to the stability of global climate, (b) commitment to a substantial increase in Federal funding of energy R&D, (c) increased focusing of the Federal R&D effort on possibilities for breakthrough technologies, (d) creation of mechanisms for greater coordination of energy-related research and development across agencies and sectors, and (e) commitment to an enhanced degree of international cooperation and coordination with respect to energy-technology innovation that can abate climate-change risks -- parallel some of the main findings and recommendations of the three energy R&D studies I chaired for PCAST in the late 1990s (7-9). I hope that something very much like this bill will be enacted into law.

Written Testimony

SOME COMMENTS ON S.1008:
AMENDMENTS TO THE ENERGY POLICY ACT OF 1992 TO DEVELOP
THE UNITED STATES CLIMATE CHANGE RESPONSE STRATEGY

STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD BY
JOHN P. HOLDREN

RECORD FOR THE JULY 18, 2001 HEARING ON S.1008
BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
Submitted July 25, 2001

My name is John P. Holdren and I am a professor at Harvard in both the Kennedy School of Government and the Department of Earth and Planetary Sciences. Since 1996 I have directed the Kennedy School's Program on Science, Technology, and Public Policy, and for 23 years before that I co-led the interdisciplinary graduate program in Energy and Resources at the University of California, Berkeley. Also germane to the topic of the July 18 hearing, I was a member of President Clinton's Committee of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) and served as chairman of the 1995 PCAST study of "The U.S. Program of Fusion Energy Research and Development", the 1997 PCAST study of "Federal Energy Research and Development for the Challenges of the 21st Century", and the 1999 PCAST study of "Powerful Partnerships: The Federal Role in International Cooperation on Energy Research, Development, Demonstration, and Deployment". A more complete biographical sketch is appended to this statement.

My work at Harvard on energy R&D policy and climate policy over the past five years has been funded, in various combinations, by the U.S. Department of Energy, the Energy Foundation, the Heinz Family Foundation, the MacArthur Foundation, the Packard Foundation, and the Winslow Foundation. The opinions I will offer here are my own and not necessarily those of these funders or of the other organizations with which I am or have been associated. This written statement draws on and supplements testimonies on energy policy that I presented to other Congressional hearings earlier this year and last year (1-3), as well as an article I wrote on energy strategy in the Spring issue of Issues in Science and Technology (4) and a review of the PCAST energy studies and their impact that I wrote with a colleague for publication in Annual Review of Energy and the Environment this fall (5). I regret that a conflict with my previously scheduled testimony at another Senate hearing (6) prevented my testifying in person at the hearing on S.1008 on July 18. I am grateful for the opportunity to submit this statement for the record.

Overview

I find S.1008 to be a well conceived, well drafted, timely, and important piece of legislation. Many of the thrusts of the bill -- particularly (a) recognition of the key role of technological innovation in energy in ameliorating greenhouse-gas-related risks to the stability of global climate, (b) commitment to a substantial increase in Federal funding of energy R&D, (c) increased focusing of the Federal R&D effort on possibilities for breakthrough technologies, (d) creation of mechanisms for greater coordination of energy-related research and development across agencies and sectors, and (e) commitment to an enhanced degree of international cooperation and coordination with respect to energy-technology innovation that can abate climate-change risks -- parallel some of the main findings and recommendations of the three energy R&D studies I chaired for PCAST in the late 1990s (7-9). I hope that something very much like this bill will be enacted into law.

Holdren Statement for the Record on S.1008 C 25 July 2001 C page 9

Climate-Change Risks

The bills language is correct in saying that continuation of the current trajectory of greenhouse-gas emissions would be inconsistent with the goal of "stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system" -- a goal embodied in international law in a treaty (the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change) to which the United States is a full party. The language is also correct in saying that achieving this goal will require transformative changes in the U.S. and world energy systems...changes that can only be achieved in a timely way and at tolerable cost through a substantial acceleration of the pace of energy-technology innovation. These propositions are underpinned by the 2001 climate assessment by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (10), the U.S. Global Change Research Program report late last year on climate-change impacts on the United States (11), the recent National Academy of Sciences review of key questions in climate science (12), and the PCAST reports mentioned above (7-9), among many others.

While there is as yet no formal or informal agreement on the appropriate target level for stabilization of greenhouse-gas concentrations, I believe that the growing evidence of harmful impacts already being experienced, plus increasingly persuasive simulations of impacts to be expected under higher concentrations, suggest that a target equivalent to a doubling of the pre-industrial concentration of carbon dioxide, or less, will ultimately be agreed. If one assumes for the sake of a simple thought experiment that the net cooling effect of anthropogenic particulate matter in the atmosphere just offsets the warming effects of non-CO2 greenhouse gases and that the target is specified, accordingly, as not exceeding a doubling of the pre-industrial concentration of CO2 itself, then it is easy to show that a "business as usual" trajectory for the 21st century in respect to growth of the world population (reaching 11.1 billion in 2100), growth of per capita economic activity (averaging 1.8% per year in real terms), and reduction in energy intensity of economic activity (declining at 1% per year throughout the century) would require that non-CO2-emitting forms of energy supply would need to grow fifteen-fold between 2000 and 2100 in order to meet the target. If the rate of improvement of energy efficiency (rate of decline of energy intensity) is twice the business as usual figure -- that is, if it averages 2% per year over the whole century -- a three-fold growth in non-CO2-emitting energy supply would still be required during the 21st century (from 100 exajoules of nuclear energy and renewables in 2000 to 300 exajoules of these sources -- plus CO2-sequestering fossil-fuel technologies -- in 2100).

These figures underline the size of the challenge for advanced energy technologies -- those that can increase the rate of improvement of energy efficiency and those that can expand the carbon-free energy supply. This challenge is immense, and far beyond what is likely to achieved at anything like current rates of private and public investment in research, development, demonstration, and deployment of such technologies.

Energy R&D Investments

In FY1997 -- the base year for the 1997 PCAST study of "Federal Energy R&D for the Challenges of the 21st Century" (8) -- Federal budget authority for applied energy-technology R&D ( that is, R&D focused specifically on developing or improving technologies for harnessing fossil fuels, nuclear fission, nuclear fusion, renewable energy sources, and increased efficiency of energy end use) totaled about $1.3 billion. The "energy R&D" line in DOE's budget contains a number of other categories that bring the FY1997 total to almost $2.9 billion. These include Basic Energy Sciences (which includes research in materials science, chemistry, applied mathematics, biosciences, geosciences, and engineering that is not directed at developing any particular class of energy sources), biomedical and environmental research, radioisotope power sources for spacecraft, and some energy management and conservation programs that are not actually R&D at all. The PCAST-97 focus was primarily on the applied energy-technology R&D component, although one recommendation did address, in a general way, the Basic Energy Sciences part of the budget.

Correcting for inflation, this was precisely what the country had been spending for applied energy-technology R&D thirty years earlier, in FY1967, when real GNP was 2.5 times smaller and the reasons for concern about the adequacy of the nation's energy options were far less manifest (8, p 2-8).
Federal applied energy-technology R&D ramped up sharply after the Arab-OPEC oil embargo of 1973-74, reaching a peak of over 6 billion 1997 dollars per year in FY1978 in the process of adding sizable investments in advanced fossil-fuel technologies, renewables, and end-use efficiency to the fission- and fusion-dominated portfolio of the 1960s. After Ronald Reagan assumed the Presidency in 1981, however, with his view that any energy R&D worth doing would be done by the private sector, Federal applied energy-technology R&D spending fell 3-fold in the space of 6 years. A Clean Coal Technology Program that was a joint venture of government and industry brought a brief and modest resurgence from 1988 to 1994, but from then through FY1997 the overall decline continued. Similar declines in government-funded energy R&D were also being experienced in most other industrial nations: the relevant expenditures fell sharply between 1985 and 1995 in all of the other G-7 countries except Japan. Japan's governmental energy R&D budget in 1995 was nearly $5 billion, in an economy only half the size of that of the United States. (Nearly $4 billion of the Japanese total was concentrated in nuclear fission and fusion, however, a pattern similar to that in the United States in the early 1970s.)

Private-sector energy R&D in the United States had been estimated by a 1995 Secretary of Energy Advisory Board study (13) at about $2.5 billion per year at that time. Complete and consistent R&D figures for the private sector are difficult to assemble, but it appears that these expenditures had, like those of the Federal government, been shrinking for some time: the Department of Energy estimated that U.S. industry investments in energy R&D in 1993 were $3.9 billion (1997 dollars), down 33 percent in real terms from 1983's level; a study at Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratory showed U.S. private-sector energy R&D falling from $4.4 billion (1997 dollars) in 1985 to $2.6 billion in 1994, representing a drop of about 40 percent in this period . Combined public and private investments in applied energy-technology R&D in the mid-1990s, at under $5 billion per year, amounted to less than one percent of the nation's expenditures on fuels and electricity. This meant that the energy business was one of the least research-intensive enterprises in the country measured as the percent of sales expended on R&D. Average industrial R&D expenditures for the whole U.S. economy in 1994 were about 3.5 percent of sales; for software the figure was about 14 percent, for pharmaceuticals about 12 percent, and for semiconductors about 8 percent.

Why had energy R&D investments in the United States fallen so low? On the private-sector side, R&D incentives had been reduced by the rapid fall, since 1981, of the real prices of oil and natural gas (together constituting over 60 percent of U.S. energy supply) and by energy-sector restructuring (resulting in increased pressure on the short-term "bottom line", to the detriment of R&D investments with long time horizons and uncertain returns). Perennial factors limiting energy-industry R&D include the low profit margins that often characterize energy markets, the great difficulty and long time scales associated with developing new energy options and driving down their costs to the point of competitiveness, and the circumstance that much of the incentive for developing new energy technologies lies in externality and public-goods issues (e.g., air pollution, overdependence on oil imports, climate change) not immediately reflected in the balance sheets of energy sellers and buyers.

As for the government side of low propensity to invest in energy R&D, the "let the market do it" philosophy of the Reagan years was certainly important in the steep declines from FY1981 through FY1987. It was augmented by the bad taste left in taxpayers' and policy-makers' mouths by the ill-fated government forays of the late 1970s into very-large-scale energy development and commercialization ventures (notably the Synfuels Corporation and the Clinch River breeder reactor); by the overall Federal budget stringency characterizing the first Clinton term; by Congressional concerns about the effectiveness of DOE management; and by lack of voter interest, in the absence of gasoline lines or soaring energy bills or rolling blackouts, in energy policy.

The 1997 PCAST study (8) conducted a detailed review of the then-existing portfolio of applied energy-technology R&D in the Department of Energy (where about 95% of Federal energy R&D resides). It concluded that these programs "have been well focused and effective within the limits of available funding" but that they were "not commensurate in scope and scale with the energy challenges and opportunities the twenty-first century will present". It noted that "[t]his judgment takes into account the contributions to energy R&D that can reasonably be expected to be made by the private sector under market conditions similar to today's", and it argued that "the inadequacy of current energy R&D is especially acute in relation to the challenge of responding prudently and cost-effectively to the risk of global climate change from society's greenhouse-gas emissions" (8, p ES-1). It recommended ramping up DOE's applied energy-technology R&D spending from the $1.3 billion level of the FY1997 appropriation (and from the $1.4 billion level of the FY1998 request, not yet acted upon by Congress at the time the report was written) to to $2.1 billion in FY2003 (expressed in constant 1997 dollars). The following table shows the distribution of the proposed increases.
Table 1. PCAST-Recommended DOE Budget Authority for Energy-Technology R&D (millions of constant 1997 dollars)

The detailed programmatic recommendations within these budget lines stressed the importance of strengthening efforts on what S.1008 has called "breakthrough" technologies -- those with the potential to deliver large improvements in performance. All of the PCAST budget recommendations were unanimous, notwithstanding the diversity of energy (and nonenergy) backgrounds represented on the panel and notwithstanding the history of disagreements among the different energy constituencies about funding priorities. The unanimity on the panel emerged from detailed joint review and discussion of the content of the existing programs, the magnitudes of unaddressed needs and opportunities, the current and likely future role of private industry in each sector, and the size of the public benefits associated with the advances that R&D could bring about. Efficiency and renewables received the great bulk of the increment C and increased their share of the total from 50% in FY1997 to almost 64% in the FY2003 recommendation C because they scored high on potential public benefits and on R&D needs and opportunities unlikely to be fully addressed by the private sector.
Besides these budget recommendations, the panel offered a number of recommendations about overall energy Federal R&D strategy. These included:

•  increased coordination between DOE's Basic Energy Sciences (BES) program and its applied-energy-technology programs; The PCAST-97 study did not review the content of the BES program, but it did recommend, in light of the close coupling between advances in BES and progress in the applied-energy-technology R&D, that DOE consider expanding its BES effort in parallel with the recommended increase in applied-energy-technology work and the proposed increase in coordination (8, p ES-2).
  
•  more systematic efforts within DOE at integrated assessment of its entire energy R&D portfolio "in a way that facilitates comparisons and the development of appropriate portfolio balance, in light of the challenges facing energy R&D and in light of the nature of private sector and international efforts and the interaction of U.S. government R&D with them" (5, p ES-6);
• other improvements in DOE's management of its energy R&D portfolio, including that overall responsibility for that portfolio be assigned to a single person reporting directly to the Secretary of Energy and that increased use be made of industry/national-laboratory/university advisory and peer-review committees, while reducing internal process-oriented reviews.
  
• The panel also recommended strongly that increased attention be devoted to the opportunities for strengthening international cooperation on energy-technology innovation C a recommendation that became the basis for the subsequent PCAST study with this focus (9).
  

Table 2 shows the distribution, across the energy sectors, of PCAST's recommended budgets for FY1999-2003, Administration requests for FY1999-2002, and Congressional appropriations for FY1999-2001, along with the appropriations from FY1998. These figures show that the requests and appropriations rose, through 2001, in a pattern similar to that recommended by PCAST, but at a slower pace and with a particularly conspicuous shortfall in the renewable category. In addition, since the PCAST study, DOE has undertaken a major effort in integrated analysis of the Department's entire energy R&D portfolio, which reaffirmed the overall direction of the program while highlighting some key gaps, including energy-system reliability and international cooperation on energy-technology innovation. DOE has also made considerable effort at, and progress in, addressing its management challenges.

As indicated in Table 2, the Bush Administration=s FY2002 budget request for applied energy-technology R&D, totaling about $1.3 billion, proposed a large step backward C one that would return the country to essentially the FY1997-1998 spending levels. This proposal is not consistent with the Administration's recent statements about the importance it attaches to energy issues and to the role of technological innovation in addressing them. (In fairness, however, it must be said that the FY2002 budget request had to be submitted before Vice President Cheney's energy task force had completed its work). In any case, I hope that Congress's appropriation for FY2002 will not follow the numbers in the Administration's request but will boost energy R&D spending toward the trajectory recommended by PCAST in 1997.

The supplemental appropriations for energy-technology R&D in S.1008 would be a major step in the right direction...and not just for FY2002 but for the ensuring nine years. Specifically, it must be supposed that a substantial fraction of the $4,000,000,000 appropriation for FY2002 to FY2011 -- averaging $400 million per year for the indicated decade -- that the bill would direct to the DOE Office of Carbon Management would be devoted to the responsibilities of that office specified in Subsection 1624.a.2.A, "namely to Amanage an energy technology research and development program that directly supports the [Climate Change Response] Strategy", with a focus on "high-risk, bold, breakthrough technologies". This increment to Federal energy R&D expenditures under existing programs is certainly not excessive in light of the stakes and the opportunities.

Table 2. PCAST Recommendations, Administration Requests, and Congressional Appropriations for Applied Energy Technology R&D, FY1998-2003 (millions of as-spent-$)

effic renew foss fiss fusn total

FY98 appropriation 437 272 356 7 223 1295

FY99 appropriation 503 336 384 30 222 1475
Admin request 598 372 383 44 228 1625
PCAST reccmdtn 615 475 379 66 250 1785

FY00 appropriation 552 310 404 40 250 1559
Admin request 615 398 364 41 222 1640
PCAST reccmdtn 690 585 406 86 270 2037

FY01 appropriation 600 375 433 59 255 1722
Admin request 630 410 376 52 247 1715
PCAST reccmdtn 770 620 433 101 290 2214

FY02 Admin request 475 237 333 39 255 1339
PCAST reccmdtn 820 636 437 116 320 2329

FY03 PCAST reccmdtn 880 652 433 119 328 2412

Notes: The values listed here may vary from other tabulations due to rescissions, uncosted obligations, inclusion or exclusion of other budget lines, and other factors. The efficiency line listed here does not include state and local grants, or the Federal Energy Management Program. The nuclear fission line includes only direct civilian energy-related R&D and University training support. The fossil energy line does not include expenditures for the clean coal program, which is a demonstration rather than a research and development effort associated with development of a more climate-friendly array of energy technologies than what would be likely to emerge under a business-as-usual R&D pattern, and the conditions the bill attaches to its expenditure seem to me to well designed to maximize desired outcomes.

Beyond Domestic R&D: Aspects of Commercialization and International Cooperation

To the great credit of the drafters, the bill's language calls (at several locations) for measures going beyond the usual boundaries of R&D to move climate-friendly energy-technology innovations forward toward commercial application. This mirrors a finding in the 1997 PCAST study that, when the public benefits of commercial application of the fruits of energy R&D would considerably exceed the expected returns from deployment to private investors (as would be the case for many climate-friendly technologies), a degree of government involvement in pushing beyond R&D toward demonstration and accelerated commercial deployment can be warranted. Both the PCAST report and the language of the bill stress the importance of this being done wherever possible through public-private partnerships, and in all cases with limits on the extent and duration of government support until the "hand-off" to the private sector has been completed.

Also to the credit of the drafters, S.1008 recognizes explicitly that the global climate-change challenge cannot be met through development and deployment of advanced energy technologies in the United States alone, and it draws the logical conclusion that the United States has an interest in cooperating with other countries -- above all the less-developed countries -- to promote the development and implementation of climate-friendly energy technologies everywhere. This, too, mirrors findings of the 1997 PCAST report, as well as of the subsequent 1999 report that was focused entirely on the needs and opportunities for increased U.S. engagement in international cooperation on "energy research, development, demonstration, and deployment". The initiatives that emerged from the 1999 PCAST recommendations in the Clinton Administration's FY2001 budget proposal fared very badly in Congress (of a requested increment of $100 million for international energy cooperation in FY2001, only $8.5 million was appropriated), and it is particularly gratifying now to see the crucial need for increases in such cooperation reflected in this new legislation.

Coordination and Oversight

Two more themes of the PCAST studies that are evident as well in the provisions of S.1008 are the need for better coordination within and among the Federal agencies with responsibilities for energy-technology innovation and for international cooperation with respect to it, and the desirability of making greater use of advice and oversight from experts in the corporate, academic, and NGO sectors. I find most of the provisions of the bill in these directions -- including the coordinating and integrative-analytic functions to be embodied in the White House Office of Climate Change Response, the Interagency Task Force under its direction, the DOE Office of Carbon Management, and its Center for Strategic Climate Change Response, and including the advisory and oversight functions of the U.S. Climate Change Response Strategy Review Board -- to be potentially helpful.

I question, however, whether the bill's provision establishing a procedure for annual certification by National Laboratory directors that the nation's energy R&D efforts are on track technically and financially is really needed or appropriate. This provision appears to be modeled after the process in which the national weapons laboratory directors certify annually the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. But in that case, the lab directors are certifying matters that are entirely within the province of the three laboratories' collective expertise and responsibility. In the case of energy R&D, the national efforts include much that is done in the national laboratories but also much that is done outside them. The basis on which the laboratories would make the specified certification is therefore much less clear for energy R&D than for the status of the nuclear weapons stockpile. And there is potential for conflict between the energy R&D oversight responsibilities of DOE headquarters -- including the new such responsibilities specified in this bill -- and the certification responsibilities of the national energy labs, as well as potential for disputes arising from the quite different points of view and emphases of the different labs. If, after deliberation and consideration of other points of view, this lab-director certification process does survive in the final legislation, I suggest that the directors of the Livermore National Laboratory, the Los Alamos National Laboratory, and the Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory should be added to the list of those participating in the certification, because these three labs -- like the others now named -- all have important functions both in applied energy-technology R&D and in basic energy sciences.

Requirements for Analysis

I believe the requirements that this legislation would impose on various offices and agencies for analysis and documentation of their efforts and of the compatibility of these with the overall strategy are, for the most part, reasonable and appropriate. I think, however, that the requirement imposed on the Secretary of State by Subsection 1623.4.C.iii.I, relating to specification of the economic and environmental costs and benefits of proposed international treaties, should be slightly softened by means of the words I have added and underlined in the following revision of the relevant passage:

The Secretary of State...shall provide to the Director of the White House Office an opinion that— (I) specifies to the extent possible the economic and environmental costs and benefits of any proposed international treaties or components of treaties that have an influence on greenhouse gas management.

The reason for this modification is that it is not now possible and probably will never be possible to specify confidently and precisely, in advance, all of the economic and environmental consequences of any policy measure.

References

(1) John P. Holdren. "U.S. Vulnerability to Oil-price Shocks And Supply Constrictions...And How to Reduce It." Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, Oversight Hearings on Recent Oil-Price Increases. March 24, 2000. http://www.senate.gov/~gov_affairs/032400_holdren.htm.

(2) John P. Holdren. "Improving U.S. Energy Security and Reducing Greenhouse-Gas Emissions: What Role for Nuclear Energy?" Hearing by the Subcommittee on Energy and Environment, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives. July 25, 2000. http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/BCSIA/Library.nsf/pubs/energysecurity

(3) John P. Holdren. "Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy in the U.S. Energy Future", Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives, Hearing on The Nation's Energy Future C Roles of Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency. February 28, 2001.

http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/bcsia/library.nsf/pubs/energy-future

(4) John P. Holdren and Samuel F. Baldwin. "The PCAST Energy Studies: Toward a National Consensus on Energy RD3 Policy." Annual Review of Energy and the Environment, 2001, in press.
</(5) John P. Holdren. "Searching for a National Energy Strategy." Issues in Science and Technology, Vol. XVII, Number 3, 2001, pp 43-50. http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/BCSIA/Library.nsf/pubs/nat'l-energy

(6) John P. Holdren. "Federal Energy Research and Development for the Challenges of the 21st Century:
The 1997 PCAST Study and Its Relevance to Provisions of S.597." Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, United States Senate, Hearing on Legislative Proposals Related to Energy and Scientific Research, Development, Technology Deployment, Education, and Training. July 18, 2001.

(7) President's Committee of Advisors on Science and Technology, Fusion Review Panel. The U. S. Program of Fusion Energy Research and Development. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. July 1995. http://www.ostp.gov/PCAST/fusionenergypub.html.

(8) President's Committee of Advisors on Science and Technology, Energy Research and Development Panel. Federal Energy Research and Development for the Challenges of the 21st Century. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. November 1997. http://www.ostp.gov/Energy/index.html.

(9) President's Committee of Advisors on Science and Technology, Panel on International Cooperation in Energy Research, Development, Demonstration, and Deployment. Powerful Partnerships: The Federal Role in International Cooperation on Energy Innovation. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. June 1999. http://www.ostp.gov/html/p2epage.html.

(10) Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Third Assessment Report -- Climate Change 2001. Geneva: IPCC. 2001. http://www.ipcc.ch/

(11) National Assessment Synthesis Team, US Global Change Research Program. Climate Change Impacts on the United States: The Potential Consequences of Climate Variability and Change. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2000. http://www.gcrio.org/NationalAssessment/
(12) Committee on the Science of Climate Change, National Research Council. Climate Change Science: An Analysis of Some Key Questions. Washington, DC: National Academy Press. 2001. http://www.nap.edu/catalog/10139.html

(13) Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, Task Force on Strategic Energy R&D. Energy R&D: Shaping Our Nation's Future in a Competitive World. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. 1995.

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