ACADEMIC PAPERS & REPORTS
November 2009
"Beyond Optimism and Pessimism: The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation"
By Matthew Kroenig, Affiliate, Project on Managing the Atom
Matthew Kroenig examines the effect of the spread of nuclear weapons on international politics. He proposes a theory of nuclear proliferation that examines the differential effects of nuclear proliferation. Kroenig argues that the threat nuclear proliferation poses to a particular state depends on that state’s ability to project military power. This article contributes to our understanding of the consequences of nuclear proliferation and contains important implications for nuclear nonproliferation policy.
Fall 2009
"Enabling a Nuclear Revival—and Managing Its Risks"
Innovations, issue 4, volume 4
By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom; Co-Principal Investigator, Energy Research, Development, Demonstration, and Deployment (ERD3) Policy Project and Martin B. Malin, Executive Director, Project on Managing the Atom
Matthew Bunn and Martin B. Malin examine the conditions needed for nuclear energy to grow on a scale large enough for it to be a significant part of the world’s response to climate change. They consider the safety, security, nonproliferation, and waste management risks associated with such growth and recommend approaches to managing these risks. Bunn and Malin argue that although technological solutions may contribute to nuclear expansion in the coming decades, in the near term, creating the conditions for large-scale nuclear energy growth will require major international institutional innovation.
AP Photo
Fall 2009
"Energy for Change: Introduction to the Special Issue on Energy & Climate Change"
Innovations, issue 4, volume 4
By John P. Holdren, Former Director and Faculty Chair, Science, Technology and Public Policy Program
"Without energy, there is no economy. Without climate, there is no environment. Without economy and environment, there is no material well-being, no civil society, no personal or national security. The overriding problem associated with these realities, of course, is that the world has long been getting most of the energy its economies need from fossil fuels whose emissions are imperiling the climate that its environment needs."
October 30, 2009
Iran: Reform of Energy Subsidies
Monthly Review
By Djavad Salehi-Isfahani, Research Fellow, The Dubai Initiative
At long last and after decades of talking about doing something about the subsidies, there is a bill before Iran's majlis to target (but not remove) subsidies. I could not locate the bill itself but my impression is that it only addresses energy subsidies and not other subsidies such as food and medicine. So far only 5 of the bill's 14 articles have been passed, but the government already has the mandate to raise prices on energy products over the next five years
AP Photo
October 2009
"Targeting Nuclear Programs in War and Peace"
By Matthew Fuhrmann, Affiliate, Project on Managing the Atom and Sarah Kreps, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2007-2008
When do states attack or consider attacking nuclear infrastructure in nonnuclear weapons states? Despite the importance of this question, relatively few scholarly articles have attempted to identify the factors that lead a state to attack another state's nuclear facilities. This paper conducts the first large-n analysis on when states use force as a way to control proliferation.
This paper challenges existing arguments that states are deterred from attacking nuclear programs by the prospect of a military retaliation from the proliferating state or concerns about international condemnation. Instead, it finds that states are more likely to attack nuclear programs when they believe that the proliferating state might use nuclear weapons or engage in other offensive behavior. States are willing to accept substantial costs in attacking if they believe that a particular country's acquisition of nuclear weapons poses a significant threat to their security.
AP Photo
Summer 2009
"The Art of China's Mediation during the Nuclear Crisis on the Korean Peninsula"
Asian Affairs: An American Review, issue 2, volume 36
By Jason Qian and Xiaohui (Anne) Wu, Associate, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom
Mediating regional conflict in Asia is a delicate art. It requires an acute understanding of the unique mediation culture in the region. China's mediation in the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula reveals key elements of this art and offers useful lessons. China's experience illustrates that an influential but neutral and harmony-oriented mediator is critical in the Asian context.
AP Photo
July 2009
"Iran, the Middle East, and International Security"
Ortadogu Etutleri, issue 1, volume 1
By Kayhan Barzegar, Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program
"In the years since the September 11 attacks and the onset of crisis in Iraq, Iran's consolidation of its political-security role in the Middle East, and its impact upon regional and international security systems has been the focus of attention in international and Middle East security studies. The prevailing view in the West and the Arab world is that new political-security and geopolitical developments have changed the balance in regional power and political structure in favor of Iran. Accordingly, this situation has had negative effects on the United States' strategic interests, its regional allies in the Arab world, and on Israel's position. During recent decades, preserving a 'balance of power' policy between the regional actors has been the basis of American foreign policies in the region, especially in the Persian Gulf. The recent developments have unbalanced power equations in favor of Iran."
AP Photo
Fall 2009
"The Paradox of Iran's Nuclear Consensus"
World Policy Journal, issue 3, volume 26
By Kayhan Barzegar, Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program
"...[S]ituated in what it sees as a hostile neighborhood, it is hardly surprising that the Iranian government views an independent nuclear fuel cycle as interchangeable with deterrence, rather than as a bid for building a nuclear arsenal. While building a nuclear arsenal would be a costly endeavor, risking international isolation and assuring Iran's 'pariah status,' acquiring civilian nuclear capability would afford Iran the security and psychological edge it has long sought, and at a lower cost."
September 11, 2009
Russia's Support for Zero: Tactical Move or Long-term Commitment?
By Simon Saradzhyan, Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
Although powerful contingents within the Russian leadership ascribe significant value to the various roles played by the country's nuclear arsenal, they have nonetheless enumerated consecutive or simultaneous external conditions necessary for Russia to embark on the road towards eliminating nuclear weapons. These include: universal implementation of existing nuclear arms control and nonproliferation treaties; further and irreversible cuts in U.S.-Russian nuclear arsenals; constraints on U.S. missile defense and enhancement of Russian conventional forces; and resolution of major conflicts. Subsequently, there will be a verifiable accounting of all nuclear powers' nuclear arsenals, their reduction and elimination, followed by guarantees that no country or sub-state actor would be able to develop/acquire such weapons in the future.
AP Photo
July 2009
"U.S. Aid to Pakistan—U.S. Taxpayers Have Funded Pakistani Corruption"
By Azeem Ibrahim, Research Fellow, International Security Program
The United States must not provide Pakistani institutions with incentives to act counter to U.S. foreign policy objectives in the future. It has done so in the past. But until the spring of 2009, no comprehensive overview of the full funding to Pakistan was possible as the figures were kept secret. Those figures, as well as a full analysis of what is known about how they were spent, can now be evaluated. The available information paints a picture of a systemic lack of supervision in the provision of aid to Pakistan, often lax U.S. oversight, and the incentivization of U.S. taxpayer–funded corruption in the Pakistani military and security services. The author believes that this is the first attempt to present an overview of U.S. aid to Pakistan since 2001, evaluate it, and present recommendations on how to ensure that mistakes are not repeated and lessons are learned.
