ACADEMIC PAPERS & REPORTS
AP Photo
January 2008
"A Profile of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan"
CTC Sentinel, issue 2, volume 1
By Hassan Abbas, Former Senior Advisor, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
"The organizational strength, military strategy and leadership quality of the Taliban in Pakistan's tribal territories has qualitatively improved during the last few years. At the time of the U.S.-led military campaign in Afghanistan in late 2001, allies and sympathizers of the Taliban in Pakistan were not identified as 'Taliban' themselves. That reality is now a distant memory. Today, Pakistan's indigenous Taliban are an effective fighting force and are engaging the Pakistani military on one side and NATO forces on the other."
Summer 2007
Pakistan: Instability Raises Nuclear Security Concerns
Oxford Analytica
By Hassan Abbas, Former Senior Advisor, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
Managing the Atom Fellow Hassan Abbas provides analysis of Pakistan’s nuclear command and control systems and the security of its nuclear program in the aftermath of the recent test-firing of a nuclear-capable missile and terrorist attack.
Spring 2006
"'Islam versus the West' and the Political Thought of AbdolKarim Soroush"
al Nakhlah, The Fletcher School Online Journal for Issues Related to Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization
By Hassan Abbas, Former Senior Advisor, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
"Extremist forces in the Muslim world can only be defeated if progressive forces in both the West and the Islamic world cooperate to tackle the issue through dialogue and constructive engagement. A partnership is required. A unilateral campaign by the West to win the hearts and minds of Muslims without listening to their concerns or enlisting their aid will not succeed."
Winter 2006
"Pakistan Through the Lens of the 'Triple A' Theory"
The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, issue 1, volume 30
By Hassan Abbas, Former Senior Advisor, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
"How has a state whose founding fathers were secular people who believed in rule of law and democracy drifted toward religious extremism and authoritarianism? Three primary factors—variations on the Triple A theory of influence (Allah, the Army, and America)—have led Pakistan down this path: a powerful independent military, the mushrooming of religious militant groups, and the hydra-headed monster that is the intelligence services."
July 2007
"Tariff-Based Incentives for Improving Coal-Power-Plant Efficiencies in India"
Energy Policy, issue 7, volume 35
By Ambuj D. Sagar, Associate, Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program, Ananth Chikkatur, Former Associate, Energy Technology Innovation Policy research group, Nikit Abbyankar and N. Sreekumar
Energy Policy article assessing the efficiency of coal-based power plants and its role in the performance of India's power sector.
AP Photo
February 17, 2012
"Putin, the protest movement and political change in Russia"
EU Institute for Security Studies
By Simon Saradzhyan, Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and Nabi Abdullaev
Few leaders undertake major reforms in either domestic or foreign policy late in their rule, and Vladimir Putin – who seeks to return to the Kremlin this spring for at least six years – hardly wants to be an exception. However, should the disparate groups behind the recent unprecedented protests in Russia develop into an organised movement leading to a sustained increase in public pressure on the Kremlin, then Putin may end up pursuing far more extensive domestic political and economic reforms than he would wish.
Spring 2008
"What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy"
International Security, issue 4, volume 32
By Max Abrahms, Former Research Associate, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
The strategic model—the dominant paradigm in terrorism studies—claims that terrorists are rational actors who attack civilians to achieve political goals. To defeat terrorism, policymakers have sought to decrease its political utility by adhering to a no concessions policy, engaging in political accommodation, and promoting democracy. The evidence suggests, however, that terrorists are not motivated primarily by a desire to achieve political objectives. Rather, they use terrorism to develop strong affective ties with fellow terrorists. Counterterrorism strategies must therefore find ways to diminish the social utility of terrorism.
Summer 2007
"Correspondence: Does Terrorism Ever Work? The 2004 Madrid Train Bombings"
International Security, issue 1, volume 32
By William Rose, Rysia Murphy and Max Abrahms, Former Research Associate, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
William Rose and Rysia Murphy reply to Max Abrahms's fall 2006 International Security article, "Why Terrorism Does Not Work."
Fall 2006
"Why Terrorism Does Not Work"
International Security, issue 2, volume 31
By Max Abrahms, Former Research Associate, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
Terrorism may be a choice method of political coercion at the moment, but this study finds that it is not very successful. Terrorists who attack civilian populations rather than military targets fail to achieve their policy objectives, because countries whose populations are victims of massive terrorist violence are highly unlikely to negotiate, let alone make political concessions, with terrorists whose actions imply that they will not compromise.
James Gordon, Flickr Commons
September 6, 2007
The Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq
By General (ret.) James L. Jones, USMC, Former Senior Advisor, Preventive Defense Project, General (ret.) John Abrams, Lt. General (ret.) Martin R. Berndt, General (ret.) Charles G. Boyd, Command Sergeant Major (ret.) Dwight J. Brown, Terrance Gainer, John J. Hamre, Colonel (ret.) Michael Heidingsfield, Admiral (ret.) Gregory G. Johnson, General (ret.) George Joulwan, Lt. General (ret.) James C. King, Duncan McCausland, Sergeant Major (ret.) Alford McMichael, Lt. General (ret.) Gary S. McKissock, Brig. General (ret.) Richard Potter, Maj. General (ret.) Arnold L. Punaro, Charles Ramsey, John F. Timoney, Lt. General (ret.) John A. Van Alstyne and General (ret.) Charles Wilhelm
The Independent Commission submitted this report to the House and Senate Committees on Armed Services, Appropriations, Intelligence, and Foreign Relations/Affairs on the readiness of the Iraqi Security Forces in September 2007.
