ARTICLES AND OP-EDS
November 20, 2009
"Why Israel is Safer (from Iran) Than it Might Seem"
The Huffington Post
By Azeem Ibrahim, Research Fellow, International Security Program
Most of the arguments that Iran is a threat to Israel center around Iranian President Ahmadinejad's anti-Semitism and holocaust denial. But he does not make Iranian foreign policy, Khameini does. Khameini has been in office since 1989, throughout the period of relative detente with the West during Khatami's presidency, and through the violent and volatile Ahmadinejad years. Yes, there is evidence that Khameini is a tyrant comfortable sanctioning violence to hold onto power in Iran; no, there is no evidence that he is a psychopath whose hatred of Israel would drive him to order the murder of millions. Yes, there is evidence that he sanctions the sponsorship of anti-Israel terrorism to increase his influence in the region, but no, there is no evidence that he values a confrontation with Israel the reprisal from which would inevitably cause Iranian casualties and threaten the regime's already weak power structure (from within even if not from without).
November 1, 2009
"A Middle Way, Best Solution to Nuclear Crisis"
Iran Review
By Kayhan Barzegar, Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program
"Although it is difficult under the current circumstances to predict Iran's response to the agreement, but all signs point to a middle way, which if chosen carefully, could be positive and in line with Iran's national interests. In fact, if Iran kept part of the enriched uranium in the country and sent the rest to another country, it would pave the way for the continuation of cooperation."
October 22, 2009
"Russian Nuke Plans, Overkill"
International Relations and Security Network
By Simon Saradzhyan, Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
The Russian military and security community's drive to expand the use of nuclear weapons in the new defense doctrine will add little value to deterring real threats, but may undermine Russia's image as a co-leader of nuclear arms control, Simon Saradzhyan comments for ISN Security Watch.
October 13, 2009
"U.S., Russia Must Lead on Arms Control"
Politico
By General Brent Scowcroft, Joseph S. Nye, Harvard University Distinguished Service Professor, R. Nicholas Burns, Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Politics and Strobe Talbott
"The Nobel Peace Prize Committee cited Obama's dedication to arms control and nonproliferation when announcing last Friday his selection as this year's laureate. If he creates a positive, mutually reinforcing dynamic in the way he presents and sequences the two treaties [NPT and CTBT], it will give momentum and coherence to follow-on negotiations and the agreements that they produce."
October 13, 2009
"Obama's Nuclear Agenda"
Daily News Egypt
By Joseph S. Nye, Harvard University Distinguished Service Professor
"So long as the world remains a dangerous place with several nuclear weapons states, Obama must reassure its allies about the credibility of American guarantees of extended deterrence. Otherwise, reductions that create anxieties in other countries could lead them to develop their own weapons and thus increase the number of nuclear weapons states."
October 1, 2009
Obama’s opportunity in Iran
Boston Globe
By R. Nicholas Burns, Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Politics
The Obama administration faces a daunting set of barriers to diplomatic progress today as the United States holds the first serious talks between Washington and Tehran in 30 years.
September 30, 2009
Iran Sanctions: Who Really Wins?
The Brookings Institution
By Djavad Salehi-Isfahani, Research Fellow, The Dubai Initiative
US and Iranian representatives meet this week at a time when trust between the two countries is at a low ebb following the revelation last week of a previously undisclosed Iranian nuclear facility under construction and the test firing of Iran's long-range missiles on September 28. Meanwhile, the Obama administration's policy of engagement with Iran has emerged as little more than the old policy of "carrots and sticks."
September 17, 2009
"Obama Made the Right Decision on Missile Defense"
National Review Online
By Thomas M. Nichols, Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom
"Despite the outcry that President Obama has sold out the Europeans and caved to the Russians by cancelling missile defenses in Europe, it was the right thing to do. Those defenses were not going to work (or work well enough or soon enough to matter in any major crisis with Iran), and the diplomatic price we were paying for them was far out of proportion to any small gains we might have made by annoying the Russians or reassuring the Czechs and the Poles...."
August 31, 2009
"Keeping Up with the Indians"
Foreign Policy
By Paul Staniland, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program/Intrastate Conflict Program, 2008–2009
"Neither Americans nor Indians always understand how threatening their military strength can look to weaker countries. This dynamic is clearly at play in the case of Pakistan — Indians feel that they are self-evidently not a threat, while Americans are often baffled that Pakistani security elites care so much about India, which to the U.S. looks like a positive force for stability and democracy. At the end of the day, however, the world does not look the same from Rawalpindi and Islamabad as it does from Washington, and the U.S. needs to remember these differing goals, incentives, and fears as it pursues its vital interests in the region."
August 13, 2009
"Pakistan's Nukes are Safe. Maybe."
Foreign Policy
By Vipin Narang, Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom
"...[T]he primary risk to the Pakistani Army's ability to safely secure nuclear assets in its custody would likely be during crisis scenarios — either against India or due to a perceived Western threat to the integrity of Pakistan's arsenal — that might cause Pakistan to move to a higher state of nuclear readiness. If the Army feels compelled to rapidly disperse or relocate nuclear components and loses the defensive advantage of protecting them in secure fixed locations, insider foreknowledge of movements and the loss of centralized control could increase the probability of theft or loss...."
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