BOOK CHAPTERS
August 28, 2008
"Historic Barriers to Anglo-American Nuclear Cooperation"
By Andrew Brown, Associate, Project on Managing the Atom
Andrew Brown's chapter, "Historic Barriers to Anglo-American Nuclear Cooperation," has been published in the recent book US-UK Nuclear Cooperation After 50 Years. The book is a joint publication from CSIS and Chatham House London examining the impact of the 1958 Mutual Defense Agreement and its consequences.
September 2000
Ensuring Quality People in Defense
By David S.C. Chu, John P. White, Member of the Board, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John Brown and Nurith Berstein
Chapter in Keeping the Edge: Managing Defense for the Future
July 2005
"Conclusions: Lessons for the Design and Use of Voluntary, Collaborative, and Information-Based Approaches to Environmental Policy"
By Vicki Norberg-Bohm and Theo de Bruijn
July 2005
"Introduction: Toward a New Paradigm for the Transition to a Sustainable Industrial Society?"
By Theo de Bruijn and Vicki Norberg-Bohm
Department of Energy
January 2010
"Nuclear Terrorism: A Strategy for Prevention"
By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom
"On the night of November 8, 2007, two teams of armed men attacked the Pelindaba nuclear facility in South Africa, where hundreds of kilograms of weapons-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU) were stored. One of the teams opened fire on the site security forces, who reportedly fled. The other team of four armed men went through a 10,000-volt security fence, disabled the intrusion detectors so that no alarms sounded—possibly using insider knowledge of the security system—broke into the emergency control center, and shot a worker there in the chest after a brief struggle. The worker at the emergency control center raised an alarm for the first time. These intruders spent forty-five minutes inside the secured perimeter without ever being engaged by site security forces...."
December 9, 2008
"Securing Nuclear Stockpiles Worldwide"
By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom
Matthew Bunn authored the chapter "Securing Nuclear Stockpiles Worldwide" in the book Reykjavik Revisited: Steps Toward a World Free of Nuclear Weapons.
December 9, 2008
"Transparent and Irreversible Dismantlement of Nuclear Weapons"
By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom
Matthew Bunn authored the chapter "Transparent and Irreversible Dismantlement of Nuclear Weapons" in the book Reykjavik Revisited: Steps Toward a World Free of Nuclear Weapons.
November 2008
"Preventing Nuclear Terrorism"
By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom and Andrew Newman, Former Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom, August 2008–February 2011
Matthew Bunn and Andrew Newman contributed the chapter "Preventing Nuclear Terrorism," to the 2009 National Security and Nonproliferation Briefing Book, published by the Peace and Security Initiative.
October 2007
"Disposition of Excess Highly Enriched Uranium"
By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom and Anatoli Diakov
This chapter describes the progress of the Russian and U.S. HEU disposition programs and how they could be expanded and accelerated. It also provides a brief update on the progress of the international programs to clean out and dispose of civilian HEU. The quantities of HEU involved are much smaller than those in the weapons programs but civilian sites are typically much less secure than military ones. Cleaning them out may therefore contribute more to reducing the overall danger of nuclear theft.
October 2007
"Disposition of Excess Plutonium"
By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom and Anatoli Diakov
This chapter describes disposition options and assesses the Russian and U.S. programs. The discussion is also relevant to the problem of disposing of the world's growing stocks of separated civil plutonium —especially in the United Kingdom, which currently has no disposition plan.
