CONFERENCE PAPERS
July, 2006
The LWR Provision and the North Korean Nuclear Crisis: A Chinese Perspective
By Hui Zhang, Senior Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom
March 5-6, 2005
US Nuclear Policy and International Law: Does Washington Have a Compliance Problem?
By Steven E. Miller, Director, International Security Program; Editor-in-Chief, International Security; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom
March 1, 2005
U.S. Policy in the South Caucasus in the Second George W. Bush Administration
By Brenda Shaffer, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1999–2007; Former Research Director, Caspian Studies Program, 2000–2005; Former Research Director, Caspian Studies Project, 2005–2007
August 2003
"The [F]utility of Barbarism: Assessing the Impact of the Systematic Harm of Noncombatants in War"
By Ivan Arreguin-Toft, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2002-2009
Under what conditions does barbarism — a state or non-state actor’s deliberate and systematic injury of non-combatants during a conflict — help or hinder its military and political objectives?
October 29-November 2, 2001
"Reducing the Threat of Nuclear Theft and Sabotage"
By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom and George Bunn
The appalling events of September 11, 2001 require a major international intiative to strengthen security for such materials and facilities worldwide, and to put stringent security standards in place. This paper recommends a range of specific steps to upgrade security at individual facilities and strengthen national and international standards, with the goal of building a world in which all weapons-usable nuclear material is secure and accounted for, and all nuclear facilities secured from sabotage, with sufficient transparency that the international community can have confidence that this is the case. These steps will cost money, and accomplishing them will require sustained political leadership and reconsideration of a range of past policies and approaches. But the costs and risks of failing to act are far higher than the costs of acting now.
July 19, 2000
Detecting Undeclared Reprocessing Activities through Sampling Analysis
By Hui Zhang, Senior Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom
The Democratic-Peace Thesis in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Uses and Abuses
By Pinhas (Piki) Ish-Shalom, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2004-2005
17-21 July 2011
"Reassessing China’s Military Inventory of Highly Enriched Uranium"
By Hui Zhang, Senior Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom
Hui Zhang presented his paper "Reassessing China’s Military Inventory of Highly Enriched Uranium," at the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management 52nd Annual Meeting, in Palm Spring, CA, 17-21 July 2011.
17-21 July 2011
"China’s Stockpile of Military Plutonium: A New Estimate"
By Hui Zhang, Senior Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom
Hui Zhang presented his paper "China’s Stockpile of Military Plutonium: A New Estimate," at the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management 52nd Annual Meeting, in Palm Spring, CA, 17-21 July 2011.
July 2010
"China's Current Spent Fuel Management and Future Management Scenarios"
By Yun Zhou, Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program
China's recent nuclear energy ambitions have put it in the forefront of research and development in the nuclear industry.This paper will first discuss the status of China's current spent fuel management methods and storage capability. Second, this paper will estimate and calculate the accumulated spent fuel and required spent fuel storage up to 2040 based on three different nuclear development scenarios. Third, future spent fuel management scenarios from now to 2040 are designed and financial costs and proliferation risks are evaluated and discussed associated with each scenario. Last, policy recommendations will be provided for the future spent fuel.
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