CONFERENCE PAPERS
March 5-6, 2005
US Nuclear Policy and International Law: Does Washington Have a Compliance Problem?
By Steven E. Miller, Director, International Security Program; Editor-in-Chief, International Security; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom
March 1, 2005
U.S. Policy in the South Caucasus in the Second George W. Bush Administration
By Brenda Shaffer, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1999-2000; Former Research Director, Caspian Studies Project, 2004-2007
2005
Building a Genuine U.S.-Russian Partnership for Nuclear Security
By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom; Co-Principal Investigator, Energy Research, Development, Demonstration, and Deployment (ERD3) Policy Project
MTA Research Associate Matthew Bunn presented at the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management on building a genuine partnership between the United States and Russia to improve nuclear security.
September 21, 2004
Designing a Regime for Developing Countries that is Cost-Effective and Equitable
By Joseph Aldy, Former Co-Director, Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements and Jeffrey Frankel, James W. Harpel Professor of Capital Formation and Growth
Paper presented at the Leaders' Summit on Post-Kyoto Architecture: Toward an L20? Conference, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, NY, September 21, 2004
August 2003
"The [F]utility of Barbarism: Assessing the Impact of the Systematic Harm of Noncombatants in War"
By Ivan Arreguin-Toft, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2002-2009
Under what conditions does barbarism — a state or non-state actor’s deliberate and systematic injury of non-combatants during a conflict — help or hinder its military and political objectives?
13-17 July, 2003
Evaluating China's MPC&A System
By Hui Zhang, Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom
The September 11 large-scale terrorist attack shows the threat of nuclear terrorism is real. Recent seizures of stolen weapons-usable fissile materials (HEU and plutonium) make clear that establishing modern, well-designed nuclear material protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A) systems to secure nuclear material everywhere is critical to prevent against nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. This work will assess the current status of China’s MPC&A system, analyze existing regulations and administrative systems, and recommend steps for improvement, including international cooperation.
13-17 July, 2003
Approaches to Design Basis Threat in Russia in the Context of Significant Increase of Terrorist Activity
By Dmitry Kovchegin, Former Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program, 2002-2005
Design Basis Threat is one of the main factors to be taken into account during design of physical protection system of nuclear facility. In according with IAEA’s recommendations outlined in INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 (Corrected) “The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities” Design Basis Threat (DBT) defined as: “the attributes and characteristics of potential insider and/or external adversaries, who might attempt unauthorized removal of nuclear material or sabotage, against which a physical protection system is designed and evaluated”. Development of DBT is considered as one of the significant task during the work on domestic Russian regulations in the field of physical protection.
July 13, 2003
Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: an Update
By Anthony Wier, Former Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom/Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program, 2002-2007 and Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom; Co-Principal Investigator, Energy Research, Development, Demonstration, and Deployment (ERD3) Policy Project
June 23-27, 2002
China and Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty
By Hui Zhang, Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom
In this paper, I will explore China's possible position in upcoming FMCT negotiations, China’s major security concerns, the kind of verification provisions that could be accepted by China, and the factors that might facilitate China’s participation in the treaty.
November 1, 2001
"Strengthening IAEA Safeguards Using High-Resolution Commercial Satellite Imagery"
By Hui Zhang, Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom
