CONFERENCE PAPERS
October 31, 2001
"FMCT Verification: Case Studies"
By Hui Zhang, Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom
October 29-November 2, 2001
"Reducing the Threat of Nuclear Theft and Sabotage"
By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom; Co-Principal Investigator, Energy Research, Development, Demonstration, and Deployment (ERD3) Policy Project and George Bunn
The appalling events of September 11, 2001 require a major international intiative to strengthen security for such materials and facilities worldwide, and to put stringent security standards in place. This paper recommends a range of specific steps to upgrade security at individual facilities and strengthen national and international standards, with the goal of building a world in which all weapons-usable nuclear material is secure and accounted for, and all nuclear facilities secured from sabotage, with sufficient transparency that the international community can have confidence that this is the case. These steps will cost money, and accomplishing them will require sustained political leadership and reconsideration of a range of past policies and approaches. But the costs and risks of failing to act are far higher than the costs of acting now.
October 2001
Climate Change: An Agenda for Global Collective Action
By Joseph Aldy, Former Co-Director, Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements, Joseph E. Stiglitz and Peter R. Orszag
Prepared for the conference on "The Timing of Climate Change Policies," Pew Center on Global Climate Change, October 2001.
July 15-19, 2001
A Discussion of China's Nuclear Transparency Options
By Hui Zhang, Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom
This paper will discuss how much nuclear transparency China can afford to adopt in light of the changing international security context. The work will examine China’s attitude toward nuclear transparency; the possible influence of high-resolution satellite imagery on China’s position; what sorts of nuclear transparency China could accept under international arms control and nonproliferation treaties; and what kind of on-site inspections China could accept at its specific nuclear production facility and site under an FMCT.
July 2001
Economic Aspects of Civilian Reprocessing in China
By Hui Zhang, Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom
Currently, China is pursuing a long-term expansion of its nuclear power program and plans to reprocess the resulting civilian spent fuel, recycling the plutonium in MOX fuel for LWRs and in fast breeder reactors. China presently operates three civilian nuclear power reactors, but it plans to build about 20 reactors by 2020. A pilot civilian reprocessing plant has been built at Lanzhou, with a capacity 50 metric tons of spent fuel per year. This plant is ready to start operations now. A key decision now hanging in the balance is whether to proceed with expensive plans to build a larger commercial reprocessing plant, with a capacity of up to 800 tons per year, by 2020.
July 19, 2000
Detecting Undeclared Reprocessing Activities through Sampling Analysis
By Hui Zhang, Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom
July 16, 2000
Potential Application of Commercial Observation Satellite Imagery for the Verification of Declared and Undeclared Nuclear Production Facilities
By Hui Zhang, Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom
The Democratic-Peace Thesis in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Uses and Abuses
By Pinhas (Piki) Ish-Shalom, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2004-2005
