DISCUSSION PAPERS
AP Photo
October 2009
"Targeting Nuclear Programs in War and Peace"
By Matthew Fuhrmann, Affiliate, Project on Managing the Atom and Sarah Kreps, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2007-2008
When do states attack or consider attacking nuclear infrastructure in nonnuclear weapons states? Despite the importance of this question, relatively few scholarly articles have attempted to identify the factors that lead a state to attack another state's nuclear facilities. This paper conducts the first large-n analysis on when states use force as a way to control proliferation.
This paper challenges existing arguments that states are deterred from attacking nuclear programs by the prospect of a military retaliation from the proliferating state or concerns about international condemnation. Instead, it finds that states are more likely to attack nuclear programs when they believe that the proliferating state might use nuclear weapons or engage in other offensive behavior. States are willing to accept substantial costs in attacking if they believe that a particular country's acquisition of nuclear weapons poses a significant threat to their security.
AP Photo
July 2009
"U.S. Aid to Pakistan—U.S. Taxpayers Have Funded Pakistani Corruption"
By Azeem Ibrahim, Research Fellow, International Security Program
The United States must not provide Pakistani institutions with incentives to act counter to U.S. foreign policy objectives in the future. It has done so in the past. But until the spring of 2009, no comprehensive overview of the full funding to Pakistan was possible as the figures were kept secret. Those figures, as well as a full analysis of what is known about how they were spent, can now be evaluated. The available information paints a picture of a systemic lack of supervision in the provision of aid to Pakistan, often lax U.S. oversight, and the incentivization of U.S. taxpayer–funded corruption in the Pakistani military and security services. The author believes that this is the first attempt to present an overview of U.S. aid to Pakistan since 2001, evaluate it, and present recommendations on how to ensure that mistakes are not repeated and lessons are learned.
March 2007
"A New Energy Paradigm: Ensuring Nuclear Fuel Supply and Nonproliferation through International Collaboration with Insurance and Financial Markets"
By Debra K. Decker, Associate, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom and Erwann O. Michel-Kerjan
"Seeking ways to dissuade more states from contemplating launching their own uranium enrichment programs...the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is considering different mechanisms to assure these states that they can obtain fuel supplies from the market without political interference."
November, 2002
Defense Leadership in Russia: The General Staff and Strategic Management in a Comparative Perspective
By Michelle Von Euw, Former Editorial Assistant, International Security Program, 2001-2003; Former Faculty Assistant to Stephen Walt, Edward Parson, and Monica Toft, 1999-2001
March, 2002
Beyond the ABM Treaty: A Plea For a Limited National Missile Defense System
By Michelle Von Euw, Former Editorial Assistant, International Security Program, 2001-2003; Former Faculty Assistant to Stephen Walt, Edward Parson, and Monica Toft, 1999-2001
April, 1998
Getting to Zero: Is Pursuing a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World Too Difficult? Too Dangerous? Too Distracting?
By John P. Holdren, Former Director and Faculty Chair, Science, Technology and Public Policy Program
John P. Holdren sorts out some of the conceptual and terminological ambiguities about the meaning of "zero" nuclear weapons in this paper.
1989
"Analyzing the Dual Use Technologies Question"
By Dr. Ashton B. Carter, Co-Director, Preventive Defense Project (on leave), Harvard & Stanford Universities
Discussion Paper by Dr. Ashton B. Carter
AP Photo
October 2009
"Targeting Nuclear Programs in War and Peace"
By Matthew Fuhrmann, Affiliate, Project on Managing the Atom and Sarah Kreps, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2007-2008
When do states attack or consider attacking nuclear infrastructure in nonnuclear weapons states? Despite the importance of this question, relatively few scholarly articles have attempted to identify the factors that lead a state to attack another state's nuclear facilities. This paper conducts the first large-n analysis on when states use force as a way to control proliferation.
This paper challenges existing arguments that states are deterred from attacking nuclear programs by the prospect of a military retaliation from the proliferating state or concerns about international condemnation. Instead, it finds that states are more likely to attack nuclear programs when they believe that the proliferating state might use nuclear weapons or engage in other offensive behavior. States are willing to accept substantial costs in attacking if they believe that a particular country's acquisition of nuclear weapons poses a significant threat to their security.
