DISCUSSION PAPERS
March 2013
"Iran and Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Military Dynamics of Nonproliferation"
By Mansour Salsabili, Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom
Ambiguity in Iran's weapon acquisition dynamics exacerbates mistrust, which is the core reason for the present standoff at the negotiating table. This paper elucidates the Iranian military's capability and intention by delving into the main componential elements of weapon acquisition.
December 2012
"A WMD-Free Zone in the Middle East: Creating the Conditions for Sustained Progress"
By Martin B. Malin, Executive Director, Project on Managing the Atom and Paolo Foradori, Associate, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program
How can the states of the Middle East begin to create the political conditions for achieving sustained progress toward the elimination of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons? This paper examines the challenges and obstacles that the parties of the region will need to overcome to bring a WMD-free zone into force, and recommends near-term steps for improving regional security.
NNSA Production Office
December 14, 2012
"Defining and Implementing Best Practices in Nuclear Security"
By William H. Tobey, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
This paper analyzes the contribution that best practices can make to the field of nuclear security by doing the following:
- Defining what is meant by best practice
- Specifying a methodology for deriving it
- Understanding the resulting characteristics of the method
- Comparing its pros and cons to other methods contributing to security, such as guidelines and regulations
November 2012
"Antiproliferation: Tackling Proliferation by Engaging the Private Sector"
By Ian J. Stewart, Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom
Illicit trade from the international marketplace plays a direct role in sustaining the nuclear and missile programs of several countries, including Iran, in defiance of UN sanctions. This paper sets out what measures the private sector should take in order to manage the legal, financial and reputational risks associated with involvement in proliferation-related trade, and makes recommendations to national authorities for how for how to help the private sector identify and prevent potential proliferation.
AP Photo/U.S. Defense Department
September 2012 (Working Draft)
Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis in the Context of Strategic Stability
In this discussion paper Andrei Kokoshin, member of the Russian Academy of Sciences and sixth secretary of the Russian Security Council, offers a concise discussion of the essence of the most dangerous nuclear crisis in the history of humankind.
May 2012
"Perceptions and Narratives of Security: The Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps and the Iran-Iraq War"
By Annie Tracy Samuel, Research Fellow, International Security Program
This paper explores the importance of the Iran-Iraq War for the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) by analyzing how the Guards have used the war to present their positions on Iran's national security.
AP Photo
March 2012
What Happened to the Soviet Superpower’s Nuclear Arsenal? Clues for the Nuclear Security Summit
By Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; Douglas Dillon Professor of Government, Harvard Kennedy School
Twenty years ago Russia and fourteen other newly-independent states emerged from the ruins of the Soviet empire, many as nations for the first time in history. As is typical in the aftermath of the collapse of an empire, this was followed by a period of chaos, confusion, and corruption. As the saying went at the time, “everything is for sale.” At that same moment, as the Soviet state imploded, 35,000 nuclear weapons remained at thousands of sites across a vast Eurasian landmass that stretched across eleven time zones.
Today, fourteen of the fifteen successor states to the Soviet Union are nuclear weapons-free. This paper will address the question: how did this happen? Looking ahead, it will consider what clues we can extract from the success in denuclearizing fourteen post-Soviet states that can inform our non-proliferation and nuclear security efforts in the future. These clues may inform leaders of the U.S., Russia, and other responsible nations attending the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit on March 26-27, 2012. The paper will conclude with specific recommendations, some exceedingly ambitious that world leaders could follow to build on the Seoul summit’s achievements against nuclear terrorism in the period before the next summit in 2014. One of these would be to establish a Global Alliance Against Nuclear Terrorism.
May 2011
"U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe after NATO's Lisbon Summit: Why Their Withdrawal Is Desirable and Feasible"
By Tom Sauer, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1997-1999 and Bob van der Zwaan, Former Research Associate, Energy Technology Innovation research group/Project on Managing the Atom Project/Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program, 2001–2005
This paper describes how, over the past two decades, the usefulness of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons that are forward-deployed in Europe has gradually declined, and it explains the logic behind their decreased importance.
April 2011
"Before the First Bomb Goes Off: Developing Nuclear Attribution Standards and Policies"
By Debra K. Decker, Former Associate, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom, 2006–2011
Nuclear forensics and attribution are the new "deterrence" concepts against illicit use of fissile material. Although the science is being developed, the required systems of policies and processes have not been fully analyzed. This paper attempts to show how nuclear attribution can advance from theory to practice by establishing multilaterally coordinated policies and procedures and by replicating systems that have worked in other disciplines.
AP Photo
October 2009
"Targeting Nuclear Programs in War and Peace"
By Matthew Fuhrmann, Former Associate, Project on Managing the Atom, January–August 2009; Former Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, 2008–December 2009 and Sarah Kreps, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2007–2008
When do states attack or consider attacking nuclear infrastructure in nonnuclear weapons states? Despite the importance of this question, relatively few scholarly articles have attempted to identify the factors that lead a state to attack another state's nuclear facilities. This paper conducts the first large-n analysis on when states use force as a way to control proliferation.
This paper challenges existing arguments that states are deterred from attacking nuclear programs by the prospect of a military retaliation from the proliferating state or concerns about international condemnation. Instead, it finds that states are more likely to attack nuclear programs when they believe that the proliferating state might use nuclear weapons or engage in other offensive behavior. States are willing to accept substantial costs in attacking if they believe that a particular country's acquisition of nuclear weapons poses a significant threat to their security.
