JOURNAL ARTICLES
October 2012
"Decrypting the Fifth Amendment: The Limits of Self-Incrimination"
University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law Heightened Scrutiny, volume 15
By Vivek Mohan, Research Fellow, Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program/Information and Communications Technology and Public Policy Project and John Villasenor
In "Decrypting the Fifth Amendment: The Limits of Self-Incrimination in the Digital Era," Vivek Mohan and John Villasenor examine the scope of information protected from compelled self-incriminating disclosure by exploring the boundaries of the contents of the mind. They propose a framework for bringing the foregone conclusion doctrine, which was articulated in 1976, into the digital era, and conclude that the question of what constitutes a "testimonial act" must be revisited to proactively ensure that emerging technologies do not eviscerate the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
AP Photo
November 2012
"The Energy Technology Innovation System"
Annual Review of Environment and Resources, volume 37
By Kelly Sims Gallagher, Senior Associate, Energy Technology Innovation Policy research group, Arnulf Grubler, Laura Kuhl, Gregory Nemet, Former Visiting Scholar, Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program/Energy Technology Innovation Policy research group, January–June 2011 and Charlie Wilson
This article reviews the concept of an energy technology innovation system (ETIS). The ETIS is a systemic perspective on innovation comprising all aspects of energy transformations (supply and demand); all stages of the technology development cycle; as well as all the major innovation processes, feedbacks, actors, institutions, and networks.
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2012
"Israel in Lebanon—Getting It Wrong: The 1982 Invasion, 2000 Withdrawal, and 2006 War"
Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs, issue 3, volume VI
By Chuck Freilich, Senior Fellow, International Security Program
"The present study assesses the reasons for Israel's repeated policy failures in Lebanon by comparing the decision making processes (DMPs) in the three most important cases above: the two wars and the unilateral withdrawal. Failure, of course, is both a relative and subjective term. Indeed, it can be argued that not all of these cases were unequivocal failures; the outcome of the 2006 war was not entirely negative from Israel's perspective and the alternative in 2000, such as remaining in Lebanon, might have been worse. Thus, failure, for the purposes of this study, refers not to the quality of the outcomes, but to Israel's ability to achieve the objectives set out by its leaders."
September 2012
"Theory and Policy in International Relations: Some Personal Reflections"
Yale Journal of International Affairs, issue 2, volume 7
By Stephen M. Walt, Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Affairs; Faculty Chair, International Security Program
"It has been nearly thirty years since I received my PhD. At that time, I was convinced that systematic scholarly research could uncover and verify timeless truths about international politics and foreign policy, and that once those discoveries had been made, a grateful policy community would quickly absorb them and adopt the right prescriptions. With the passage of time, I've gained both a greater respect for the limits of what social science can accomplish and a greater appreciation for the imperviousness of the policy community to reasoned discourse, especially in the United States. Even if scholars were able to produce more convincing analyses—itself a debatable proposition—overcoming the entrenched interests that shape what policy makers choose to do is not easy."
Fall 2012
"Correspondence: Debating India’s Pathway to Nuclearization"
International Security, issue 2, volume 37
By Andrew B. Kennedy, Jason Stone, Gaurav Kampani and Karthika Sasikumar, Former Stanton Nuclear Security Junior Faculty Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom, 2010–2011; Former Associate, International Security Program, 2008–2009
Gaurav Kampani, Karthika Sasikumar, and Jason Stone each respond to Andrew B. Kennedy's fall 2011 International Security article, "India's Nuclear Odyssey: Implicit Umbrellas, Diplomatic Disappointments, and the Bomb."
AP Images
Fall 2012
"China's Fear of Contagion: Tiananmen Square and the Power of the European Example"
International Security, issue 2, volume 37
By Mary Elise Sarotte, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1997–1999
Obsession with the democratic changes sweeping Europe in the late 1980s and a concomitant desire to keep these changes from spreading may have played a critical role in the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) decision to take violent action against the Tiananmen Square protestors in 1989. New sources, released during the 2009 to 2011 anniversaries of the events that ended the Cold War, cite the CCP’s determination to prevent the spread of democracy as one of its primary motivating factors. These sources also suggest that the CCP did not fear reprisals by the United States, which it predicted would take “no real countermeasures.”
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Fall 2012
"The Psychology of Threat in Intergroup Conflict: Emotions, Rationality, and Opportunity in the Rwandan Genocide"
International Security, issue 2, volume 37
By Omar S. McDoom, Former Research Fellow, Intrastate Conflict Program/International Security Program, 2004-2007; Former Associate, Intrastate Conflict Program/International Security Program, 2007-2008
Group emotions, fear in particular, play an important role in how security threats polarize social groups. The case of the Rwanadan genocide demonstrates that four psychosocial mechanisms (boundary activation, outgroup derogation, outgroup homogenization, and ingroup cohesion) play an important role in group polarization, and that fear is a crucial driver of these mechanisms. A more thorough understanding of how security threats activate group polarization could help policymakers to minimize intergroup conflict.
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Fall 2012
"Israel’s War in Gaza: A Paradigm of Effective Military Learning and Adaptation"
International Security, issue 2, volume 37
The United States and its allies have long sought to learn from major combat encounters and to assimilate their learning into military doctrine, force development, and operating procedures. Israeli’s successful campaign in Gaza in 2008–09 is evidence that the Israel Defense Forces learned from their mistakes in the Lebanon War two years earlier and incorporated that learning into their combat repertoire. Israel’s achievement in this area should be studied as an exemplar of military lessons learned and assimilated.
Full article available.
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Fall 2012
"Just War Moral Philosophy and the 2008–09 Israeli Campaign in Gaza"
International Security, issue 2, volume 37
The controversial 2008–09 Israeli campaign in Gaza violated just war principles on three main accounts: it did not discriminate in its targets, there was no just cause, and it did not exhaust nonviolent alternatives. Human rights organizations have criticized Israel for its methods during the campaign, but its claim that the attack was an act of self-defense and was therefore justifiable is still widely accepted. The campaign’s primary purpose, however, was to crush resistance to Israel’s repression of Gaza—an indefensible cause by just war standards. Moreover, Israel did not fully explore political alternatives before launching the attack.
Full article available.
Fall 2012
"Two Concepts of Liberty: U.S. Cold War Grand Strategies and the Liberal Tradition"
International Security, issue 2, volume 37
By Brendan Rittenhouse Green, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2009–2011
Contrary to conventional accounts, the United States did not immediately adopt a balancing strategy against the Soviet Union after World War II. Rather, the Eisenhower administration sought U.S. withdrawal from Western Europe by pursuing a buck-passing strategy. Only under the Kennedy administration did the United States begin to make permanent commitments to the defense of Europe. A new theory analyzes this shift in policy, defining those who sought to withdraw from Europe as “negative liberals” and those who sought firmer balancing commitments as “positive liberals.”
