JOURNAL ARTICLES
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Spring 2009
"How Smart and Tough Are Democracies? Reassessing Theories of Democratic Victory in War"
International Security, issue 4, volume 33
By Alexander B. Downes, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2007-2008
New evidence challenges the near-conventional argument that democracies are more likely than nondemocracies to win wars they start. A reanalysis of original data on war outcomes and an in-depth case study of the Johnson administration's decisions regarding Vietnam in 1965 demonstrate that democracies of all types are not significantly more likely to win wars. Furthermore, they are constrained by domestic politics and are often pressured into unwinnable wars.
Spring 2009
"The Social Market Roots of Democratic Peace"
International Security, issue 4, volume 33
By Michael Mousseau, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2005-2006
Democracy does not cause peace among nations. An analysis of conflicts from 1961 to 2001 shows that the absence of war between democratic countries depends on domestic economic factors-such as a contract-intensive economy-rather than on democracy. Because China and Russia lack this type of economy, an economic divide will define great power politics in the coming decade. Democratic leaders of nations with contract-intensive economies would do better to support global economic opportunity than to promote democracy abroad.
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Spring 2009
"Bridge over Troubled Water? Envisioning a China-Taiwan Peace Agreement"
International Security, issue 4, volume 33
By Phillip C. Saunders and Scott L. Kastner
The new Taiwan president and senior leaders in China have indicated a willingness to reach a cross-strait agreement. Such an agreement could reduce the possibility of a military confrontation in the Taiwan Strait. Although significant obstacles remain, if China negotiates a formal and generous agreement with Taiwan, a peace agreement—if reached—could endure.
Spring 2009
"Long Time Coming: Prospects for Democracy"
International Security, issue 4, volume 33
The odds of Iraq achieving democracy in the next twenty-five years are nearly zero, at best about two in thirty, but probably worse. Since the end of the nineteenth century, thirty nations have had long-lasting autocracies as extreme as Iraq's. Of those, only seven are now democratic. Their average transition time was fifty years, and only two managed it in twenty-five years. Their collective political experience indicates a similarly pessimistic future for Iraq and comparable nations. Furthermore, Iraq lacks the structural conditions necessary for a successful democratic transition. Thus the sober question of whether Iraq can democratize should deter policymakers from considering regime change in Iran or North Korea.
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April 2009
"Improving India's Counterterrorism Policy after Mumbai"
CTC Sentinel, issue 4, volume 2
By Paul Staniland, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program/Intrastate Conflict Program, 2008–2009
"All of these pathologies were evident in the failure to prevent or appropriately respond to the Mumbai attacks. There was in fact significant intelligence suggesting a seaborne terrorist attack was likely, and even that prominent sites such as the Taj Hotel would be targeted. This information, however, was ignored by several key bureaucratic actors—including the Coast Guard and the Maharashtra state director-general of police—because it was deemed unactionable. Others, such as the Maharashtra Anti-Terrorism Squad, at least attempted some kind of preparation. The differences in readiness highlight the extent of fragmentation among the security apparatus. Even when Mumbai police tried to take preventive action, they lacked the manpower to sustain increased security at the hotels. Once the attack occurred, the security forces did not have sufficient night-vision equipment, heavy weaponry, or information about the attack sites, leading to a long response time and the emergence of a disastrous siege...."
Spring 2009
"Power without Influence: The Bush Administration’s Foreign Policy Failure in the Middle East"
International Security, issue 4, volume 33
By Jeremy Pressman, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2002-2003
The George W. Bush administration's efforts in the Middle East failed to advance U.S. national security. The Bush administration did not defeat terrorism, promote democracy in the region, or stop nonconventional proliferation. It was unsuccessful because it relied too heavily on military force, showed an unwillingness to learn and adapt, and did not resolve long-standing policy contradictions. Given the Bush administration's failure in the Middle East, scholars should examine why material power does not automatically translate into international influence.
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April 2009
"Defining the Punjabi Taliban Network"
CTC Sentinel, issue 4, volume 2
By Hassan Abbas, Senior Advisor, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
"The Punjabi Taliban network is a loose conglomeration of members of banned militant groups of Punjabi origin—sectarian as well as those focused on the conflict in Kashmir—that have developed strong connections with Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Afghan Taliban and other militant groups based in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). They shuttle between FATA and the rest of Pakistan, providing logistical support to FATA- and Afghan-based militants to conduct terrorist operations deep inside Pakistan. Between March 2005 and March 2007 alone, for example, about 2,000 militants from southern and northern Punjab Province reportedly moved to South Waziristan and started different businesses in an effort to create logistical support networks. Given their knowledge about Punjabi cities and security structure, they have proved to be valuable partners for the TTP as it targets cities in Punjab, such as Lahore, Rawalpindi and Islamabad...."
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February 2009
"Carbon Mitigation in the Indian Coal-Power Sector: Options and Recommendations"
Energy Procedia, issue 1, volume 1
By Ananth Chikkatur, Associate, Energy Technology Innovation Policy and Ambuj D. Sagar, Former Visiting Scholar, Energy Technology Innovation Policy research group (ETIP), June 2009; Former Research Fellow, ETIP, 1996-2002; Former Senior Research Associate, Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program, 2007-2008
Given coal's large contribution to India's emissions, it is important to explore options for reducing emissions from the Indian coal power sector. Even as India awaits stronger action by industrialized countries, several no-regrets options can still be instituted to position the Indian coal-power sector appropriately for an eventual deeper carbon mitigation strategy: (a) improve efficiency of generation, transmission and distribution, and end-use systems; (b) aggressively deploy higher-efficiency coal combustion technologies; (c) develop a strategic plan for technology innovation; (d) improve environmental regulations to keep open economic carbon capture options; and (e) invest in detailed geological assessment of carbon storage sites.
April 1, 2009
"A Strategic Approach to Nuclear Proliferation"
Journal of Conflict Resolution, issue 2, volume 53
By Erik Gartzke and Matthew Kroenig, Affiliate, Project on Managing the Atom
Gartzke and Kroenig examine why states acquire nuclear weapons, why they engage in nuclear cooperation, and explore the relationship between nuclear weapons possession and a variety of security and diplomatic outcomes. This list does not cover the full range of possible nuclear proliferation issues that could be subjected to scholarly scrutiny, but they offer several advantages for our research. First, these outcomes are substantively important. Second, they can be measured, allowing them to quantitatively analyze nuclear proliferation across cases and over time. Third, this list covers a broader range of outcomes than are considered in the existing literature.
April 1, 2009
"Importing the Bomb: Sensitive Nuclear Assistance and Nuclear Proliferation"
Journal of Conflict Resolution, issue 2, volume 53
By Matthew Kroenig, Affiliate, Project on Managing the Atom
Matthew Kroenig's article "Importing the Bomb: Sensitive Nuclear Assistance and Nuclear Proliferation" argues that sensitive nuclear transfers are an important determinant of nuclear proliferation. In broader terms, Kroenig finds strong support for a supply-side approach to nuclear proliferation. States that are better able to produce nuclear weapons, due to either international assistance or domestic capacity, are more likely to do so.
