PAPERS
February 2007
"Funding for U.S. Efforts to Improve Controls Over Nuclear Weapons, Materials, and Expertise Overseas: Recent Developments and Trends"
By Anthony Wier, Former Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom/Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program, 2002-2007 and Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom
Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier find that although threat reduction funding has had dramatic effects in reducing the risk of nuclear terrorism, the Bush administration’s proposed FY 2008 budget for cooperative threat reduction would reduce the overall funds available. They propose a number of remedies, some of which have been taken up by congress in the appropriations process.
June 2006
"Placing Iran's Enrichment Activities in Standby"
By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom
Matthew Bunn argues that placing the centrifuges at Natanz in one of two "standby" modes offered a way out of the current stand-off over suspension.
October, 2005
Learning from Past Success: The NPT and the Future of Non-proliferation
By James Walsh, Former Executive Director, Project on Managing the Atom/Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program, 2002-2006; Former Research Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 1999-2002
September 2004
"Global Cleanout: An Emerging Approach to the Civil Nuclear Material Threat"
By Philipp C. Bleek, Former Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, 2009–December 2010
Nuclear proliferation to terrorists willing to sacrifice their lives to kill hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians represents a grave threat to the United States and its allies; nuclear proliferation to hostile states poses serious dangers. Yet poorly secured civil research sites with hundreds of nuclear bombs' worth of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium are scattered around the globe. Because obtaining such material is the greatest hurdle to constructing a nuclear weapon, these sites represent an urgent proliferation threat.
April 23, 2004
Reducing Global Dangers from HEU: Lecture from the Moscow Conference on Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction
By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom
July 2003
An American Security Policy: Challenge, Opportunity, Commitment
By Ashton B. Carter, Former Co-Director, Preventive Defense Project, Harvard & Stanford Universities, Dr. William J. Perry, Former Co-Director, Preventive Defense Project, Secretary Madeleine K. Albright, Samuel R. Berger, Louis Caldera, General Wesley K. Clark, Former Senior Advisor, 2001-2009, Preventive Defense Project, General (ret.) John M. Shalikashvili, Former Founding Senior Advisor, Preventive Defense Project, Dr. Elizabeth D. Sherwood-Randall, Former Founding Senior Advisor, Preventive Defense Project, Alfonso E. Lenhardt and John D. Podesta
A paper by the National Security Advisory Group
December 23, 2002
"Iran's Nuclear Activities: What Might the IAEA Learn?"
By Chen Zak Kane, Former Associate, Project on Managing the Atom, 2008–2010; Former Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, 2005–2007, 2002–2004
"Satellite photos published last week showed two sites in Iran that might house a civilian energy program and/or a nuclear weapons program. To determine exactly what purpose these sites serve would require an on-site inspection. Yet, inspections performed by international regulatory agencies are bound by certain limitations. What are the chances that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the organization responsible for verifying compliance to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), will detect clandestine nuclear activities in these two sites or elsewhere in Iran?"
AP Photo
April 2012
"Safe, Secure and Effective Nuclear Operations in the Nuclear Zero Era"
By Ronald G. Allen, Jr., Former Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom, 2011–2012
Without significant change in the geopolitical landscape, nuclear weapons will remain a relevant portion of America's long-term national security strategy. Therefore, the burdens and responsibilities of maintaining an effective nuclear deterrent force are paramount to ensure credibility for America and her allies. Bottom line: nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence are still relevant today and for the foreseeable future. Therefore, to maintian international strategic stability we must embrace the necessity of nuclear deterrence, develop strategic policy that supports deterrence as an essential element and adequately resource the enterprise.
April 2012
"Nuclear Collisions: Discord, Reform & the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime"
By Steven E. Miller, Director, International Security Program; Editor-in-Chief, International Security; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom, Wael Al-Assad, Jayantha Dhanapala, C. Raja Mohan and Ta Minh Tuan
Nearly all of the 190 signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) agree that the forty-two-year-old treaty is fragile and in need of fundamental reform. But gaining consensus on how to fix the NPT will require reconciling the sharply differing views of nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states. Strengthening the international rules is increasingly important as dozens of countries, including some with unstable political environments, explore nuclear energy. The result is an ever-increasing distribution of this technology. In this paper, Steven E. Miller outlines the main points of contention within the NPT regime and identifies the issues that have made reform so difficult.
June 2011
"Ensuring Strategic Stability in the Past and Present: Theoretical and Applied Questions"
In the Foreword to this paper by Andrei Kokoshin, Belfer Center Director Graham Allison writes: "The global nuclear order is reaching a tipping point. Several trends are advancing along crooked paths, each undermining this order. These trends include North Korea’s expanding nuclear weapons program, Iran’s continuing nuclear ambitions, Pakistan’s increasing instability, growing doubts about the sustainability of the nonproliferation regime in general, and terrorist groups’ enduring aspirations to acquire nuclear weapons. Andrei Kokoshin, deputy of the State Duma and former secretary of Russia’s Security Council, analyzes these challenges that threaten to cause the nuclear order to collapse in the following paper."
