"...[A]ssessing the bioterrorism threat coming from the life sciences requires a broad range of expertise and information. A better analysis of such threats would involve relevant analysts within the intelligence community engaging with a range of social science experts. Such experts could provide information about terrorist intentions, motivations, and capabilities, as well as a more nuanced understanding of the difficulties involved in replicating scientific experiments and utilizing them for terrorist purposes."
February 11, 2014
By Matthew Bunn, Professor of Practice; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom
In this presentation to an Institute for Nuclear Materiials Management workshop on risk-informing security, Matthew Bunn proposes a new approach to judging which materials would be easiest or more difficult for terrorists to use in a nuclear bomb, and hence which materials require more or less security.
By William H. Tobey, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
In the dead of night on July 28, 2012, three senior citizens, including an 82-year-old Catholic nun, Sister Megan Rice, broke into the Y-12 National Security Complex near Oak Ridge, Tennessee, site of the US Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility (HEUMF). This self-proclaimed “Fort Knox of uranium” is America’s central repository for weapons-grade uranium.
....The security failings revealed by the nun and her fellow protesters are legion. The protesters were on the site for over an hour and 20 minutes, trekking about seven-tenths of a mile as the crow flies, but far longer as they traversed a steep ridge. They pierced fences equipped with sophisticated sensors. Yet the Y-12 Protective Force failed to spot them until they enjoyed unimpeded access to the exterior of the HEUMF forabout 20 minutes. Had these individuals been well-armed, well-equipped terrorists, instead of Bible-toting peace protesters, the incident would have been far more dire.
January 28, 2014
By Olli Heinonen, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
Testimony on the implementation of the Iran nuclear deal by Belfer Center senior fellow Olli Heinonen before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs's Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, and Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa.
January 28, 2014
By Nicholas Burns, Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Politics, Harvard Kennedy School
A daily service of Morning Prayers has been kept at Harvard since its founding in 1636. Held Monday through Saturday during term in Appleton Chapel, the service consists of music, prayer, and a brief address given by a member or friend of the University. This service, open to all, is designed to enable students and faculty to attend nine o'clock classes.
Professor Burns led Morning Prayers on January 28, 2014 where he asked attendees to join him in prayer for peace and justice around the world and here at home in America. He began with a reading from Amos 5, verses 22-24: “Even though you bring me burnt offerings and grain offerings, I will not accept them. Though you bring choice fellowship offerings, I will have no regard for them. But, let justice roll down like waters, and righteousness like an ever-flowing stream.”
January 13, 2014
In these slides, William H. Tobey and Pavel Zolotarev provide an updated summary of the threat of nuclear terrorism, based in part on the new U.S.-Russian report, Steps to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism. This was presented at the Meeting of the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit ‘Sherpas’, hosted by the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Pattaya, Thailand, on January 13, 2014.
By Erik Gartzke
"The internet is said to be revolutionary because it is a leveler—reducing Western military advantages—and because dependence on the internet makes developed countries more vulnerable to attack. The conviction that the internet is an Achilles' heel for the existing world order is based on narrow conceptions of the potential for harm. The internet cannot perform functions traditionally assigned to military force. To the contrary, cyberwar creates another advantage for powerful status quo nations and interests."
By Henrik Larsen, Research Fellow, International Security Program
NATO after Afghanistan is an organization that suffers from a certain fatigue pertaining to future stabilization challenges. NATO will not automatically cease to conduct operations after 2014, but the level of ambition will be lower. The Afghanistan experience and the failures of the light footprint approach calls for a thinking that is less liberalist "in the abstract" and more focused on provision of basic services (security, development, and governance).
December 23, 2013
By Terence Roehrig, Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom
An equally likely candidate for starting a conflict between North and South Korea is a disputed maritime boundary called the Northern Limit Line (NLL) drawn in the Yellow Sea (West Sea). This seminar examined the roots of the dispute, the economic, international law, and security dimensions of the issue and explores possible solutions to the problem.
November 21, 2013
By Trevor Findlay, Senior Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program
The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the United Nations are undertaking an unprecedented operation in Syria: disarming a country of a particular type of weaponry in the midst of a civil war. Professor Findlay discussed the issue in the context of the overlapping legal, institutional, technical, and political demands being made of Syria and the prospects for success of the operation.