Journal Article (continued)
Journal Article, Perspectives on Politics, issue 4, volume 13
By Dina Bishara, Associate, Middle East Initiative
The concept of "ignoring" refers not only to actions by regime officials but also captures protesters’ perceptions of those actions. Examples of ignoring include not communicating with protesters, issuing condescending statements, physically evading protesters, or acting with contempt toward popular mobilization. Existing conceptual tools do not adequately capture these dynamics. By integrating protesters’ perceptions of the behavior of the targets of mobilization, not just of the security forces, the concept of “ignoring” helps explain protesters’ reactions and their future mobilization, in a way that conventional concepts such as tolerance cannot capture.
Journal Article, International Security, issue 1, volume 40
Contrary to conventional wisdom, states do not typically construct fortified boundaries in response to border disputes or to prevent terrorism. Instead, most build such boundaries for economic reasons, to keep out unwanted migrants from poorer states. Further, Muslim states are more likely to both build and be the targets of fortified boundaries.
Journal Article, International Security, issue 1, volume 39
Al-Qaida has established a metanarrative that enables it to recruit militants and supporters. The United States and its allies can challenge its ability to do so by delegitimizing the ideological motivations that inform that metanarrative.
Journal Article, International Security, issue 4, volume 38
By Jenna Jordan
Many academics and policymakers argue that the removal of leaders is an effective strategy in combating terrorism. Leadership decapitation is not always successful, however. A theory of organizational resilience explains why some terrorist organizations survive decapitation. Application of this theoretical model to the case of al-Qaida reveals that the deaths of Osama bin Laden and other high level al-Qaida operatives are unlikely to cause significant organizational decline.
"The Structure of Success: How the Internal Distribution of Power Drives Armed Group Behavior and National Movement Effectiveness"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 3, volume 38
By Peter Krause, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program
When and why do national movements succeed? What explains variation in the use and effectiveness of political violence employed by nationalist groups? Analysis of seventeen campaigns involving sixteen groups within the Palestinian and Algerian national movements suggests that hegemonic movements with one significant group are most likely to succeed.
Journal Article, International Security, issue 3, volume 38
William G. Nomikos responds to Alexander B. Downes and Jonathan Monten's Spring 2013 International Security article, "Forced to Be Free?: Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Rarely Leads to Democratization."
Journal Article, International Security, issue 1, volume 38
By Aidan Hehir
Many observers heralded the Security Council–sanctioned intervention in Libya in March 2011 as evidence of the efficacy of the responsibility to protect (R2P). Although there is no doubt that the intervention was significant, the implications of Resolution 1973 are not as profound as some have claimed. The intervention certainly coheres with the spirit of R2P, but it is possible to situate it in the context of a trajectory of Security Council responses to large-scale intrastate crises that predate the emergence of R2P. This trajectory is a function of the decisionmaking of the five permanent members of the Security Council (P5), a group guided by politics and pragmatism rather than principles. As a consequence, the Security Council’s record in dealing with intrastate crises is characterized by a preponderance of inertia punctuated by aberrant flashes of resolve and timely action impelled by the occasional coincidence of interests and humanitarian need, rather than an adherence to either law or norms. The underlying factors that contributed to this record of inconsistency—primarily the P5’s veto power—remain post-Libya, and thus the international response to intrastate crises likely will continue to be inconsistent.
Journal Article, issue 1, volume 38
By Alan Kuperman, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2000–2001
NATO's 2011 humanitarian military intervention in Libya has been hailed as a model for implementing the emerging norm of the responsibility to protect (R2P), on grounds that it prevented an impending bloodbath in Benghazi and facilitated the ouster of Libya's oppressive ruler, Muammar al-Qaddafi, who had targeted peaceful civil protesters. Before the international community embraces such conclusions, however, a more rigorous assessment of the net humanitarian impact of NATO intervention in Libya is warranted.
Journal Article, International Security, issue 4, volume 37
Many experts argue that climate change will exacerbate the severity and number of extreme weather events. Such climate-related hazards will be important security concerns and sources of vulnerability in the future regardless of whether they contribute to conflict.
Journal Article, Sharqiyya
By Annie Tracy Samuel, Former Associate, International Security Program, July–August 2014; Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2011–2014; Former Research Fellow, Dubai Initiative, Fall 2011
"The past year has been one of tremendous change in the Middle East and North Africa. The transformations that have come in the wake of momentous upheavals—now commonly known as the Arab Spring—have a wide and varying significance. For many people in the region, the past year has been one of daring, fearless action in pursuit of far-reaching political change. Their demands induced fear among the long-time, autocratic rulers, which has resulted either in the abdication of long-clung-to power or in brutal resistance and violence against masses of unarmed, pro-democracy protesters. World leaders have found themselves scrambling to protect various vital interests while struggling not to end up on the wrong side of history."