AMERICAS
1984
Satellites and Anti-Satellites: The Limits of the Possible
Journal Article, International Security, issue 4, volume 10
By Dr. Ashton B. Carter, Co-Director, Preventive Defense Project (on leave), Harvard & Stanford Universities
Article by Dr. Ashton B. Carter in International Security
1984
Ballistic Missile Defense
Book
By Dr. Ashton B. Carter, Co-Director, Preventive Defense Project (on leave), Harvard & Stanford Universities and David N. Schwartz
Book edited by Ashton B. Carter and David N. Schwartz
April 1984
Directed Energy Missile Defense in Space
Report
By Dr. Ashton B. Carter, Co-Director, Preventive Defense Project (on leave), Harvard & Stanford Universities
Report by Dr. Ashton B. Carter for The Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress
September 1981
Air Mobile MX Basing
Book Chapter
By Dr. Ashton B. Carter, Co-Director, Preventive Defense Project (on leave), Harvard & Stanford Universities
This chapter discusses three concepts, distinguished by their approaches to the problems of dependence on warning for survivability and postattack endurance beyond the unrefueled flight time of the aircraft.
September 1981
MX Missile Basing
Book
The purpose of this study is to identify MX basing modes and to assess the major advantages, disadvantages, risks, and uncertainties of each.
May 6, 1981
The U.S.- Japan "Pie"
Op-Ed, New York Times
By Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; Douglas Dillon Professor of Government; Faculty Chair, Dubai Initiative, Harvard Kennedy School
Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki's predecessor, Masayoshi Ohira, coined the phrase "productive partnership" to define the relationship between Japan and the United States. Mr. Suzuki's current visit to this country, and the agreement last week to restrict Japan's automobile exports to the United States, provide an appropriate opportunity to consider the questions: productive of what? for whom? Autos aside, the answer for Japan seems clear. The American-Japanese relationship provides Japan with basic security guarantees essential to its self-defense, a framework of international order within which Japan can continue to develop as a major independent power, and vital economic markets. For the United States, the question appears tougher. Still, assuming competent management of our side of the partnershipe, Americans enjoy at least three major categories of benefits.
December 21, 1980
An Intelligence Agenda
Op-Ed, New York Times
By Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; Douglas Dillon Professor of Government; Faculty Chair, Dubai Initiative, Harvard Kennedy School
The central test of a national intelligence service is how well its analyses and estimates inform policy-makers of probable developments abroad. More than any other, it is this test that the United States intelligence community is failing today.
Consider the case of Iran. Through l978 and 1979, American intelligence profoundly misassessed the revolutionary forces opposing the Shah. For example, in August l978, a Central Intelligence Agency estimate concluded: 'Iran is not in a revolutionary or even prerevolutionary situation.' The intelligence community's failure to illuminate these events exasperated President Carter, provoking him to send a memorandum to the C.I.A. declaring: 'I am not satisfied with the quality of political intelligence.'
Beneath the surface of this case, one finds characteristic failings of the current community in the three key elements of performance: collection, analysis, and service to policy-makers.
March 1974
Cold Dawn and the Mind of Kissinger
Journal Article, The Washington Monthly
By Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; Douglas Dillon Professor of Government; Faculty Chair, Dubai Initiative, Harvard Kennedy School
On Kissinger's secretiveness as Special Assistant for National Security Affairs.
1973
Military Capabilities and American Foreign Policy
Journal Article, The Annals of the American Academy of Political Science and Social Science, issue 1, volume 406
By Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; Douglas Dillon Professor of Government; Faculty Chair, Dubai Initiative, Harvard Kennedy School
Can the availability of a rapid response capability lead the United States to intervene militarily in situations where, without those ready forces, the U.S. government would decide that military intervention was not required? Secretary of Defense McNamara said no; Senator Richard Russell said yes. After examining the basic approaches to weapons selection that led McNamara and Russell to opposite conclusions, this article reviews recent instances—Dienbien— phu, Laos, Korea, the Bay of Pigs, and Vietnam—in which the presence or absence of a ready military option may have affected decisions about the use of force. A conclusion about who had the better part of the argument provides a base for drawing some implications concerning the full costs and benefits of military capabilities and the responsibilities of the secretary of defense.
Building Capabilities: The Intelligence Community's National Security Requirement for Diversity of Language Skills and Ethnic and Cultural Understanding
Testimony
By Juliette Kayyem, Member of the Board (on leave), Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
Written Testimony of Juliette Kayyem
