ASIA
November 2009
"Beyond Optimism and Pessimism: The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation"
Working Paper
By Matthew Kroenig, Affiliate, Project on Managing the Atom
Matthew Kroenig examines the effect of the spread of nuclear weapons on international politics. He proposes a theory of nuclear proliferation that examines the differential effects of nuclear proliferation. Kroenig argues that the threat nuclear proliferation poses to a particular state depends on that state’s ability to project military power. This article contributes to our understanding of the consequences of nuclear proliferation and contains important implications for nuclear nonproliferation policy.
2009
Pride and Prejudice and Prithvis: Strategic Weapons Behavior in South Asia
Book Chapter
By Vipin Narang, Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom
Vipin Narang's chapter "Pride and Prejudice and Prithvis: Strategic Weapons Behavior in South Asia" in the book Inside Nuclear South Asia was published by Stanford University. Narang examines the ballistic missile flight-testing pattern in the region as a proxy for nuclearization and as an indicator for both states' strategic weapons decisions, attempting to clarify the variables that drive both India and Pakistan to test strategic weapons when they do.
October 22, 2009
"Russian Nuke Plans, Overkill"
Op-Ed, International Relations and Security Network
By Simon Saradzhyan, Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
The Russian military and security community's drive to expand the use of nuclear weapons in the new defense doctrine will add little value to deterring real threats, but may undermine Russia's image as a co-leader of nuclear arms control, Simon Saradzhyan comments for ISN Security Watch.
October 13, 2009
"U.S., Russia Must Lead on Arms Control"
Op-Ed, Politico
By General Brent Scowcroft, Joseph S. Nye, Harvard University Distinguished Service Professor, R. Nicholas Burns, Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Politics and Strobe Talbott
"The Nobel Peace Prize Committee cited Obama's dedication to arms control and nonproliferation when announcing last Friday his selection as this year's laureate. If he creates a positive, mutually reinforcing dynamic in the way he presents and sequences the two treaties [NPT and CTBT], it will give momentum and coherence to follow-on negotiations and the agreements that they produce."
October 13, 2009
"Obama's Nuclear Agenda"
Op-Ed, Daily News Egypt
By Joseph S. Nye, Harvard University Distinguished Service Professor
"So long as the world remains a dangerous place with several nuclear weapons states, Obama must reassure its allies about the credibility of American guarantees of extended deterrence. Otherwise, reductions that create anxieties in other countries could lead them to develop their own weapons and thus increase the number of nuclear weapons states."
Summer 2009
"The Art of China's Mediation during the Nuclear Crisis on the Korean Peninsula"
Journal Article, Asian Affairs: An American Review, issue 2, volume 36
By Jason Qian and Xiaohui (Anne) Wu, Associate, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom
Mediating regional conflict in Asia is a delicate art. It requires an acute understanding of the unique mediation culture in the region. China's mediation in the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula reveals key elements of this art and offers useful lessons. China's experience illustrates that an influential but neutral and harmony-oriented mediator is critical in the Asian context.
September 17, 2009
"Obama Made the Right Decision on Missile Defense"
Op-Ed, National Review Online
By Thomas M. Nichols, Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom
"Despite the outcry that President Obama has sold out the Europeans and caved to the Russians by cancelling missile defenses in Europe, it was the right thing to do. Those defenses were not going to work (or work well enough or soon enough to matter in any major crisis with Iran), and the diplomatic price we were paying for them was far out of proportion to any small gains we might have made by annoying the Russians or reassuring the Czechs and the Poles...."
Fall 2009
"The Paradox of Iran's Nuclear Consensus"
Journal Article, World Policy Journal, issue 3, volume 26
By Kayhan Barzegar, Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program
"...[S]ituated in what it sees as a hostile neighborhood, it is hardly surprising that the Iranian government views an independent nuclear fuel cycle as interchangeable with deterrence, rather than as a bid for building a nuclear arsenal. While building a nuclear arsenal would be a costly endeavor, risking international isolation and assuring Iran's 'pariah status,' acquiring civilian nuclear capability would afford Iran the security and psychological edge it has long sought, and at a lower cost."
September 11, 2009
Russia's Support for Zero: Tactical Move or Long-term Commitment?
Paper
By Simon Saradzhyan, Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
Although powerful contingents within the Russian leadership ascribe significant value to the various roles played by the country's nuclear arsenal, they have nonetheless enumerated consecutive or simultaneous external conditions necessary for Russia to embark on the road towards eliminating nuclear weapons. These include: universal implementation of existing nuclear arms control and nonproliferation treaties; further and irreversible cuts in U.S.-Russian nuclear arsenals; constraints on U.S. missile defense and enhancement of Russian conventional forces; and resolution of major conflicts. Subsequently, there will be a verifiable accounting of all nuclear powers' nuclear arsenals, their reduction and elimination, followed by guarantees that no country or sub-state actor would be able to develop/acquire such weapons in the future.
August 31, 2009
"Keeping Up with the Indians"
Op-Ed, Foreign Policy
By Paul Staniland, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program/Intrastate Conflict Program, 2008–2009
"Neither Americans nor Indians always understand how threatening their military strength can look to weaker countries. This dynamic is clearly at play in the case of Pakistan — Indians feel that they are self-evidently not a threat, while Americans are often baffled that Pakistani security elites care so much about India, which to the U.S. looks like a positive force for stability and democracy. At the end of the day, however, the world does not look the same from Rawalpindi and Islamabad as it does from Washington, and the U.S. needs to remember these differing goals, incentives, and fears as it pursues its vital interests in the region."
