Nuclear Issues (continued)
April 22, 2015
Op-Ed, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
By Aaron Arnold, Associate, Project on Managing the Atom
"Speaking from the White House earlier this month, President Obama announced details of a framework agreement between Iran and the P5+1—the United States, Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany—that limits Iran’s path to building a nuclear weapon over the next 10 to 15 years. Although negotiators will finalize technical details between now and the June 30 deadline, the parameters provide Iran with sanctions relief in exchange for limits on its uranium enrichment, converting its Arak heavy water reactor, limiting the number and type of centrifuges, and agreeing to intrusive inspections. Should Iran cheat or fail to uphold its end of the bargain, however, the United States and its allies reserve the right to “snap-back” into place tough economic and financial sanctions..."
April 19, 2015
Op-Ed, The New York Times
By General James Cartwright, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
We find ourselves in an increasingly risky strategic environment. The Ukrainian crisis has threatened the stability of relations between Russia and the West, including the nuclear dimension — as became apparent last month when it was reported that Russian defense officials had advised President Vladimir V. Putin to consider placing Russia’s nuclear arsenal on alert during last year’s crisis in Crimea.
Magazine or Newspaper Article, The National Interest
In the United States and Europe, many believe that the best way to prevent Russia’s resumption of its historic imperial mission is to assure the independence of Ukraine. They insist that the West must do whatever is required to stop the Kremlin from establishing direct or indirect control over that country. Otherwise, they foresee Russia reassembling the former Soviet empire and threatening all of Europe. Conversely, in Russia, many claim that while Russia is willing to recognize Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity (with the exception of Crimea), Moscow will demand no less than any other great power would on its border. Security on its western frontier requires a special relationship with Ukraine and a degree of deference expected in major powers’ spheres of influence. More specifically, Russia’s establishment sentiment holds that the country can never be secure if Ukraine joins NATO or becomes a part of a hostile Euro-Atlantic community. From their perspective, this makes Ukraine’s nonadversarial status a nonnegotiable demand for any Russia powerful enough to defend its national-security interests.
April 19, 2015
Op-Ed, The Korea Times
By Joseph S. Nye, Harvard University Distinguished Service Professor
"...Russia seems doomed to continue its decline ― an outcome that should be no cause for celebration in the West. States in decline ― think of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1914 ― tend to become less risk-averse and thus much more dangerous. In any case, a thriving Russia has more to offer the international community in the long run."
April 15, 2015
The Future of Diplomacy Project proudly hosted former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright at the Spangler Center in April through the American Secretaries of State Project, jointly directed by Harvard Business School and Harvard Law School's Program On Negotiation. Led by Faculty Directors, Professor Nicholas Burns of the Harvard Kennedy School, Professor James Sebenius of the Harvard Business School, and Professor Robert Mnookin from Harvard Law School, the program seeks to interview former Secretaries of State to gain their insights into how modern diplomacy and negotiation can be used effectively in reponse to "intractable" conflicts.
April 14, 2015
By Ariane Tabatabai, Associate, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom and Tong Zhao, Former Stanton Nuclear Security Predoctoral Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom, 2013–2014
Iran and its P5+1 negotiating partners reached a groundbreaking framework agreement on Tehran's nuclear program in early April. In this podcast, Carnegie's Tong Zhao and Ariane Tabatabai discussed the agreement, follow-up talks on technical details, and China's relations with Iran.
April 11, 2015
Op-Ed, The National Interest
"...U.S. and Iranian strategic interests align on some key issues, including the fight against ISIS and the postcombat mission era in Afghanistan....Today, Tehran is the only actor involved that has enough at stake in Iraq to be willing and able to send in ground troops, should the need arise. In Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia was one of three countries to recognize the Taliban as an official government. But Iran has and continues to want the Taliban out of the picture, as does Washington."
April 10, 2015
Op-Ed, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
By Hui Zhang, Senior Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom
"Since 1983, a closed fuel cycle has been an official element of China's nuclear energy policy. According to proponents, plutonium reprocessing and breeder reactors will allow full utilization of China’s uranium resources, drastically reduce the volume of radioactive waste that must be stored in an underground repository, and establish a way to dispense with the spent fuel accumulating in China’s reactor pools. But Beijing's attempts to develop commercially viable reprocessing facilities and breeder reactors have been afflicted with technological difficulties, serious delays, and cost overruns. At this point—especially taking into account China's ample uranium resources and its easy access to additional resources abroad—it appears very doubtful that reprocessing and fast reactors are the proper way forward for China's nuclear energy sector..."
April 2, 2015
By Matthew Bunn, Professor of Practice; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom
On April 2, 2015, Matthew Bunn presented "The Iranian Nuclear Deal: Benefits and Risks" at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. This presentation assess the benefits and risks of the Iranian deal compared to plausible alternatives.
March 23, 2015
By Laura Rockwood, Senior Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom
In 1996, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United States and the Russian Federation entered into a cooperative effort – the Trilateral Initiative – aimed at investigating the feasibility and requirements for a verification system under which the IAEA could accept and monitor nuclear warheads or nuclear warhead components pursuant to the NPT Article VI commitments of both States. Although the Initiative ended in 2002, the Model Verification Agreement produced could still serve as the basis for bilateral or multilateral agreements between the IAEA and nuclear-weapon States.
In this paper, Thomas E. Shea and Laura Rockwood examine the potential role for international verification of fissile material in relation to nuclear disarmament, what was accomplished under the Trilateral Initiative and, more importantly, what should be done now to preserve its legacy and take concrete steps towards such verification.