July 1, 2010
By Sasha Talcott, Former Director of Communications and Outreach
Olli Heinonen, deputy director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the world's leading outside expert on Iran's nuclear program, will join Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs as a Senior Fellow this fall.
July 1, 2010
Op-Ed, Russia in Global Affairs
By Simon Saradzhyan, Director, Russia Matters Project; Assistant Director, U.S.-Russia Initiative to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
A nuclear-free world will probably prove unattainable even in the longer-term. However, if Russia, the U.S. and other responsible nations take even some of the initial steps required to progress towards Global Zero, the world will become significantly safer-not only for these nations, but for the entire international community.
June 28, 2010
Op-Ed, Agence Global
By Rami Khouri, Senior Fellow, Middle East Initiative
The blending of perceived global threats with daily experienced local grievances seems to be a critical mental and political fulcrum in the making of terrorists -- whether they are successful financial analysts in New York or tribal farmers in Yemen, writes Rami Khouri.
June 26, 2010
Op-Ed, The Huffington Post
By Charles G. Cogan, Associate, International Security Program
"...[A]part from the question of a 'reliable ally,' can (or should) the U.S. carry out a campaign to win 'hearts and minds' in an alien country thousands of miles away on the other side of the world?"
Forthcoming Summer 2010
Journal Article, China Security, issue 2, volume 6
"...[T]he United States has spent several tens of billions of dollars on missile defense research-and yet China, Iran, North Korea and possibly others have continued to pursue increasingly effective long-range ballistic capabilities. If missile defenses are a deterrent, why do US competitors-to say nothing of outright enemies-seem undeterred?"
By Robert C. Stowe, Former Associate Director, Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program
In spring 2010, the Harvard Project hosted events with Ambassador Makio Miyagawa, the deputy head of Japan's delegation to the international climate talks, and Nancy Kontou, the European Commission's former head of cabinet to the Commissioner for Environment, at the Harvard Kennedy School.
The authors compare the targets and actions to which countries have committed under the Copenhagen Accord. The Accord allows participating countries to express their commitments to reduce greenhouse-gas (GHG) emissions in a variety of ways—most broadly, through economy-wide quantified emissions targets for developed countries and mitigation "actions" by developing countries. These are difficult to compare. However, even mitigation commitments that look similar can require very different levels of effort in different countries, and commitments that produce similar economic outcomes can look inequitable. These variations in effort and equity depend on historical patterns of energy use, marginal costs of greenhouse-gas abatement, choice of base year, methods for determining "business as usual" projections, and other factors.
By Matthew Bunn, Professor of Practice; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom
Matthew Bunn presented "The Prague Agenda – Why is Change So Hard?" at the “Nuclear Nonproliferation, Safeguards, and Security in the 21st Century,” Workshop at Brookhaven National Laboratory in June 2010.
June 19, 2010
By Thomas M. Nichols, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom, 2008–2011
How can large states deter small nuclear powers—and how should they respond if successfully attacked by a smaller aggressor with WMD, especially nuclear weapons? This paper considers conventional alternatives to in-kind nuclear retaliation, which may be impossible in the modern era.
Journal Article, International Security, issue 1, volume 35
Positive inducements as a strategy for dealing with regimes that challenge core norms of international behavior and the national interests of the United States ("renegade regimes") contain both promises and pitfalls. Such inducements, which include policy concessions and economic favors, can serve two main purposes: (1) arranging a beneficial quid pro quo with the other side, and (2) catalyzing, via positive engagement, a restructuring of interests and preferences within the other side's politico-economic system (such that quid pro quos become less and less necessary).