ASIA
September 17, 2009
"Obama Made the Right Decision on Missile Defense"
Op-Ed, National Review Online
By Thomas M. Nichols, Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom
"Despite the outcry that President Obama has sold out the Europeans and caved to the Russians by cancelling missile defenses in Europe, it was the right thing to do. Those defenses were not going to work (or work well enough or soon enough to matter in any major crisis with Iran), and the diplomatic price we were paying for them was far out of proportion to any small gains we might have made by annoying the Russians or reassuring the Czechs and the Poles...."
Fall 2009
"The Paradox of Iran's Nuclear Consensus"
Journal Article, World Policy Journal, issue 3, volume 26
By Kayhan Barzegar, Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program
"...[S]ituated in what it sees as a hostile neighborhood, it is hardly surprising that the Iranian government views an independent nuclear fuel cycle as interchangeable with deterrence, rather than as a bid for building a nuclear arsenal. While building a nuclear arsenal would be a costly endeavor, risking international isolation and assuring Iran's 'pariah status,' acquiring civilian nuclear capability would afford Iran the security and psychological edge it has long sought, and at a lower cost."
September 11, 2009
Russia's Support for Zero: Tactical Move or Long-term Commitment?
Paper
By Simon Saradzhyan, Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
Although powerful contingents within the Russian leadership ascribe significant value to the various roles played by the country's nuclear arsenal, they have nonetheless enumerated consecutive or simultaneous external conditions necessary for Russia to embark on the road towards eliminating nuclear weapons. These include: universal implementation of existing nuclear arms control and nonproliferation treaties; further and irreversible cuts in U.S.-Russian nuclear arsenals; constraints on U.S. missile defense and enhancement of Russian conventional forces; and resolution of major conflicts. Subsequently, there will be a verifiable accounting of all nuclear powers' nuclear arsenals, their reduction and elimination, followed by guarantees that no country or sub-state actor would be able to develop/acquire such weapons in the future.
Summer 2009
"Planning the Peace and Enforcing the Surrender: Deterrence in the Allied Occupations of Germany and Japan"
Journal Article, Journal of Interdisciplinary History, issue 1, volume 40
By Melissa Willard-Foster, Research Fellow, International Security Program
Much is known about the efforts of the United States to democratize, reconstruct, and deliver humanitarian aid to Germany and Japan after their defeat in WorldWar II. Much less is known about the willingness of the United States to use coercive tactics to deter and counter resistance to its military occupation of the two countries. Many of the scholars and politicians who consider the occupations of Germany and Japan to be models for success, largely because of their peaceful outcomes, often overlook the initial period of occupation, in which latent violence figured prominently. An understanding of this early period, however, is crucial to assessing the determinants of peace.
September 5, 2009
"Afghan Security for Afghanistan"
Op-Ed, The Huffington Post
By Eric Rosenbach, Executive Director for Research, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and Sabrina Roshan
"...[B]olstering the Afghan security forces will not only restore trust in coalition forces, but also build Afghans' confidence in the future of the country."
September 4, 2009
"Pan-European Security: Considering Russia"
Op-Ed, International Relations and Security Network
By Simon Saradzhyan, Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
The US and the EU should respond to Russia's call for a substantive discussion of Moscow's proposal for a new pan-European security treaty before the current system generates another failure on the scale of the wars in the former Yugoslavia or in South Ossetia, Simon Saradzhyan argues in ISN Security Watch.
August 31, 2009
"Keeping Up with the Indians"
Op-Ed, Foreign Policy
By Paul Staniland, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program/Intrastate Conflict Program, 2008–2009
"Neither Americans nor Indians always understand how threatening their military strength can look to weaker countries. This dynamic is clearly at play in the case of Pakistan — Indians feel that they are self-evidently not a threat, while Americans are often baffled that Pakistani security elites care so much about India, which to the U.S. looks like a positive force for stability and democracy. At the end of the day, however, the world does not look the same from Rawalpindi and Islamabad as it does from Washington, and the U.S. needs to remember these differing goals, incentives, and fears as it pursues its vital interests in the region."
August 18, 2009
"Kashmir in the AfPak Equation"
Op-Ed, Foreign Policy
By Paul Staniland, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program/Intrastate Conflict Program, 2008–2009
"...[T]he era of mass protest has returned after a grim period in which brutal, extremely violent insurgency and counterinsurgency dominated political life in Kashmir. This political mobilization is often inspired or directed by political leaders of various ideologies, but it shows that mass unrest and disaffection have not disappeared. They are now being expressed openly, and in significant numbers. While in Kashmir it is impossible to miss the depth of sentiment against Indian policy...."
August 14, 2009
"Confucius Could Help Relations Between US, China"
Op-Ed, Christian Science Monitor
By Xiaohui (Anne) Wu, Associate, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom
"To use the middle way essentially means that Washington and Beijing should not be too optimistic, or even too pessimistic, about their relations. Nor should they overestimate their joint capacity in shaping the world order. Instead, they should value collaboration, but also prepare for deviations. The guiding principle of this middle way is to always solve problems in a peaceful, mutually respectful, and pragmatic manner."
August 13, 2009
"Pakistan's Nukes are Safe. Maybe."
Op-Ed, Foreign Policy
By Vipin Narang, Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom
"...[T]he primary risk to the Pakistani Army's ability to safely secure nuclear assets in its custody would likely be during crisis scenarios — either against India or due to a perceived Western threat to the integrity of Pakistan's arsenal — that might cause Pakistan to move to a higher state of nuclear readiness. If the Army feels compelled to rapidly disperse or relocate nuclear components and loses the defensive advantage of protecting them in secure fixed locations, insider foreknowledge of movements and the loss of centralized control could increase the probability of theft or loss...."
