RUSSIA AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION
August 1, 2008
New Commission on United States Policy toward Russia
Announcement
The Belfer Center at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government and The Nixon Center are pleased to announce a new Commission on United States Policy toward Russia. The commission will be co-chaired by former Senator Gary Hart and Senator Chuck Hagel (R-NE).
Oak Ridge National Laboratory
July 2008
Expanded and Accelerated HEU Downblending: Designing Options to Serve the Interests of All Parties
Conference Paper
By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom; Co-Principal Investigator, Energy Research, Development, Demonstration, and Deployment (ERD3) Policy Project
Accelerating and expanding the downblending of highly enriched uranium (HEU) beyond the current 500-ton U.S.-Russian HEU Purchase Agreement would have significant security benefits. Russia will still have large quantities of HEU not needed for military purposes after 500 tons of HEU has been blended to low-enriched uranium (LEU). But no agreement to expand and accelerate the downblending of Russian or U.S. excess HEU will succeed unless it is structured in a way that serves the interests of all sides. Russia has made clear that it has no interest in extending the HEU Purchase Agreement on its current terms. This paper outlines key Russian, U.S., and industry interests relating to expanded and accelerated HEU downblending.
AP Photo
Summer 2008
"Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 1, volume 33
By Maria Stephan, Former Research Fellow, Intrastate Conflict Program/International Security Program, 2003-2005 and Erica Chenoweth, Associate, International Security Program
The historical record indicates that nonviolent campaigns have been more successful than armed campaigns in achieving ultimate goals in political struggles, even when used against similar opponents and in the face of repression. Nonviolent campaigns are more likely to win legitimacy, attract widespread domestic and international support, neutralize the opponent's security forces, and compel loyalty shifts among erstwhile opponent supporters than are armed campaigns, which enjoin the active support of a relatively small number of people, offer the opponent a justification for violent counterattacks, and are less likely to prompt loyalty shifts and defections. An original, aggregate data set of all known major nonviolent and violent resistance campaigns from 1900 to 2006 is used to test these claims. These dynamics are further explored in case studies of resistance campaigns in Southeast Asia that have featured periods of both violent and nonviolent resistance.
Summer 2008
"The Window of Vulnerability That Wasn’t: Soviet Military Buildup in the 1970s—A Research Note"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 1, volume 33
By Pavel Podvig
The Soviet strategic modernization program of the 1970s was one of the most consequential developments of the Cold War. Deployment of new intercontinental ballistic missiles and the dramatic increase in the number of strategic warheads in the Soviet arsenal created a sense of vulnerability in the United States that was, to a large degree, responsible for the U.S. military buildup of the late 1970s and early 1980s and the escalation of Cold War tensions during that period. U.S. assessments concluded that the Soviet Union was seeking to achieve a capability to fight and win a nuclear war. Estimates of missile accu¬racy and silo hardness provided by the U.S. intelligence community led many in the United States to conclude that the Soviet Union was building a strategic missile force capable of destroying most U.S. missiles in a counterforce strike and of surviving a subsequent nuclear exchange. Soviet archival documents that have recently become available demonstrate that this conclusion was wrong. The U.S. estimates substantially overestimated the accuracy of the Soviet Union's missiles and the degree of silo reinforcement. As the data demonstrate, the Soviet missile force did not have the capability to launch a successful first strike. Moreover, the data strongly suggest that the Soviet Union never attempted to acquire a first-strike capability, concentrating instead on strategies based on retaliation.
June 2008
100 Grams (and Counting...): Notes from the Nuclear Underworld
Report
This report on the 2006 seizure of weapon-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU) in Georgia, by journalist Michael Bronner, provides new insights on both nuclear smugglers and those trying to stop them.
July/August 2008
"Separatism's Final Country"
Journal Article, Foreign Affairs, issue 4, volume 87
By Richard N. Rosecrance, Adjunct Professor; Senior Fellow, International Security Program; Director, Project on U.S.-China Relations and Arthur A. Stein
"Muller argues that ethnonationalism is the wave of the future and will result in more and more independent states, but this is not likely. One of the most destabilizing ideas throughout human history has been that every separately defined cultural unit should have its own state. Endless disruption and political introversion would follow an attempt to realize such a goal. Woodrow Wilson gave an impetus to further state creation when he argued for "national self-determination" as a means of preventing more nationalist conflict, which he believed was a cause of World War I...."
AP Photo
June 13, 2008
Reinforcing the Global Nuclear Order: The Role of the IAEA
Memorandum
By Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; Douglas Dillon Professor of Government; Faculty Chair, Dubai Initiative, Harvard Kennedy School and Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom; Co-Principal Investigator, Energy Research, Development, Demonstration, and Deployment (ERD3) Policy Project
The high-level Commission of Eminent Persons advising the International Atomic Energy Agency concluded that meeting the current nuclear challenges and seizing the current opportunities will require a fundamentally reinvigorated global nuclear order, featuring a strengthened IAEA with "additional authority, resources, personnel, and technology." Without a "bold agenda" of steps to strengthen the nuclear order, the Commission warned that there were real risks that terrorists might get a nuclear bomb, that a nuclear accident might occur, or that, as the UN High-Level Panel warned, the world could suffer "a cascade of nuclear proliferation." Preventing such events, the Commission emphasized, is essential for nuclear energy to grow enough to contribute to mitigating climate change, making safety, security, and nonproliferation essential foundations for nuclear energy's future.
May 5-6, 2008
"Safety, Security, Safeguards: Enabling Nuclear Energy Growth"
Presentation
By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom; Co-Principal Investigator, Energy Research, Development, Demonstration, and Deployment (ERD3) Policy Project
Matthew Bunn presented "Safety, Security, Safeguards: Enabling Nuclear Energy Growth" to the Global Nuclear Future Workshop at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences Cambridge, Mass.
May 6, 2008
"Turkmenistan under Niyazov and Berdymukhammedov"
In the News
By Robert Rotberg, Director, Program on Intrastate Conflict and Conflict Resolution
A monument of Turkmenistan’s former autocratic ruler, Saparmurat Niyazov, will be removed from the center of the country’s capital, the New York Times reported on Monday, May 5, 2008. The removal was ordered by Turkmenistan’s current president, Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov. What seems to be a symbolic move away from the repression that has plagued Turkmenistan is more likely the removal of one autocratic legacy to make room for another.
April 2008
"Should and Can the FMCT Be Effectively Verified?"
Journal Article, INESAP Information Bulletin, issue 28
By Hui Zhang, Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom
Hui Zhang argues that an effective universal Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) would make an important contribution to nuclear disarmament, the nonproliferation regime, and the prevention of nuclear terrorism. However, such a FMCT must have a credible verification regime. Dr. Zhang suggests that it should be technically feasible to establish an effectively verifiable FMCT at a reasonable cost, while protecting national security secrets.
